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My dissertation investigates teachers’ thinking within that “oscillating place of 
difference” that is the classroom. I propose that teachers think and see differently in the 
classroom because they have practiced, like travelers, the dynamic thinking which makes them 
open to novelty, attentive to difference, reflective wayfarers on the paths of the world. I offer a 
threefold articulation of teaching into thinking, traveling and philosophizing . My guiding figure 
is that of teacher as traveler. 
I focus on the teacher’s way of seeing the familiar and the unfamiliar in the classroom. 
Reliance on teaching routines is considered as a sign of the need for the teacher to feel at  home 
in the classroom, and as a response to the inherent uncertainty of the educational experience. 
Dewey’s conception of reflective thinking is put at work to explain teachers thinking in the 
classroom: reflection is a twofold movement of the mind that at first focuses on the given 
particular of the experience, and that also expands and opens up the given to new possible 
interpretations. 
 The third chapter proposes to historicize the metaphor of teacher as traveler by 
considering Graeco-Roman thinking about travel and movement in relation to knowledge and 
wisdom. I consider the thesis that traveling is conducive to learning and wisdom. Herodotus 
explicitly connects travel to knowledge. The presence of itinerant teachers in Ancient Greece 
seems to reinforce this connection, as does the mythological representation of the ideal teacher as 
the centaur Chiron. I then posit an antithetical idea: that traveling be counterproductive because 
  
in travel the person is exposed to distraction, loss of focus, fragmentation. This antithesis is 
endorsed  by Seneca’s Epistles to Lucilius.  
The dissertation moves to a  re-examination of the figure of teacher as traveler  in relation 
to the idea of home. The traveler reaches out and explores novelty and alterity in a meaning-
making relation to where she is from. Similarly, the teacher thinks in the classroom by being 
attentive to newness and difference while keeping in mind the home or familiar: her routines, her 
curriculum, her tradition  
Montaigne’s humanistic philosophizing is considered in its constitutive dynamism.  The 
way to the knowledge of home-- and the wisdom deriving from it-- passes through the encounter 
with the Other, be it the indigenous inhabitant of the new world, or the neighboring country, or a 
different language. Like a traveler, a teacher retains her freedom to move and to chose the 
direction to her steps, and carries the necessary provisions and supplies: enough to get around, 
but not too many to weigh her down. The teacher as traveler can read the world of experience, 
can read her discipline, and can read her students by paying attention and knowing their pace.  
The encounters that are at the heart of the educational experience, between teachers, 
students, works and things of the world, all concur to exercise the mind of a traveler: a mind that 
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Chapter 1. Introduction: Toward a Re-imagining of Teaching 
 
1.Introduction 
My study is a philosophical inquiry into teaching and into the kind of thinking that is at 
work in teaching.  Though teaching is an activity in which everyone has engaged occasionally at 
one time or another, I am interested in studying what is done by those who make of teaching in 
formal settings a significant part of their existence (teachers and professors). I hypothesize that, 
regardless of the subject-matter taught, teaching involves a reflective mode of thinking that is 
akin to philosophical thinking. There is a particular quality to teachers' thinking that enables 
them to navigate the challenging uncertainty of the terrain where teaching and learning take 
place.  I am interested in exploring this quality and how it shall be sustained through the practice 
of philosophical thinking. 
Being a teacher myself, I have often dealt with the intuition that the secret of what goes 
on in schools is rarely grappled with in the description of teaching skills or in the evaluation of 
teachers' and schools' performances. Being an educator of future teachers, I worry that most of 
what we deem useful for prospective teachers to learn does not touch on this doubtlessly present 
yet elusive quality of thinking. Being a philosopher, I nurture a hope that philosophical thinking 
may concur to the cultivation of such a disposition. I am fascinated by what I see at work in the 
classroom: the constant exercise of balancing and dealing with the unforeseen as it comes up, by 
this discernible but perhaps un-measurable disposition to switch frames of reference and to move 




My study aims at unearthing what makes teachers irreplaceable in schools of any level, 
from pre-k to universities. There is something that teachers and only teachers do: intentional, 
thoughtful, artful teaching to students about subject matter. No software, parent, self-help book 
can do it this way. What makes teachers irreplaceable, their secret, is undeniably there: yet it 
eludes definitions.  
What teachers do in regard to thinking discloses some defining traits of the educational 
experience. I am after something that is hard to grapple with as it cannot be ever abstracted and 
considered in se. Because I take teaching to be situated (i.e.: it pertains to a particular 
experienced combination of circumstances) and situational (i.e.: not only descriptively it takes 
place in a situation, but it cannot be thought of without a relation to a situation), I consider it 
inherently related to the context in which it takes place. This context is what in my research I 
refer to as “the classroom”: the physical space shared by students and teacher in which education 
happens. The classroom can be anywhere: a playground, a porch, an agora, a soccer field, a café. 
But it needs to be somewhere, in a common space within whose boundaries individuals 
encounter.  
A classroom is the intersection of worlds. Every time a teacher enters her classroom, she 
ventures in a territory that is and stays only partially known to her. In this territory, however, she 
will perform her daily teaching through a constant interpretation and mediation of countless 
opposing or diverse needs, expectations, duties and tasks. The classroom space is a place of 
encounters, battles, negotiation of identities. It is where boundaries are set and challenged, in an 
ongoing movement which encompasses sameness and difference of students, teachers, and 




Imagining and anticipating how to build a provisional sense of direction, how to chose 
where to stand, and maybe even simply how to stand in this space, is a daunting endeavor. Just 
as a traveler may venture in a newly discovered land, with both hopeful expectation, and an 
anticipation that accepted frames of reference may be challenged, the teacher enters  the 
educational space as an unpredictable frontier. 
Because teaching is in the situation, a consideration of the space in which it occurs will 
provide elements to start sketching that situated dynamic thinking that I propose characterizes it. 
Within the educational space, the teacher occupies a place, a position from which she exercises 
her thinking and teaching. In my next section, I examine different conceptions of the teacher’s 
place, resulting in an idea of  “oscillating space of difference” that will serve as backdrop for the 
whole inquiry.  
 
2.What is the teacher’s place in the educational space? 
An inquiry into the teacher’s place shall begin by considering the immediate multivocity 
of the question. The term place  assumes two different, however strongly related, meanings: 
initially it indicates a physical position, where the teacher’s body is primarily situated. At the 
very same time, place comes to indicate also a non-physical position, the site of thoughts, 
emotions and in general of dispositions of the mind where the teacher’s body is situated 
(Epstein-Jannai, 2001). The teacher feels her place as extremely personal, private, subjective and 
emotional, yet this uniqueness is transferable to others in the very act of teaching.  
Teaching has an oxymoric quality  due to the fact that it  inhabits the tension  between at 
least two different dimensions, be it the objective-subjective, or the theory-practice, or the 




both students and knowledge. Epstein-Jannai writes: "I am pointing to a specific mental, logical, 
and emotional position, in relation to a wide range of issues (intrapersonal, but most strongly 
interpersonal), which structures the teaching situation in such a way as to permit students' 
personal construction of knowledge and not only knowledge repetition" (p.6).  
I will temporarily accept the idea that  teaching could be the  standpoint from which the 
teacher connects to student learning. Learning is understood, in agreement with a long tradition, 
as an inquiry that gives shape to the path on which one enters life: an existential "path of 
stepping into the world"(p. 8). Learning is the  process of making sense of the world and of one's 
life in it. So understood, learning is not only and not primarily about gathering information: 
rather it is a complex enterprise of inquiry into experience with the finality of searching its 
meaning. The teacher's position in relation to her students' learning needs then to be expression 
of her stand towards learning, knowledge and meaning.  
From this standpoint, the preoccupation with the quality of knowledge is  more relevant 
than the one  with the objects of learning. Hence, the teacher's teaching can be situated in the 
"place of doubt" (p.9): learning takes place when perplexity about the world, and our path in it, is 
accepted and considered inherent to the inquiry of learning itself. This leads the author to suggest 
that "when the teacher is in the place where teaching takes place, the possibility of absolute 
knowledge articulated as scientific and precise knowledge, (...) no longer exists."(p.9)   
The teacher, in order to set conditions for teaching and learning to happen, has to be 
guarded against the seductions of perfect knowledge and dogmatism. She knows that quest for 
knowledge can be talked about in terms of lack of it. Socratic irony as dialogical manifestation of 
doubt is part of a discoursive strategy that allows teaching and learning to take place. Irony 




Epstein-Jannai conceptualizes irony as the teacher's place in the text of the class. Irony as a 
matter of fact describes "teaching's dual nature: to be at the real moment of doing, inside and 
outside the institutionalized framework"(p.12). The ironic stance showcases the teacher’s ability 
to shift her positions from inside to outside the given situation. For the purposes of my inquiry, 
this insight is suggestive of the hypothesis that teaching implies the capacity to swing positions 
or places in reference to a common shared space. 
The location of education can be viewed as a space of opening  between teachers and 
students. Gert  Biesta (2004 ) writes "This gap is a necessary condition for communication- and 
hence education- to take place. A pedagogy of relation should, therefore, acknowledge and 
affirm the uncertainties and risks and the possibilities that are at stake in this gap" (p.11).  In-
between the actors of the educational experience, a space is opened which constitutes the relation 
itself. If there were no difference, there would be no distance, and  no movement, therefore the 
relation could not take place. Without difference, no learning is possible, thus no education. This 
space in between is unrepresentable, and elusive: "the unrepresentability of what makes 
education possible, rather, highlights the performative nature of the process of education, that is, 
the fact that education exists only in and through the communicative interaction between the 
teacher and the learner"(p.21). 
 Biesta contributes to clarify that the in-between, the space that makes education possible, 
structures processes of thought, meaning and communication. When a teacher abandons "the safe 
side of knowledge" (Anders Saefstrom, 2003), her assigned place from which she could exert her 
role of depositary of knowledge and power, she is not abandoning thinking; rather, she is moving 




related qualifies this space, more than the specificity of the things that are put in relation 
(teachers, students, curriculum, institution, traditions and so on).  
This space can be understood as a middle ground. Middle grounds are difficult to theorize 
because they do not succumb to the dichotomies we rely upon so promptly (cfr. Oyler and 
Becker, 1997). "Middle grounds have a bad name in professional philosophy. Too often, 
occupying such a position is condemned as a refusal to take a stand, a plea for undecidibility and 
indifferent tolerance, a desire to have things both- or all-ways, hence a feeble form of fence 
sitting"(Code,1991, p. 318). Inhabiting the middle ground of teaching and learning requires that 
the teacher gives up her side of the metaphorical fence and practices the art of balancing in 
precarious equilibrium.  
When the classroom is considered, fences are multiple as there are always more than two 
sides at play; thus requiring an extraordinary ability to move and navigate the uneven territory 
that is continuously re-described by the emergence of new events and factors. The idea of a 
middle ground could indeed evoke a space in which the two opposing sides are neutralized 
through a lukewarm lack of involvement.   
As my inquiry moves, I need to clarify that in my conception, the educational space 
cannot be marked by any one couple of opposing factors. An interpretation of it in terms of 
dichotomies risks a fundamental mistake: that of flattening the constant variability of its 
components. By reducing the dynamic complexity of this middle ground, we superimpose a 
static, simplified scheme on the alive ever moving experience of the classroom. The spatial 





It is with a similar concern that Doris Santoro (2008) considers the dichotomy instituted 
between teacher-centered and student-centered pedagogy from a radical questioning of the 
spatial metaphor on which those two models are constructed. She shows that the margin-center 
schema  functions differently depending on the general framework of reference. In feminist 
theories, this schema serves "to name and criticize a central locus of power while at the same 
time illuminating the actual conditions of those who reside at the margins"(p.314). This 
metaphor is a tool to describe and to offer an interpretation of the classroom situation. When this 
same schema is deployed in a prescriptive way, a diagnose of the situation in terms of teacher-
centred-ness implies that the prescripted cure for this situation be reversing it to a situation of 
student-centred-ness.   
Santoro with great efficacy shows that the student-centered pedagogy has the undesirable 
outcome to place teachers at the margins of the classroom experience. The marginalized teacher 
exerts a "pedagogy of disappearance"(p.316), "predicated on the notion of invisible labor" 
(p.317): she gives up expertise and her capacity to have any influence on the classroom. 
Responsibilities are abdicated though with the best of intentions, and when professional 
responsibility is enacted, this takes place with a sense of guilt on the teacher's side. Santoro 
suggests that the disappearance of the teacher "reinstates outdated prescriptions of ‘women's 
proper place’ based on bourgeois ideals of domesticity "(p.317). If applying a student-centered 
pedagogy posits the teacher in a marginal position, then, the author writes, "the marginalization 
of teachers should not be less problematic then the marginalization of students"(p.317).  
The problem lies in the use of this margin-center spatial metaphor. When this metaphor is 
accepted, one of the two protagonists of the classroom experience, either the teacher or the 




closer look at this conundrum we realize that the issue is twofold: firstly, it operates on the idea 
that there are proper places, fixed positions to be occupied by one role. Secondly, this particular 
metaphor implies that the margins and the center never meet.  Santoro explains: "The margin-
center schema leaves little room for the dynamic negotiated space required for the multiple, 
shifting positions involved in teaching and learning relations. When a teaching position is taken 
as a static, self-evident location, (...) the multiple purposes practices and meanings available in 
various approaches to teaching are diminished."(p.314).  
Santoro is rightly guarded against the mechanism of reversal that simply repositions 
excess of power from one opposite to the other. She urges for a creative recovery of a different 
spatial metaphor that allows for thinking the educational experience without giving in to the 
exclusionary logic of the margin-center schema. She proposes to consider the concept of "in-
between" as an essential pedagogical concept that offers "a more inhabitable spatial metaphor for 
teaching and learning relations"(p.329). She  suggests that the "in-between", as a space of 
movement that makes the relation possible, opens the potentiality coming from the fact that 
entities in relation are not fixed in a specific location. Such openness to potentiality clearly 
applies to the educational relation as well: "The in-between provides a space where the positions 
of all involved in a relation have the capacity to change through the relation, and, indeed, must 
change if a relation is said to truly take place. The in-between constitutes the teaching and 
learning relation acknowledging the distance between teachers, students and their objects of 
study as well as the space for movement that should ensue as a result of learning."(p.330)   
What goes on in an educational relationship, as Santoro phrases it, is often 
oversimplified. The "transmission approach" which assumes teachers to know exactly where 




how a static and somehow motionless understanding of the educational relation betrays the 
relation itself. What makes the relation such is its dynamic quality. Being in a relation means 
understanding that the poles in relation keep changing and moving: they cannot be fixed down to 
one single identifiable position. Identities are not settled: they are there to be disrupted, if not 
sistematically, at least as a possibility for the educational relationship (p.331).  
An " oscillating space of difference" is compounded within the educational 
relationship.  Santoro writes:  "But it is in its dynamism that the in-between exceeds static 
representation. Dynamic relations call for conceiving of teachers work as necessarily mobile. 
Rather than attempting to locate the proper or best place for good teachers, we will need to 
investigate movement within the space for good teaching" (p.332).  
Before taking on the invitation to explore the teachers’ movement within the oscillating 
space of difference, I wish to comment on the implications of accepting this description for ways 
of thinking about the educational experience in general. This hardly definable ground: the "in-
between" or " middle ground", recurs in the different theorizations of teacher's positioning (Oyler 
and Becker, 1997, Espstein-Jannai,2001, Biesta, 2004, Santoro, 2008).  If there is an urgency to 
leave behind conceptual oppositions that do not restitute the fullness of what goes on in the 
classroom, such urgency however collides with the difficulty of thinking otherwise about 
teaching.  Thinking in relation to a spatial quality can spread out some folds of the experience of 
thinking itself, though it needs to be asked if the use of the concept of "place" is helpful for this, 
or if this concept on the contrary contributes to "solidify" the experience changing it to 
something different. On this I agree with Oyler and Becker (1997) when they comment: 
From the title of our article onward, we have used a metaphor of "places". Although this 
metaphor has helped us to develop and articulate our thoughts, we are aware of some 
dangers. First, it helps us to think of the positions we encounter as something we can 




find a new territory not connected with this older places. Second, this metaphor in some 
way works to homogenize and reify. It helps make the positions we counter seem to be 
static frozen entities, too stable to be the living positions of actors in the field of real 
interactions. (p.466)  
 
    The very use of spatial metaphors risks to reduplicate that abstractive placelessness we 
were trying to avoid. But it seems impossible to be loyal to the experience of thinking and 
thinking about teaching without appealing to spatial metaphors. Perhaps this  conundrum shall be 
maintained in its tension. In order to do this, we need to operate a reversal of the order in which 
we tend to think of thinking.  
Taking "place" as a metaphor implies that there is a moment in which thinking is not in 
place. Thinking takes place out of the horizon of our experience, and then we transfer this 
original experience to some spatial dimensions so that we can metaphorically speak of it. If the 
spatial metaphor is a secondary derived trait of the experience of thinking, then there is 
something like "absolute thinking" or maybe an "absolute thinker" before the act of thinking 
itself. Similarly, if there is a teaching before its spatial conditions, then we are allowed to 
imagine something like a teacher before teaching,  an absolute teacher who does not need to 
enter the classroom, or whose entrance in the classroom is merely an application of real teaching 
taking place aloof.  
It is difficult to even think about thinking unless we think of it from a position, maybe 
swinging between two or among many positions. Thinking is inherently positional. That can be a 
reason why any metaphorical take on thinking leaves us unsatisfied and in danger of betraying 
our experience of it: because metaphor is not a derivative version, a 'translation " in spatial terms 
of what goes on elsewhere, but it is the very place in which thinking, indeed, takes place. To this, 
I think, hint the scholars that seem to run into the misty idea of  "in-between-space" or "middle-




As Montaigne writes, for the mind to be everywhere is like to be nowhere. Much of 
educational theory places teachers’ thinking in the everywhere of generalized models to be 
applied, or in the nowhere of disappearance. The teacher’s mind is not everywhere and is not no-
where: it moves in the problematic though alluring zone in-between, within which teachers think 
of themselves as in oscillating constant movement.  
My study moves from this preparatory setting to an inquiry in the movement within the 
educational space. In doing so, I take on Santoro’s concluding suggestion that “rather than 
attempting to locate the proper or best place for good teachers, we will need to investigate 
movement within the space for good teaching" (p.332). Unknown territory whose map is perhaps 
undrawable, the space of teaching and learning is nevertheless that which teachers need to 
inhabit. How to move within this space, is something to be further thought about.  
 
3. Methodology of the study 
The question about methods assumes particular relevance in preparation to an inquiry, as 
mine, that plans to take on the possibility of philosophically rethinking  teaching in today’s 
world.  The election of a method depends on the epistemology informing  the inquiry that is 
about to start. When teaching is considered, two competing models based on diverging 
conceptions of reason and thinking can be seen at play: from one side, a rational method 
comprising universal rules that can ensure valid knowledge. On the other side, a reasonable 
method in which argumentations carry conviction with a force related to local knowledge of 
concrete events, and not to universal, abstract rationality (cfr. Toulmin, 2001, p. 84 and ff).   I 
incline toward a method of reasonableness not because I believe it is possible to select one 




more apt to the exploration of the experience of teaching. The model  I chose to adopt relies on 
informal or situational logic that uses metaphors, poetic imagination and non deductive thought. 
To rely on metaphorical descriptions in order to gain a deeper understanding of what 
teachers do is to acknowledge that reasoning and logic are informed by ways of imaginative 
rationality.  David Hansen (2004) writes: "Teaching constitutes at one and the same time an idea 
and a practice that we can characterize, in the sense of describing the character of the work much 
as we find ourselves describing the character of painting, fishing, raising a family or being in 
love. In this time-honored, evidently permanent aspect of human sense-making, terms of art and 
metaphor are invaluable vehicles of insight and understanding." (p.127). An exploration of the  
occurrence of forms of thought in images about teaching allows for insight and understanding of 
teaching because of the relation between the images and the theory such images want to 
illustrate.  
This relation is one of solidarity but it also searches  for points of tension within the 
theory. Images and metaphors are neither completely heterogeneous nor isomorphous with the 
body of concepts they want to translate (cfr. Le Doeuff, 1989, pp. 3-20) Therefore, looking at 
images provides a unique perspective on teaching. Images do not reduplicate the concept they 
want to convey, but in conveying the concept they complicate it and provide a whole new set of 
questions and connections about the theoretical enterprise in which they are at work.   
The guiding image for my study is the teacher as traveler.  This image refracts ideas of 
movement, exploration, and translation.  And as even images of travelers refuse to stay still, this 
guide conducts me between different realms of experience, across disciplinary borders and in 




 In this light, my proposed argument will be developed through a variety of approaches.  I 
engage in deep exegetic reading of chosen authors of reference (Italo Calvino, Dewey, 
Herodotus, Seneca, Montaigne), which inform my conversation with other sources from the 
world of educational scholarship, of historiography, and literary theory. Conceptual analysis 
helps me clarify and articulate the thinking I develop in this multi-voice conversation. Megan 
Laverty (2010) writes: “Judgments about our concepts are inescapably circular: individuals have 
no choice but to trust the received meaning of concepts, while seeking opportunities to alter 
them.” She continues, “conceptual understanding is experienced as a task to be undertaken or, 
alternatively, as an obligation to be fulfilled—it is, if you like, our distinctly human vocation”. 
She suggests that we cannot simply accepts concepts and ideas as an inherited given, rather, we 
must “take [them] up and make them fully and uniquely [our]own.” (p.29). For me, the call to 
“take greater responsibility for our conceptual understanding” (p.20) is heeded to with work on 
figures and ideas in conversation with works of my inherited tradition.  
At first glance revisiting works of philosophy and literature, some of which   written 
many centuries ago, may seem removed from the project of thinking about the teacher today. 
Nonetheless, I will show that those works can assist us in making sense --perhaps a new sense-- 




4. Trajectory of the dissertation 
 
After this introduction, I start my inquiry by posing a question about the irreplaceability 




experience? They think and see differently in the classroom because they have practiced, like 
travelers, that dynamic thinking which makes them open to novelty, attentive to difference, 
reflective wayfarers on the paths of the world.  
The second chapter aims at instituting the figure of the teacher as a traveler. Substance to 
this figure is found in the interpretation of a work of literature, The Invisible Cities by Italo 
Calvino. I offer a reading of the relationship between the two characters of the book, Marco Polo 
the explorer and Kublai Kahn the emperor to whom Marco reports, as an educational 
relationship. Marco Polo is a traveler, a student of the world. For this reason, I uphold, he is a 
teacher to the emperor.  
 My interpretation of Marco Polo as a teacher unfolds into a second section of the chapter 
in which I undertake a conceptual exploration of “being a teacher”. This exploration  focuses on 
the teacher’s way of seeing the familiar and the unfamiliar in the classroom. Reliance on 
teaching routines is considered as a sign of the need for the teacher to feel at  home in the 
classroom, and as a response to the inherent uncertainty of the educational experience. Routines 
when adopted with flexibility can indeed leave an open space for reflective thinking about the 
present situation.  
Dewey’s conception of reflective thinking is put at work to explain teachers thinking in 
the classroom: reflection is a twofold movement of the mind that at first focuses on the given 
particular of the experience, and that also expands and opens up the given to new possible 
interpretations. The reflective wayfarer (Dewey, 1933, p.13) comes to signify the thinker for 
whom reflection “is the method of the educational experience” (Dewey, 1916, p.163).   
The third chapter proposes to historicize the metaphor of teacher as traveler by 




wisdom. The organization of the chapter consists in two moments: in the first, I posit the thesis 
that traveling is conducive to learning and wisdom. Consequently, those who teach enact some 
form of traveling because it is through this outward movement that they have gathered what they 
can now teach. Herodotus explicitly connects travel to knowledge. The presence of itinerant 
teachers in Ancient Greece seems to reinforce this connection, as does the mythological 
representation of the ideal teacher as the centaur Chiron.  
In the second part, I posit an antithetical idea: that traveling be counterproductive because 
in travel the person is exposed to distraction, loss of focus, fragmentation. Seneca’s Epistles to 
Lucilius well embody the sentiment that the only advisable movement to the person seeking 
wisdom is the straight forward path of the philosophical discipline. Seneca’s point deserves 
consideration because it encapsulates two objections that are heard in many other versions: one, 
that only finalized movement is useful and productive. Two,  that all is needed to reach wisdom 
and thus happiness is at hand in one’s home. Any movement of reaching out ends up spoiling 
this ideal of domestic felicity as it contaminates it. “Why would you want or need a teacher to 
travel?” Seneca seems to ask, “Let her go out in the world, and she will get lost, while all she 
needs to know is very close by: in the walled space of her lesson plan”. Seneca’s point is well put 
and it signals the need for my inquiry to rearticulate and deepen the connection between teaching 
and traveling that I have initially affirmed.  
The reexamination passes through the idea of home: a clarification of the presence and 
role of the home in the movement of the traveler contributes to state that the connection between 
teaching and traveling is actually threefold because it requires philosophizing as well. The 
traveler reaches out and explores novelty and alterity in a meaning-making relation to where she 




difference while  keeping in mind the home or familiar: her routines, her curriculum, her 
tradition.  In the trajectory of my inquiry, the threefold articulation of teaching into thinking, 
traveling and philosophizing takes   place through a reading of Montaigne’s Essays and Journal 
of Travel to Italy.   
The fourth and fifth chapters are dedicated to the formulation of a synthesis between the 
two aforementioned positions. Montaigne’s humanistic philosophizing is considered in its 
constitutive dynamism. His work shows that travel is conducive to learning and wisdom when it 
is done well. Chapter four starts by considering (without any pretense at exhaustiveness) some 
historical and cultural traits of Early Modernity, such as the development of Humanism, the 
introduction of the printing press and more importantly the geographic discoveries. Against this 
background, I reformulate the alternative between the idea that the experience of the world is 
beneficial to education, and the idea that the way to education is focused knowledge of one’s 
own.  
Within an early modern frame, this alternative becomes an option between road and 
book. Montaigne assists in seeing that the world is not opposed to, but it is truly the way to gain 
knowledge of the self. In the Renaissance, world came to indicate something different and new: a 
larger known extension of ocean and lands inhabited by new peoples. Montaigne shows that the 
way to the knowledge of home-- and the wisdom deriving from it—passes through the encounter 
with the Other, be it the indigenous inhabitant of the new world, or the neighboring country, or a 
different language. He also shows that no travel is possible if one does not carry her books with 
her: metaphorically suggesting that the relation to otherness and novelty is sustained by a relation 




Chapter five continues the analysis and connects it more explicitly to themes of teaching 
and learning. Montaigne’s main writings on education (I:25, and I:26) are read through some of 
the writings on the New World (I:31 and III:6). The chapter outlines education as the lifelong 
preparation of more embracing ways of looking and thinking, open to the novelty and difference 
of the experience, preparation carried out in the development of judgment. The teacher’s 
judgment is developed when her freedom of movement and thought is preserved and valued. A 
teacher with a “well formed” mind is the opposite of the pedantic tutor who accumulates 
knowledge without ever owning it, showing a “dependent and mendicant ability” (I; 25, p.101).  
Like a traveler, a teacher retains her freedom to move and to chose the direction to her 
steps, and carries the necessary provisions and supplies: enough to get around, but not too many 
to weigh her down. The teacher traveler attends to things of the world and to the words that say 
them. The parallelism put forth by Montaigne between traveling and reading allows for an idea 
of reflectivity as capacity to judge, in a combination of artistic ability with a relational concern. 
The teacher as traveler can read the world of experience, can read her discipline, and can read 
her  students by paying attention and knowing their pace (I:26, p.110).  
The encounters that are at the heart of the educational experience, between teachers, 
students, works and things of the world, all concur to make the mind of a traveler: a mind that 
finds itself “ at home” in the world. 
 
5. Conclusion  
I want to set off  my dissertation with the story of a  traveler. This story generates many 




It is a story about a sixteen year old Dutch schoolgirl who sailed around the world alone: 
Laura Dekker who completed her 518 days journey arriving in Sint Marteen on the 21st of  
January 2012. She is the youngest solo sailor to circumnavigate the globe, having travelled 
27,000 nautical miles in a 38-ft yacht named Guppy. Laura, who was born on a sailing a boat in 
the port of Whangarei, New Zealand during a seven-year trip by her parents, is a smart, 
determined girl who has always known she would be a sailor. Now that her big adventure is at 
the end, she has a book project and a film is being made about her.  She writes on her blog1: 
 Thanks a lot for all the title suggestions for my book. In the meantime I've made 
my decision and will let everyone know when I'm at the Hiswa boat show in Holland. I 
am still enjoying Bonaire for a few more days before heading out into the cold--with the 
plane this time. I took a two day break from writing my book and went sailing with my 
minicat. There's been a lot of wind the past few days so that was great fun. Writing the 
book is a lot of fun too, reading all the pieces I wrote along the way and thinking about it 
all really makes me wanna leave again, or at least most of the time… 
Laura 3.1.2012 
  
Laura’s voyage is over. Now that her adventure is finished, she seems intentioned to go 
back to school and complete her high school degree. Since Laura is sixteen now she has no 
longer an obligation to attend school. Nevertheless, she has an obligation by law to receive a 
graduation before her eighteenth birthday. The solo sailor reported that the Dutch social services 
have tried their best to stop her from pursuing her dream2. A newspaper article3 explains that “a 
Dutch court originally blocked her voyage and only permitted her to set off after she bought a 
bigger, sturdier boat than the one she originally planned to use; fitted it with advanced navigation 
and radar equipment; enrolled in a special correspondence school; and took courses in first aid 
and coping with sleep deprivation.” Even after having won the right to sail, Laura still felt that 




she and her family were being scrutinized by the Dutch authorities. During her journey, her 
father was summoned by truancy officers because the schoolgirl had failed to complete her 
homework on time. A journalist commented4: “ and yet it is perhaps no surprise that the 
authorities might have something to say about a 14-year-old girl dropping out of school to go off 
round the world on a boat of her own”. 
Laura’s story is of great interest for me as I am about to develop my inquiry. She is a 
young, gifted child who has spent nearly two years at sea by herself. For this, her family has 
been suspected of neglecting her education. How are we to think about this case? Have the Dutch 
social services “tried to stop her from pursuing her dreams?” Has Laura been denied a 
fundamental right by leaving school and embarking in her adventure?   
This is quite puzzling for me. If from one side, I see the concern of the social services, on 
the other I am also drawn by the courage and strength of this girl. While I have not found much 
commentary on the educational questions presented by this case, one5 of the rare news articles 
that commented on it titles: “School Books on Board”. 
 I find the image of Laura reading books on the long solo voyage quite moving. She 
seems to have in her ways embodied a little bit of what Montaigne meant when he said “I do not 
travel without books”. A picture she posted on her blog would also be telling: it is at first view a 
silly Winter Holiday picture. It represents a Santa hat on a plastic globe, held by Laura’s hand, 
on the background the ocean. Jean II de Gourmont’ s engraving “Congnois toy toy-mesme” 
(1562, figure 3) represents something similar in its structure: a character with a headgear, whose 
head is in fact a globe.  
                                                4	  (BBC News 21 January 2012, Anna Holligan).  	  





Laura Dekker may be the voyager that comprises knowledge of the world with 
knowledge of the self.  I would love to have her as my student. And here perhaps lies the 
problem with this story and figure. When I see her on her boat, I cannot stop thinking she is a 
very young adventurer. Where is her teacher? Is there place for a teacher on Laura’s boat? If we 
accept that Laura had a right to substitute her (compulsory) schooling with a two year solo 







Chapter 2  
1. Introduction 
This chapter considers the question: What do teachers do that makes them irreplaceable 
in the classroom? They “ think differently” because they “see differently”. I maintain that 
teachers’ capacity to think within the educational space of difference is deeply connected with 
philosophical practices of attention and movement. In this chapter, an opening section presents a 
literary pair from Italo Calvino’s Invisible Cities: Kublai Khan the emperor and Marco Polo the 
explorer and ambassador. The relation between the two is framed as an educational relationship 
in which Marco Polo teaches his student Kublai. In the narrative, most elements of my proposed 
way of understanding the teacher as traveler are highlighted and discussed. I leave this section 
holding my guiding metaphor as it emerges from my reading of the story.  
The ensuing section articulates the idea that teachers think differently in the classroom. 
The appraisal of teachers’ special mode of vision is measured against a conception of expertise, 
in favor of an interpretation that views teachers as “at home” in the classroom. The sense of 
familiarity will not be separated from the experience of foreignness, surprise, and uncertainty 
that qualifies the life of the school. The role of routines in teaching is examined as a case in 
which the process of familiarization can put in the shadows teachers’ element of thinking. 
Reflectivity is considered as the way of thinking enacted by teachers when they  decide 
according to the situation  instead of following predetermined sequences of action. In it, intuition 
and reflection are combined. The mind of the teacher moves in the time of teaching with modes 
of openness and responsibility. The image of the wayfarer is found again at the end of the 
chapter not merely  as an illustration of a theory, but as a figure that reflects and expands the 





2.Teacher and student in Invisible Cities 
 
Kublai Khan does not necessarily believe everything Marco Polo says when he 
describes the cities visited on his expeditions, but the emperor of the Tartars does 
continue listening to the young Venetian with a greater attention and curiosity than he 
shows any other messenger or explorer of his (Calvino, 1972, p.5).  
 
These are the opening lines of Italo Calvino’s Invisible Cities.  This work consists in a 
collection of fifty two lyrical sketches of cities belonging to the boundless extension of the Tartar 
empire. We read of cities of memory, of desire, of trade. We read of cities and eyes, of cities and 
names, cities and signs. Of thin cities, continuous cities and hidden ones. The cities are self-
contained worlds that do not relate to each other. At times Marco Polo describes them in the 
tiniest details; at times he considers the whole: he is always looking at where no one else looks. 
The accounts of the cities are not “stories”: nothing happens in them except a lyrical description 
of the cities themselves. The only seeming connection among the different accounts is offered by 
the insertion of framing material that tells an overarching story presenting the interaction 
between Marco Polo, the explorer who produces the accounts, and the Emperor Kublai Khan. 
The framing parts offer images of a relationship between the two in which certain ideas or 
questions are dramatized, especially ideas about listening and telling, and teaching and learning. 
In sum, these parts  display the unraveling of an original and challenging educational experience. 
The emperor is bored and indifferent to the growing unrelenting power of his dominion. At 
times, he feels desperate to ever be able to make sense of the emptiness that takes hold of him in 
the evening. He listens to the stories of the  young Venetian trader, Marco Polo, as a possibility 




Arguably the stories are not reported as Marco Polo uttered them to the emperor: all we 
know from their mode of communication clashes with the style in which the accounts are written 
(see Breiner, 1988, pp. 561-562). Marco Polo recounts cities to the Emperor because he is an 
ambassador. The text does not tell us  about his travels: what he does, and if he really has seen 
the cities he tells of, is unrevealed to us. His function is fulfilled in the telling. Kublai is the 
listener and the reader of the explorer’s stories. He provides a sort of unity to the narration 
through his main concern: the empire. He stands for any reader who listens to the stories having 
in mind what most matters to her. The first page gives a clear indication that Kublai is “us”-  who 
take in the descriptions and provide unity to the collection of images through our own interest in 
it. Calvino writes:  "In the lives of emperors there is a moment which follows pride in the 
boundless extension of the territories we have conquered ..."(p.13, emphasis added). From now 
on, Kublai refers to himself in the singular. Breiner (1988) notes that “by this device Calvino 
enforces an extreme implication of the reader throughout (and incidentally raises a question 
about whose voice it is that speaks the frame)”(p.563). One is led to feel that she is Kublai, as the 
narrative slips from first to third person and back in an imperceptible way. Kublai learns from 
Marco as the reader learns from what he reads. Their learning is mainly an exercise of 
interpretation sustained by a vital concern with meaning. 
Many are the traits that contribute to make their relationship an educational one.  From 
the opening lines we learn that between the two there is listening, with attention and curiosity: 
“but the emperor of the Tartars does continue listening to the young Venetian with a greater 
attention and curiosity”.  Something in Marco’s embassies wins over the emperor’s ennui. Marco 
is a trader. He trades  experience and knowledge. Marco Polo and Kublai Khan represent 




shared need of knowledge and meaning. The empire is a muddled and undifferentiated territory: 
“in the Khan’s mind the empire was reflected in a desert of labile and interchangeable 
data”(p.22). Marco Polo is interesting to the emperor because he helps him make sense of the 
empire. His sketches, descriptions of the cities he maybe visited, maybe invented, are what the 
emperor needs to develop a knowledge of his empire, of his power and ultimately of himself. 
The trade is by no means a simple passing of something from hand to hand. The knowledge and 
meaning  being traded emerge only from the interaction between the two. Marco does not 
possess it, nor does the emperor. Only in the exchange some possibility of meaning emerges. 
Kublai learns from the elusive ambassador. Marco learns to read the emperor’s expectations in 
his facial expression, in his questions, in what he does not say. Learning would not take place 
unless both were engaged in it. Kublai cannot learn to read Marco’s stories unless Marco learns 
to read the Emperor. Together they develop a language that is only theirs. Their language springs 
from the intention to communicate parts of experience that are otherwise foreign to the other. 
“The emperor is he who is a foreigner to each of his subjects, and only through foreign eyes and 
ears could the empire manifest its existence to Kublai ” (p.21). The need for meaningful 
knowledge is born out of this undeniable foreignness to one’s own property. The empire belongs 
to the emperor, yet he can only make sense of it “through foreign eyes and ears”.  
Likewise, Marco Polo who does not speak any of the languages of the empire, find his 
own points of access to it and manages to translate his experience to the emperor. “Newly 
arrived and totally ignorant of the Levantine languages, Marco Polo could express himself only 
with gestures, leaps, cries of wonder and of horror, animal barkings or hootings, or with objects 
he took from his knapsacks- ostrich plumes, pea-shooters, quartzes- which he arranged in front 




The sovereign has to interpret “the ingenious foreigner’s improvised pantomimes”. He 
can decipher the signs, but still cannot see the connection between them and the cities visited. 
Marco Polo the teacher arranges the souvenirs of his travels in front of his student following the 
scheme of a chessboard: Marco and Kublai are rival emperors, each of them a chess player, 
“rival readers meeting over a continent, a text, a chessboard”  (Breiner, 1988, p.569). The image 
of the chessboard is a strong one and it will recur other times in the framing narrative. It suggests 
that the roles in  the relationship between Marco Polo and Kublai, that I am reading as an 
educational relationship, are fluid and shifting, and so are the balances of power. We see this 
with clarity in a particularly intense episode.  
The emperor is in a bad mood. He challenges Marco Polo: all the other ambassadors 
inform him of real (we would say “data heavy”) news: famines, conspiracies, or the discovery of 
a turquoise mine. “And you?- he asks- You return from lands equally distant and you can tell me 
only the thoughts that come to a man who sits on his doorstep at evening to enjoy the cool air. 
What is the use, then, of you traveling? “(p.27). 
The real question, initially formulated as a question of utility (“What is the use of your 
traveling?”), seems instead to revolve around ways of looking.  As a matter of fact, the emperor 
continues: “My gaze is that of a man meditating, lost in thought-I admit it. But yours? You cross 
archipelagoes, tundras, mountain ranges. You would do as well never moving from here.” The 
challenge is radical. Marco Polo the traveler is asked, why travel, at all? Where do you direct 
your gaze to, when you travel? What do you gain, by traveling?  
The answer to this question is nearly whispered- in fact, from the story one cannot tell if 
it is uttered or only imagined. The answer is a complicated one. Traveling is vitally connected to 




“Home” is the word hardly uttered but still ever present. “Venice”, Venezia, the city of his 
childhood, mentioned en passant, is what Marco Polo tries to retrace in every city he explores.  
The answer is unsatisfying, so Kublai thinks, because it binds the travelers’ gaze to a backward 
direction. “You advance always with your head turned back?” or “Is what you see always behind 
you?” or rather, “Does your journey take place only in the past?”(p.28). 
The question hits the traveler, every traveler, considering that the experience of departure 
from home, one’s past and familiar place of origin is gradually muted into an experience of 
foreignness and also alienation. What kind of home is the home looked for from a condition of 
foreignness? What kind of past is the past that one carries in the future of a destination still 
uncovered?  
What he sought was always something lying ahead, and even when it was a 
matter of the past it was a past that changed gradually as he advanced in his journey, 
because the traveler’s past changes according to the route he has followed: not the 
immediate past, that is, to which each day that goes by adds a day, but the remote past. 
Arriving at each new city, the traveler finds again a past of his that he did not know he 
had: the foreignness of what you no longer are or no longer possess lies in wait for you in 
foreign, unpossessed places. (pp28-29) 
 
The emperor is implacable. The question of why one travels, at what one is directing her 
gaze when she travels, how she leaves home, if she does, and how she finds home in the places 
she explores while acknowledging that they are not home, is a question to be asked over and 
over. Being able to entertain such questions is a mark of the educational pregnancy of the 
relationship entertained by the emperor and the merchant. Marco’s answer, “Elsewhere is a 
negative mirror” says and does not say, because of course, what is a negative mirror, and how 
one sees oneself in it, is a whole new thing to explore.  
The education of Marco Polo and the emperor continues when the emperor starts taking a 




describe cities to Marco Polo, waiting to hear from him if the cities indeed exist and are like he 
had imagined them. Kublai’s intention is to understand the logic followed by Marco: he 
“dismantles the city piece by piece and reconstructs it in other ways”(p.43). Here the flexibility 
of the roles of teacher and learner is patent: Kublai is the one who listens, but he is also now the 
one who wants to start exploring, in his way. In order to do this, he needs to understand how 
Marco Polo thinks. Initially, he hopes to find the secret rule to apply. But this does not work, as 
the cities Marco Polo explores are always different than the ones the emperor tries to describe. 
The emperor is looking for a model, in the hope to deduce from it all possible cities. This model, 
says Kublai, “contains everything corresponding to the norm. Since the cities that exist diverge 
in varying degree from the norm, I need only foresee the exceptions to the norm and calculate the 
most probable combinations” (p.69). But this is not the way in which the experience of a traveler 
informs her thinking. There is nothing in the journeying that can be deduced from a norm. Yes, a 
traveler thinks with a model. But this model has to contain the possibility of infinite divergence 
and spontaneity. “I have also thought of a model city from which I deduce all the others” Marco 
answered, “it is a city made only of exceptions, exclusions, incongruities, contradictions”(p.69).  
Towards the end of the collection, they have a shared language and what matters most a 
shared imagery. Kublai has learned about the world through Marco Polo, the traveler, and Marco 
has learned to speak fluently the emperor’s languages. But most surprisingly, the aging Kublai 
does not need anymore to listen to Marco Polo’s tales. He is tired. There is that moment of 
established familiarity, in any educational relationship, in which once more, the question “why 
are you my teacher?” is asked. The emperor says: “I do not know when you have had time to 
visit all the countries you describe me. It seems to me you have never moved from this 




simply display the objects from his knapsacks. He asks him to play chess and Marco abides his 
request, except then starting to talk about the chessboard itself:  
Then Marco Polo spoke: "Your chessboard, sire, is inlaid with two woods: ebony and 
maple. The square on which your enlightened gaze is fixed was cut from the ring of a trunk that 
grew in a year of drought: you see how its fibers are arranged? Here a barely hinted knot can be 
made out: a bud tried to burgeon on a premature spring day, but the night's frost forced it to 
desist."  Until then the Great Khan had not realized that the foreigner knew how to express 
himself fluently in his language, but it was not this fluency that amazed him.   "Here is a thicker 
pore: perhaps it was a larvum's nest; not a woodworm, because, once born, it would have begun 
to dig, but a caterpillar that gnawed the leaves and was the cause of the tree's being chosen for 
chopping down . . . This edge was scored by the wood carver with his gouge so that it would 
adhere to the next square, more protruding . . . "  The quantity of things that could be read in a 
little piece of smooth and empty wood overwhelmed Kublai; Polo was already talking about 
ebony forests, about rafts laden with logs that come down the rivers, of docks, of women at the 
windows . . . 
 
Marco Polo, the emperor’s teacher, knows something special: he knows how to look 
attentively, how to read quantities of things in a small piece of wood. He has learned this by 
traveling. He is able to teach well insofar as he has allowed for his thinking to explore, to move, 
to experience or to imagine that which is not necessarily at hand or stated. Marco Polo the 
practitioner knows his discipline. He can trade, barter, read maps, and make himself understood. 
But he also knows something more precious: he knows to lean forward, consider attentively a 
small piece of wood, and read in it stories of nearby and faraway experiences together with his 
student. That makes him the teacher.  
 
 
3. What is “being a teacher”? A conceptual exploration  
 
I begin my inquiry with a question about “being a teacher”. Mine is a question of 




schooling and in education. In doing so, I enroll myself in the Socratic tradition as outlined in the 
early dialogues by Plato. Within such tradition, the quest for a definition aims at uncovering the 
fertility of a radical questioning. Terms are not defined once for all. Instead, because it appeals to 
the experience shared by the interlocutors, the attempt at defining opens spaces for dialogue and 
allows for a recognition of aporia. It is in this spirit that I consider the question: what is being a 
teacher? It is a generative question that focuses my interest by opening a space, a roaming space 
shared with many who have entertained the same query. While there is no expectation to set the 
answer, there is hope that by entering a conversation with practitioners, scholars and thinkers 
about this question, my own thinking about it will contribute and unfold new views on this 
essential question. 
What does “being a teacher” mean? In my inquiry, this question is asked through the lens 
of the experience of the traveler. In Marco Polo’s story, one emblematic moment for my query is 
when the emperor asks Marco: “What are you teaching me? Why are you traveling?” This 
question starts  a delicate exchange that nevertheless opens the way for a meaningful exploration 
of Marco’s way of looking and of his nostalgic relation to his hometown.  
Kublai as a student has every right to ask his teacher: “What makes you my teacher? 
What is it that you do, that makes you different from the other imperial messengers? Why should 
I listen to you?” Marco as a teacher has the duty to attend to this question, and to let himself 
explore with his student an honest answer to it. Being not a neutral question, but one implicating 
views on vocation, mission and uniqueness of the person to whom it is addressed, the question 
about “being a teacher” also exposes the teacher’s vulnerability. One needs to know how to 
endure uncertainty in order to be able to bear this question. Certainly Marco has developed this 




The question tackles one of the basic human experiences. As with dreaming, eating, 
dancing, and loving, it can be assumed that many share an experience of teaching and being 
taught. Teaching is surely an activity in which most of us have engaged occasionally at one time 
or another. In this sense, the significance of my inquiry embraces the spectrum of basic human 
experiences. Yet, I need to carve out a more specific object.  Thus I elect to study what is done 
by those who make teaching in formal settings a significant part of their existence (teachers and 
professors).  
Teachers deal with knowledge in relation to its movement, growth and sharing with 
others who want to learn. Teaching is a multi-vocal, complex and multilayered activity, involved 
in all aspects of human existence. Teaching takes place in social contexts and it is informed by  
the emotional, interpersonal and developmental aspects. When I chose to focus on those 
dimensions of teaching related to knowledge and to thinking, I am aware that in doing so I am 
inattentive towards the other aspects of being a teacher, like the emotional and social ones. This 
does not imply a dismissal but it simply is a delimitation of my object of inquiry.  
After this delimitation, I propose to address the question about “being a teacher” as a 
question inquiring into the ways of teachers’ thinking in the classroom. I want to unearth that 
very special way of thinking that teachers are capable of: what enables a teacher at the same time 
to, for example, explain a grammar rule, while noticing that Annie in the third seat is not in her 
usual pensive mood, and while requesting attention with a gesture. The teacher is also keeping in 
mind that she will have to collect money for the fieldtrip at the end of class, and that the 
Principal asked to see her after school to discuss some curriculum changes. The minute after this, 
that same teacher is connecting the use of that grammar rule to a particular poetry style, and she 




Tom who has been texting during class, and after noticing a general lack of attention, she decides 
to change her lesson plan and to start a group activity. What kind of thinking is at work here?  
How is it connected to the way of looking of Marco Polo, who was able to read the smallest 
piece of wood and make it meaningful with his student? The mind moves in constant swinging, 
and then stops, focuses on a particular piece of the experience to immediately open it up to the 
myriad other things and stories that can be recalled, and so on. While certainly the movement of 
the mind I have described above characterizes thinking at large, I see it at work, so to say, in its 
bare essentiality while teaching.  
Generally speaking, scholarship and common sense agree in identifying two possible 
modes of understanding teachers’ way of thinking in the classroom. One possible way is to 
recognize a set of teacher skills that can be learned or better memorized and then applied as a 
kind of know-how to the diverse teaching situations. Another way consists in appreciating that 
what teachers do mirrors a very specific kind of expertise- whose traits need to be explored but 
that cannot be reduced to sets of skills. Philip Jackson’s (1986) examination of the method of 
teaching can be seen as fitting in the second category I listed above. He asks: “Is there more to 
teaching than the skilled application of something called “know-how”? (p.1). Certainly, every 
teacher has to master the material taught and this achievement comes with an additional set of 
knowledge-related demands, regarding for example the methodology of inquiry proper to the 
material and the history of how each field was constituted.   
However, I agree with Jackson that there is a specific “way of doing things” (ibidem)--
what he refers to as “method”--related with instructional content but not in any way conflated 
with it. All of teaching calls for a “method”. The method of teaching is not a collection of 




the way through which teaching and learning take place, a way deeply connected with epistemic 
conceptions of what it means to think and to experience. To gain experience in teaching means to 
become more and more familiar with this “method” of teaching. “Expert teachers” are more 
thoughtful than those who still have not lived enough that kind of experience. Here “more 
thoughtful” does not indicate that they “think more”, but rather that  “they think differently” 
(p.87).  
The idea that teachers “ think differently” lends itself to much questioning. Firstly, it will 
be asked: what does “thinking differently” mean? Then, the adverb “differently” shall be 
explored. We will have to ask from what is this difference constituted. Finally, can we say that 
such difference is what makes a teacher? The questions are overarching ones and they will 
inform all of the following inquiry in the dissertation.  
The piece of experience I want to comment on next thus serves as entry point to the 
terrain in which such questions are asked. The experience, lived and narrated, is where questions, 
doubts and insights are inextricable and yet reflected upon. Jackson (1986) tells the story of how 
he started to work as a Nursery School principal. Because he knew very little of Nursery  School, 
he decided to spend some time in the classroom simply observing every teacher to get a sense of 
what they were doing. After some time, he thought to have caught what made them teachers. 
Over a lighthearted discussion with the school teachers over lunch, he jokingly proposed an 
impression of the “ nursery school teacher”. His impression included mimicking postures and 
gestures and was met with laughter by the teachers. It also started a conversation about whether 
him or anyone else could really get away with impersonating a teacher without others realizing 
he was an imposter. Within this conversation with teachers about what makes “real teaching”, a 




to a child triggered a new thread of reflections about how he arrived to this observation. He 
writes: “I noticed that when nursery school teachers spoke to individual children or listened to 
what they had to say they first descended to the child’s height by bending at the knees until their 
faces were at on a level with the child’s own. At the same time, I was bemused to note, when I 
myself spoke or listened to a child I tended to bend at the waist rather than the knees. As a result, 
I hovered above the tyke like some huge crane, causing him or her to gaze skyward and, if out of 
doors on a bright day, to shade the eyes while doing so”(p. 76).  
This seems quite a minute observation- but what the philosopher does with it is definitely 
worth inquiring into. He sees that any judgment on whether one is teaching is informed by an act 
of interpretation that relies on the background of a shared historical and cultural context, in 
which events are observed and interpreted on the ground of common sense (see p. 83). He notes 
that teaching is “not as much seen, as it is read” (p.84). When we are sure that what we are 
observing is teaching, we do so on the basis of some unarticulated and unquestioned 
understanding of teaching.  Jackson returns to his observation about the posture from which to 
speak to a child. He writes that he “saw” immediately that the teacher’s posture entailed a better 
way of doing things. Nonetheless, he questions the immediateness of his seeing: his evaluation 
that the teachers had a better way to speak to a child implies assumptions about teaching.  Into 
his way of looking at what he saw in the classroom is also contained a consideration of why the 
teachers behaved the way they did.  
This  point pertains  more generally to every perceptual encounter: what we see “makes 
sense” because we interpret what is offered to the senses on the ground of assumptions coming 
from a mainly unarticulated form of knowing. That is what Jackson defines  “tacit knowledge” 




fact that  “ if we had to ponder afresh each thing we saw and heard, life would be more of a 
puzzle than most of us could stand” (p. 86). But, it is important that we question our habitual 
way of interpreting the world. We could either find our commitments to the way we interpret 
reality reinforced, or we could see that a new interpretation is needed. This questioning  of 
established interpretations of the world is what Jackson calls “ the task of looking at the familiar 
as if it were once again strange” (p.86).  
Teachers too, he suggests, are involved in the task of interpreting and this is no special 
task, as it pertains to everything human. Jackson suggests that, focusing on perception alone, a 
difference between how “experts” and “ laymen” perceive should be noticed. He proposes that 
the same difference in perception holds for teachers and “non-teachers”. The expert sees 
differently. The same field is perceived with a finer vision. In the same way, teachers distinguish 
themselves from laymen because they see and think differently. He writes: 
Expert teachers “see more” than do non experts. They are alive to the latent 
pedagogical possibilities in the events they witness. Within a classroom setting, they 
anticipate what is going to happen. They can spot an inattentive student a mile off. They 
can detect signs of incipient difficulty. Their senses are fully tuned to what is going on 
around them. They are not easily rattled. As younger students sometimes swear it is true, 
they behave as though they had eyes in the back of their heads. (p.87) 
 
 A teacher is “expert” when she/he has learned to look at a special portion of the world in 
a certain manner. What is exactly this manner? It is a heightened way of perception and of 
response to the perceived.  Jackson goes on to suggest that this way of perception builds into a 
sense of “feeling at home” in the classroom that is as genuine as hard to specify (p.88). The 
teachers’ special mode of vision contributes to her feeling “at home” in the classroom. The 
feeling of familiarity accompanies the growth of expertise in the teacher who, having developed 




and perceive in a finer way that portion of the world, which is the classroom. There is rest  and 
comfort in the sense of belonging there and of feeling at home in the classroom. However, I 
would like to suggest that exactly in those moments of familiarity, the teacher is able to look for 
something unfamiliar in it. As Jackson himself wrote, we should be always engaged in 
questioning established interpretations of the world. This task  is more so true of that portion of 
the world we call “classroom.” Here too, “the task of looking at the familiar as if it were once 
again strange” (p.86) is imposed on us by the very interpretative disposition of human existence. 
Marco’s piece of wood is familiar, perhaps obvious and plane. But he looks closer and realizes 
that it is full of venations and ribs, shades of color and knots revealing a long, surprising history. 
Marco can look at the familiar and see its new unpredicted qualities. Jackson would agree that 
this capacity reveals the teacher in him.  
 
4. Are teachers at home in the classroom?  
Teachers are experts when they develop a mode of seeing that enhances a sense of 
familiarity in the classroom. The idea of teachers’ expertise calls into question the relation of 
teaching to common sense. According to common sense, one is an “expert” when nothing 
surprises her anymore, when she has developed her ways of perceiving and decision making so 
as to feel she is in command. Expertise is a matter of specialization but moreover so it is a matter 
of power and social position. Robert Welker (1992) has shown that relying on expertise to 
qualify the work of teachers has some important limitations for a more inclusive understanding 
of what teachers do. He highlights the “technical intrusion of expertise in educational 
matters”(p.12). Expertise often times speaks “ the language of dominance” as it positions the 




Technological dependency and public apathy are the main backdrops of excessive reliance on the 
idea of teacher expertise, as is a general sense of disempowerment felt by those implied in the 
educational experience who do not “qualify as experts”. A telling example of the patronizing use 
of the label of “expertise” can be found in the practice of “classroom run through”. This indicates 
a technique of school supervision in which the supervisor (that could be the school principal or a 
specially appointed expert) visits one classroom for few minutes to “take the pulse” of student 
learning in it (cfr. Downey, 2004). Walk –throughs are intended as non formal evaluation 
processes and imply regular follow up conversations with teachers. Though interesting in theory, 
in my view the walk-through model can deplete the teacher’s autonomy and sense of ethical 
responsibility due to the intervention of an “external expert”. In my concluding chapter I offer 
some comments on a walk through that took place in an elementary   public school in the 
Philadelphia district and its disastrous consequences.   
The issues with the idea of teacher expertise are many, but   for the purposes of this 
section I will focus on what is at stake when the idea of expertise fosters a sense of exclusive 
familiarity with the environment. If we think of teachers as experts, we assume that they must 
feel perfectly at ease in the classroom: the classroom should be a natural comfort zone for them. 
Instead, I am proposing in my study that the sense of feeling at home in the classroom  should be 
combined with that particular way of looking that sees elements of unfamiliarity in that very 
environment in which one feels at home. Perhaps a teacher can be experienced, but not “an 
expert”, for there is never going to be a moment in which the classroom stops surprising her. 
When she feels “at home” in the classroom, at the same time she is aware that some things in the 




and the unfamiliar, between the known and the unknown. Reliance on teaching routines is a  trait 
of the teacher experience in which the connectedness is at play.  
Being at home means knowing one’s way. When I am entering my home, I know where 
the light switch is and can reach it even in the dark, I know where the dresser’s corner bumps out 
on the hallway so that I am able to avoid it, and so on. I rely on a set of behaviors and strategies 
that I know to work well, given that I have tried and repeated them over and over. The feeling of 
home is strictly related with that of  familiarity which endorses the reliance on routines. If then 
we accept that teachers are those whose expertise makes them “at home” in the classroom, a look 
at how they do act when they are “at home in the classroom” will illuminate something of the 
teachers’ experience.  
A discussion in these terms is related to the attempt at defining teaching as a craft, a 
concept which, at first glance, is opposed to art and suggests elements of technicality and 
repetition of skillful patterns of action. A thorough examination of teachers’ professional craft 
knowledge is offered in Brown and  Mc Intyre (1993).  The authors investigate experienced 
teachers’ thinking during their classroom teaching. In this study, teachers’ craft knowledge is 
articulated in salient patterns emerging of teachers’ account of their classroom teaching. These 
patterns are considered routines having a discernible “goal”, a given set of conditions and one or 
more actions chosen in the pursuit of the goal. For instance, an art teacher may have the goal that 
students produce imaginative work. Some conditions to take into account would be for instance 
the students’ lack of technical skills or their tendency to produce quick drawings with no detail. 
It is likely that that teacher will respond to this set of goals and conditions by choosing one or 
more actions, like assisting the student with the technical aspect, or suggesting to add some detail 




Brown and McIntyre recognize that there is a variety of possible structures of routines. 
They express a conviction that classroom decisions demand speed and also immediacy. “A 
teacher who stands in front of a class, systematically searching through a plethora of concepts 
and theories of teaching, is likely to find the class has deteriorated into a turmoil, or left, before a 
decision is made”(p. 101). The time factor seems the most compelling reason for why teachers 
rely on routines.  
After conducting interviews with teachers about their routines, the authors seem ready to 
accept conclusions that would undermine their very presuppositions. They comment that it is 
obvious that teachers do not simply “decide  a goal and pick up the right  action to achieve it.”  
They acknowledge that “the complicated nature of teaching decisions comes about because there 
are a large number of different Goals which teachers have, a virtually infinite variety of 
combinations of Conditions impinging on teaching and a vast array of possible Actions from 
which to chose”(p. 101, capitalization in the original). A teaching routine can rarely be described 
as a straight arrow from one action to one goal. 
 Scholars who are aware of the complex, ever changing finesse implied in teaching can 
thrive in seeing two researchers so clearly dedicated to uncover the general structure of teachers’ 
thinking acknowledge that, even within their own frame of reference, this is ultimately not 
possible. It is indeed a good moment of scholarly honesty when the authors doubt their choice of 
describing what teachers do as “routines”. They write: “In common with what is normally 
thought of as routine activities, they are spontaneous and largely automatic, but in their 
complexity they are quite different”(p. 102).  
The conundrum seems caused by the assumption that a spontaneous action needs to be 




that do not imply a standardized pattern of response? Indeed, spontaneity and automatism could 
be opposite when qualifying actions. I propose (see following chapters) that thinking possesses a 
spontaneous dynamism, attuned to life’s dynamism but not replicating it. Because the dynamism 
of thought is an expression of freedom, thinking follows only its unforeseeable diverse directions  
in a way that has meaning but not a fixed meaning. Spontaneity of thinking therefore allows for 
freedom and innovation rather than automated patterns of response. An other point to consider 
regards the temporal factor. In Brown and McIntyre ‘s view the element of time pressure triggers 
the adoption of routine strategies. However, being pressed for time does not seem to necessarily 
imply a routine based response.  A spontaneous response may be as rapid and on the spot as an 
automated one. The question of how thinking is involved in spontaneous actions- and what kind 
of thinking- is left unexamined in the study I am referencing. Brown and McIntyre do not seem 
preoccupied with the possibility that teachers do think  in the classroom, while teaching under 
difficult conditions. They assert:  “Certainly, teachers do not have time to reflect in their 
classroom about the choices open to them, and they very rarely articulate the kinds of thinking 
they have revealed in this study…” (p. 112).  
 Access to the thinking underlying teaching is of difficult gain, considering that 
teachers can only comment on the reasons of their choices ex post, when asked to analyze or 
comment about their experience. Perhaps because of this Brown and Mc Intyre chose to consider 
that thinking about teaching takes place only after teaching itself is performed. Before their 
investigation, they are already inclined to accept that “experienced teachers’ effectiveness (is) 
dependent on a fluency of action which would be possible only if the action was spontaneous, 
largely automatic, and based on only a very limited conscious examination of available options” 




repertoire of actions. Their choice of the metaphor of “craft” instead of the one of “art” points 
exactly at their choice to look at the familiar regularity of what teachers do in their classes, and at 
its generalizable features. They somewhat flippantly gloss that “teachers’ flashes of artistic 
genius will be a bonus” (p.19). Unquestionably, given the assumption that teachers act mainly 
unthinkingly, because of the urgency of the situation and of their need to build up familiar 
patterns in the classroom, it must be admitted that even good teaching resembles at best the craft 
of a skilled artisan with none of the creative, new, different courses of action. Though I disagree 
on the general presuppositions  of Brown and Mc Intyre’s analysis,  it should be acknowledged 
that it points out  a  danger: teaching can becomes thoughtless when it  implies the adoption of 
predictable strategies hindering  the teacher’s initiative and freedom.  
The adoption of routines signals a particular relation between the teacher’s mode of 
thinking and her sense of time. We have seen that the element of time, and especially of time 
pressure, is considered a factor that motivates teachers to the “thoughtless” adoption of patterns 
of actions. Dewey’s analysis of the relation of thinking to experience in Democracy and 
Education (1916) contributes to show that the automatic reliance on routines expresses a lack of 
“real” thinking. He writes: “The opposite (…) to thoughtful action are routine and capricious 
behavior. The former accepts what has been customary as a full measure of possibility and omits 
to take into account the connections of the particular thing done. (…) Routine says in effect: ‘let 
things continue just as I have found them in the past.’ (p.146). Thoughtful action does not accept 
the familiar simply because it is such. Valuing the past qua past expresses a closure of possibility 
that for Dewey marks the renunciation to thinking.  The incompleteness of the situation, which 




Routines showcase that the teacher thinks the situation to be closed up and thus, gives up 
thinking and falls back on what has worked out already.   
I would like to challenge the idea that routinary behaviors in the classroom are 
necessarily signs of teachers’ waiving their thinking. Routines viewed as the establishment of 
regularity can actually be part of the laborious task of making oneself at home in the classroom. 
Teaching is inhabited by a constitutive uncertainty, to which it is natural and justifiable  to 
respond through the creation of familiar, unsurprising modes of decision and action. Margret 
Buchmann (1993) relates the role of routines in daily practices to a general sense of uncertainty 
in teaching.  They are a specific response to the “general problem of uncertainty” (p. 219). 
Routines can reduce the perceived uncertainty of the classroom. Standard procedures are built 
upon habits of thought and action that are developed with the growing pedagogical skill of the 
teacher. Relying on routines has the welcome effect of liberating the teacher’s mind and allowing 
for attention to the unexpected.  
Routines are entrenched in teachers’ teaching and can effectively reduce the anxiety 
coming from the realization that so much of what happens in the classroom is marked by 
uncertainty (Jackson, 1986, ch. 3): uncertainty in the students’ learning, in the outcomes of 
teaching, in the use of authority. If the term “uncertainty” suggests negative appreciation of the 
classroom experience, we could speak instead in terms of openness, fluidity, awareness of 
possibilities, or freedom from rigidity (Buchman, p. 216).  Uncertainty seen this way can become 
a desirable quality of the teaching experience. Too much certainty in the classroom may create 
preference for teaching styles in which certainty is easier to attain.  Uncertainty is vital to 
professional practices  (cfr. Schön,1983). It brings about flexibility and breadth instead of 




preserve the regularity and the perceived certainty. But one needs to be able to break out of them 
when appropriate, when a surprise arises, and the novelty disrupts one’s practice. 
The immediacy of most of the actions upon which  teachers decide while teaching is a 
factor to be taken in consideration while trying to articulate a conception of teachers’ thinking. I 
suggest that  there is a way to acknowledge teachers’ thinking by asking how teachers manage to 
think with sophistication and attention even under time constraint in the classroom. Roughly 
said, Brown and Mcintyre’s idea that, because it is difficult, then it does not happen, does not 
seem to do justice to teaching. We should  ask how teachers enact reflective thinking in their 
teaching instead of assuming that no such thing exists. If the present of teaching is thoughtless, 
why would other tenses of teaching be thoughtful? Where would all the thinking about  the 
preparation for class, and the ex post reflective evaluation of one’s own practice, evaporate in the 
moment of the actualization of the practice? Acknowledging the immediacy of teaching does not 
necessarily imply accepting teaching to be based upon non-reflective modes of expertise.   
How can teachers develop “craft knowledge” without a reflection on the classroom 
experience that not only takes place after the experience, but that is also and foremost activated 
in the very moment of the experience?  
Susan Hart (2000) posits that no re-evaluation of the classroom experience can take place 
without the reframing of pre-existing thinking, reframing that is by itself reflective. She writes 
that “a view of professional expertise as heavily reliant on intuitive judgment is not necessarily 
incompatible with a view of professional expertise as also involving reflection”(p. 141). Hart 
raises a fundamental question: how is classroom expertise intuitive and reflective at the same 




time to think, we need to be exploring what kinds of reflection teachers do spontaneously engage 
in and why, and how those are adapted to fit the circumstances of teaching” (p.145).  
Expert practice is in need of a reflective capacity, which operates together with intuitive 
ways of thinking. Reflection provides intuition that is an immediate insight into the situation, 
with the possibility for self-correction. Reflection comes into play in a second moment, as a 
second thought or a re-framing or re-evaluating of the decisions made once they prove 
inadequate. How is  then possible for thinking to monitor itself during the experience?  What is a 
practitioner to do if her best chance at good judgment is belated by its very nature of “coming 
after” the experience?   
 
 
5. On reflectivity in teaching 
The model of reflective practice proposed by Donald Schön (1983) shall provide help to 
disentangle our puzzle. Schön   looks at “the characteristic mode of ordinary practical 
knowledge” (p. 54) as antithetical to the positivist epistemology of practice as technical 
rationality (p. 31). Under this paradigm, decisions to act are merely an instrumental problem 
because the ends of the action are fixed and clear. This model does not account for practical 
competence in situations for which it is not possible to simply “apply” theory. Following 
parallels between daily experience and the experience of professionals, Schön puts forward the 
idea that there exists a “knowing-in-action”, a kind of knowing inherent in intelligent action. 
This has the appearance of a spontaneous behavior that “does not stem from a prior intellectual 
operation” (p.51). Knowing-in-action is the characteristic mode of ordinary practical knowledge: 




unable to describe. An example of this is borrowed  from Polanyi’s examples of the recognition 
of faces. Once we know a person’s face, we can recognize it among many others, though we 
cannot usually really explain why we recognize it (p.52). This “knowing” what one is doing is 
not disjointed from “thinking” about what one knows oneself to be doing. As he puts it, “not 
only can we think about doing, but we can think about doing something while doing it”(p. 54). 
The examples he provides: a pitcher finding the groove, a jazz musician improvising, support his 
view that reflection in action is needed when the situation, or the performance, leads to surprises.  
We respond to the unexpected brought about by the intuitive performance by reflecting-in-
action.  
John Dewey (1933) has the same kind of words when describing “reflective thinking”, 
that he takes to be “the best way of thinking” (p.3). Reflective thinking originates in a state of 
“doubt, hesitation, perplexity ” and it involves an inquiry to find what will settle the perplexity or 
resolve the doubt (p. 12). This note confirms the presence of what Schön defines as “the element 
of surprise” originating reflective thinking. Surprise is the interruption of an expected outcome of 
a situation in which actions are spontaneously brought about by a form of thinking that is not yet 
reflective. The element of surprise- be it positive or negative- becomes fundamental when we 
consider Schön’s understanding of professional practices. A practitioner, he writes, “is a 
specialist who encounters certain types of situations again and again”( p.60).  The use of 
terminology like “case” or “repertoire” confirms the idea that specialization and 
professionalization are constituted through the repetition of situations encountered by the 
practitioner. Every teacher could, if she wanted, easily classify her students in types: the 
cheerleader, the geek, the overachiever, and so on. Or classroom situations: the “no-one-has-




name a few. Familiarity and a sense of assuredness come with the development of expertise. Yet, 
Schön notes, as the practice becomes routine, and “knowing-in-practice becomes  increasingly 
tacit and spontaneous, the practitioner might miss important opportunities to think about what he 
is doing” (p. 61). This takes place when he develops the capacity to neglect the phenomena that 
do not fit into the routines of his “knowing-in-action” and consequently becomes more and more 
rigid and narrow-minded. Such a practitioner has “overlearned what he knows”, and needs 
reflection to correct his overlearning. Reflectivity allows the practitioner to experience situations 
of uncertainty and uniqueness, that he was not letting himself experience because he was being 
selectively inattentive to surprising phenomena (p. 61).   
If Dewey highlights  that reflexivity is required by situations of novelty and surprise, 
what he calls problems, Schön suggests  that reflexivity is also what enables us to recognize such 
situations. The circularity of those claims cannot scare us, because what else if not reflectivity, 
this double folding of the mind on itself in a kind of mirroring, can nourish circularity? 
Reflective thinking takes place in the present. Schön explores the present of the action as the 
dimension of reflective practice. He denotes as “action-present the zone of time in which action 
can still make a difference to the situation” (p. 62). What counts as “the present of the action” 
depends on the kind of practice. He writes, “the action-present may stretch over minutes, hours, 
days, or even weeks or months, depending on the pace of the activity and the situational 
boundaries that are characteristic of the practice”(p.62). In this sense, the present of the action 
stretches beyond “objective time” and reveals traits of time understood as duration: not the 
instant, the now and here, but that pace and extent of time for the practitioner to think of her 
actions in view of their meaning. For instance, a teacher may well think of a single class as a unit 




as her unit, thus stretching the “present” in which her action, informed by reflection, can still 
make a difference.  
Marco Polo, the first figure of teacher considered in this inquiry, well displays that the 
time of teaching is not the time of technical objective measurement. Marco relates to his 
experience as it winds and unwinds in the existential span of growth, discovery, and loss. 
Marco’s experience of time turns and changes with his movement through life, offering itself as 
an alive ever changing possibility for new meanings.  Calvino (1972) describes Marco Polo’s 
relation with time: “Arriving at each new city, the traveler finds again a past of his that he did not 
know he had: the foreignness of what you no longer are or no longer possess lies in wait for you 
in foreign, unpossessed places” (p.29). Like the traveler who keeps changing his relation to his 
own past and future, reconfiguring it as he journeys through new cities and lands, so the teacher 
stretches her perception of the time of her action and reconfigures it as she moves in the 
educational space.  The way our teacher relates to the situation will change the way she thinks 
and consequently acts on it. If she sees the situation as possible and not predetermined, she will 
take on the task of thinking reflectively about it in the present, and will hold back from 
mechanical repetition of standard procedures.  
 
6.The reflective wayfarer 
Reflective thinking is thinking per se (Dewey, 1916, p. 146). It is  nothing else than a 
“better way of thinking” (Dewey, 1933, p.3) compared to other ways of thought in which we 
engage. Everyone is always immersed in a flux of “things thought”, a chaotic and idle sequences 
of mental streams. While every sequence of thought can be named “thinking”, reflection 




things” in a way that lets each thought have the next one as its proper outcome, and that lets each 
outcome lean back to its antecedent, we then turn the stream into a train or chain and this is 
reflective thought proper (Dewey, 1933, pp.4-5).  Reflective thinking has a purpose beyond the 
sequence of mental images. “The train must lead somewhere” (p.5), that is, the sequence of ideas 
must be oriented towards a direction. When we say “think it out” we suggest that “an 
entanglement must be straightened and something obscure cleared up” (p.6) through thought. 
Reflective thinking consists in the movement of disentanglement and bringing out (which, I may 
note, surprisingly recalls the Latin root of education, e-ducere= to lead out). It happens when 
“thought implied is made explicit” because reflection consists in the rendering explicit the 
“intelligent element in our experience” (1916, p. 146). 
Another meaning we attribute to thinking has to do with unconsciously accepted, or 
believed, content of thoughts. These thoughts are not the result of examined evidence: they are 
rather picked up from tradition, instruction or imitation (1933, p.7). In contrast, reflective 
thinking examines beliefs and prejudgments with a conscious effort to measure them against 
evidence. Thinking can be a stream of mental images, fantasies or reveries that flow without a 
clear direction, and could be uncritically accepted. By contrast, reflective thinking consists in 
“turning a subject over in the mind and giving it serious and consecutive consideration” (p.3).  
Reflective thinking is articulated in two phases.  Thinking originates in a state of 
uncertainty that triggers a need for inquiry. When something unexpected interrupts one’s 
experience, it “perplexes and challenges the mind so that it makes belief uncertain” (1933, p.13). 
The mind then entertains starting to search and to inquire so as to resolve the situation of 
uncertainty in which it finds itself. In order to be reflectively thoughtful, one needs to endure a 




sudden chill breeze can be experienced as a disruption. One could then turn her head up and 
check if there are clouds in the sky. Such a small ordinary experience contains already the 
elements of “better thinking”: a perplexing situation triggers an inquiry. Looking up to check the 
sky for clouds is indeed performed with the intention of “bringing facts before the mind” in order 
to reach a conclusion on the basis of evidence. The act of looking then “exemplifies in an 
elementary way the operation of hunting, searching, inquiring, involved in any reflective 
operation” (p.13).  
When intentional, the act of looking, as that which offers phenomena to the attention of 
the mind, represents the quality of inquiry involved in any reflective thinking. Looking is the 
action through which one enters in contact with the world and takes in the elements of it as 
matter to build her thoughts. Attention is the focusing of the mind on the elements of one’s field 
of experience. The movement of focusing in necessarily a narrowing down, as by bringing some 
elements of our experience into focus others are left out. Attention relates to what is near and 
familiar, but it is elicited by what is out of reach and unfamiliar. One’s field of experience shall 
be narrowed down or cropped only to be successively expanded by a development of one’s 
thinking. Dewey writes that “ the necessity of the interaction of the near and the far follows 
directly from the nature of thinking” (p.290). By this he means that thinking is nourished by the 
dynamic relation between what is present and what is absent (the near and far), so that, for 
instance, a foreign matter through thinking is made familiar and this in turn becomes a resource 
to reach out to new foreign ideas.  
Reflective thinking, in Dewey’s view, consists ultimately in an act of balancing the new 
and the old, the foreign and the familiar, the difficult and the easy. This balancing is ever 




a serious playfulness that is “the ideal mental condition” (1933, p.286). Intellectual curiosity, 
open-mindedness, and flexibility allow for the “ unfolding of the subject on its own account”: 
hence the seriousness of the interaction which makes the exploration possible, because it needs 
not comply to pre-established aims or beliefs. Reflective thinking as serious playfulness, or 
playful seriousness, is enacted out of a dynamism that is the sign of a full and significant vitality. 
Thinking as balancing of the far and the near, or the bending or flexing of the mind to meet the 
field of experience, is enacted in movement. If looking, as Dewey suggested, “exemplifies in an 
elementary way the operation of hunting, searching, inquiring, involved in any reflective 
operation” (p.13), similarly, the act of moving, traveling, roaming, shall be seen as exemplifying 
the operation of balancing the near and the far that “follows directly from the nature of thinking” 
(p.290).  
The metaphor of the traveler shall be seen as appropriately expressing this Deweyan 
conception of reflective thinking: consider Marco Polo, elegantly balancing “the near and the 
far” in his travels and in his relationship with Kublai. The traveler’s gaze, comprising curiosity, 
open mindedness and flexibility, is the mark of a mind that moves reflectively within the realm 
of experience. Dewey helps us see that this kind of thinking is naturally at work in teaching. 
This connection is implicitly reinforced by the striking and not unintentional fact that 
numerous illustrations of the points made in the chapter titled “ What is thinking?” consist of 
images of moving or traveling.  Exploring thinking as “ the suggestion of something not 
observed”, Dewey writes the following example: “A man is walking on a warm day.” We follow 
this man and his train of thought as he realizes the air is getting cooler and he looks at the sky to 
check if there are clouds (1933, pp.9-10). As I noted earlier, this is a basic yet uncontestable case 




and inquiry. Now I want to highlight  that the individual enacting reflective thinking happens to 
be walking. Again, in the paragraph entitled “Reflective thinking impels to inquiry”, the example 
is provided by the figure of a sailor and explorer, Columbus. His thought about the shape of the 
earth is compared to the one held by the others who did not think a circumnavigation to be 
possible. Men who took the earth to be flat were resting “upon the limits of their vision” and they 
were not searching for new evidence. Their thinking relied on habits of navigation and on 
traditional cosmology. Columbus was thinking in a different way. “Because he doubted and 
inquired, he arrived at his thought.” He was “skeptical of what from long habit seemed most 
certain and credulous of what seemed impossible, he went on thinking until he could produce 
evidence for both his confidence and his disbelief” (p.9). This is reflective thought because it is 
an active and careful examination of one’s beliefs.  
Finally, the section “The Importance of Uncertainty and of Inquiry” presents us with the 
image of the “perplexed wayfarer”:  
A man traveling in an unfamiliar region comes to a branching of the road. Having 
no sure knowledge to fall back upon, he is brought to a standstill of hesitation and 
suspense. Which road is right? And how shall his perplexity be resolved? There are but 
two alternatives: he must either blindly and arbitrarily take his course, trusting to luck for 
the outcome, or he must discover grounds for the conclusion that a given road is right. 
Any attempt to decide the matter by thinking will involve inquiring into other facts, 
whether brought to mind by memory, or by further observation, or by both. The 
perplexed wayfarer must carefully scrutinize what is before him and he must cudgel his 
memory. He looks for evidence that will support belief in favor of either of the roads- for 
evidence that will weight down one suggestion. He may climb a tree; he may go first in 
this direction, then in that, looking, in either case, for signs, clues, indications. He wants 
something in the nature of a signboard or a map, and his reflection is aimed at the 
discovery of facts that will serve his purpose. (pp. 13-14.) 
 
The perplexed wayfarer enacts reflective thinking when he climbs a tree and looks for 
signs, clues and indications. The condition for reflective thinking lies in the capacity to adopt a 




discover. What is to be discovered? Dewey rightly suggests “ facts” or “signs” that will serve to 
find direction at the crossroad. But first, the openness of the situation shall be discovered and 
appreciated. Reflective thinking takes the situation as never complete, rather it “considers its 
bearing upon what may be but is not yet”(1916, p.147). The present is taken in as organically 
connected to future possibilities. It is not closed up. The reflective mind is not “mechanical”, it is 
not “isolated” nor “severed” (p. 145). It is open to meaning, alive and connected. Thinking opens 
the space of future possibilities in the present and by contemplating “what may be but is not yet” 
it takes the form of an exercise of responsibility. Openness to future possibilities does not happen 
at the expense of the present: “to live in the present is compatible with condensation of far- 
reaching meanings in the present” (1933, p. 287).  
Above I was wondering how the reflective capacity is one with intuitive thinking (see p. 
21). The puzzling movement for which the present is apprehended intuitively in the moment but 
understood later in reflection is made possible by gaining a different way of looking at the 
present. This way of looking consists in understanding that the present situation is unlocked and 
alive, not “half dead”(1916, p.159). It stems from a double movement of the mind, backward and 
forward connection with the experience. It is nourished by the sense that time is not the linear 
succession of severed instants, but it is the duration in which meaning is found as that organic 
connection with the things experienced. The thinker has a  playful seriousness that balances the 
near and far by maintaining the present open to future possibilities. She is reflective because the 
swinging movement of her mind manages to keep the present open by bringing out, e-ducating, 
the implicit meaning of her experience. This Dewey means when he asserts that “thinking is the 





7- Conclusion: should teachers feel at home in the classroom? 
Jackson proposed that teachers “ see differently”. This chapter has been an examination 
of this “seeing differently”. The suggestion that teachers are at home in the classroom because 
they see differently has been problematized. The idea of teachers’ “expertise” has been ruled out 
as a sufficient account, while the sense that teachers go through experience in  a different way 
has been maintained. That way entails that familiarity and foreignness are perceived as both 
present in the classroom and in the educative experience. Teaching routines have been looked at 
as an instance of the process through which teachers feel at home in the classroom. Reliance on 
teaching routines is not thoughtless and it is better understood as a response to the classroom 
inherent uncertainty. A key element has been recognized in the problematic idea that acting 
under time pressure does not let room for thinking. From here, two threads have been gathered: 
first the thread regarding the dynamic of reflective thinking in the present; and second the thread 
of how to deal with the situation’s instability and novelty. Reflective thinking has been analyzed 
as the movement of the mind combining intuition and reflection in the present with a playful 
seriousness. Traits of openness and responsibility characterize it.  
The image of the wayfarer well captures all this. The wayfarer “looks” from her tree, a 
concerned and detached position, and explores the new land in which she is traveling. Is she at 
home in the new land? No, she is not. She is and stays a newcomer. She is on the road. 
“Thinking is the method of the educative experience”. Method means the way, the road through 
which and after which6.  By thinking, the teacher is not always at home. But she is “at home” in 
the habit of paying attention to the familiar and unfamiliar traits of the experience. Hansen 
                                                6	  From the Ancient Greek meta, (see 
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0057%3Aentry%3Dmeta%2F C. II ) 





(2007) writes: “I saw that my education both inside and outside the schools had been a process, 
at least in part, of learning how to pay attention to the everyday and the apparently ordinary. I 
realized this was a habit in which I was at home” (p.42). 
The teacher is at home in the habit of paying attention to the educational element of what 
happens in the classroom. She is familiar with that way of seeing that lets her discover novelty in 
the well known and familiarity in the new and foreign. “Learning how to see things differently,” 
writes Jackson,  
whether inside the classroom or anywhere else, makes a great deal of difference in 
how we respond to our surroundings. Waking to a fresh view of things invariably alters 
the way we think and subsequently act, even though the connections between perception, 
thought, and action may be greatly attenuated and all but impossible to verify. This is the 
faith of both art and science, whose insights continually awaken us to an altered vision of 
the world.  How does this awakening happen? There doubtless are many ways that it 
occurs (…) I would rather suggest that the common and ordinary aspects of our lives to 
which classrooms certainly belong, are precisely the parts that call most urgently for 
renewed vision. 
(P. Jackson in reissue of Life in Classrooms, intro, p. xviii) 
 
Classrooms, Jackson glosses, as part of our common life, call most urgently for a new 
way of seeing. They call for teachers that find a home in the habit of paying attention to the 
educational elements of the experiences taking place within the classroom walls. It is perhaps 
ironic that my guiding metaphor in exploring how to develop this capacity is that of a traveler, 
who breaks out of any wall and leaps in to new landscapes. Marco Polo, who introduced this 
chapter, embodies the traveling teacher. All he learned is condensed in the last scene of Invisible 
Cities, in which he develops magnificently detailed stories and descriptions by looking closely at 
the ebony square in the chessboard that stands between him and the emperor, his student. All his 
travels are gathered and collected in the moment in which, motionless, he leans forward and 




small square. Like a teacher within the enclosed walls of his classroom, Marco Polo concentrates 
in the given situation all he has learned when wandering outside. By attending to the situation, he 
finds in it the space to break it open, he unlocks the square piece and refracts it in the myriad 
possibilities of meaning. He accepts responsibility for it because he sees that the present is ripe 
with far reaching meanings, offered to the attentive gaze of teachers and students that know how 
to open them. This is the way of reflective thinking, and she who walks down this way is on the 













This chapter looks at ways the metaphor of teacher as traveler is sustained and articulated 
through considering Graeco-Roman thinking about travel and movement  in its relation to 
learning, teaching, knowledge and wisdom. Here we find an articulation of this relation together 
with a sense of its inherent ambivalence.  The chapter is composed of two sections. In the first 
part, I posit that traveling is conducive to knowledge and wisdom. I propose the explicit 
connection between travel and knowledge in Herodotus as the birth certificate of this idea. The 
introduction of the figure of the itinerant teacher in Greece accompanies a consideration of the 
mythological representation of Chiron, the ideal teacher of heroes and gods. 
In the second part, I address  Seneca's criticism of the idea that movement and travel are 
conducive to knowledge and wisdom He asks: “Can wisdom, the greatest of all the arts, be 
picked up on a journey?” (Ep. CIV) where the implied answer is: no, it can not.  When Seneca 
calls into question the philosophical value of travel, another focus of interest emerges: that of 
familiarity and of home. The metaphor of travel, which in the dissertation crystallizes the idea 








2. “As one who loves learning and wisdom you have journeyed the earth”: the itinerant 
teacher in Ancient Greece 
 
In the ancient world, teachers travel because of many reasons. Because they possess a 
knowledge that is to be shared, and useful to different communities; because something in their 
work makes them similar to physicians or healers; because they can be seen as intermediate 
creatures that share traits of different worlds.  Teachers travel because traveling makes some 
kind of learning possible. We see this in the figure of one of the earliest travelers: Herodotus, 
who celebrates wandering as a means of acquiring knowledge.  
For the following section, I follow Silvia Montiglio’s outstanding analysis in Wandering 
in Ancient Greek Culture (2005). In the archaic era, travel was a dangerous undertaking, a life 
risking condition very seldom chosen, most often passively undergone by the traveler. Travel 
was a dreaded destiny as it is suggested  by Odysseus’ line that  “for mortals, nothing is worse 
than wandering” (Odyssey, 15.343). The reasons whereof were multiple: from the objectively 
harsh conditions of  seafaring to the archaic sense that to wander was a punishment inflicted by 
the gods, to the perception that wandering was the destiny of unburied bodies. The assumption 
was that wandering connoted lack, homelessness, exile. In the archaic use, the verbs used for 
wandering (planaomai and alaomai) express “a notion of unstructured moving around or away 
from a path.” Moreover, they signify a movement outward or away, like that of the exile who is 
expelled from his city. Finally, they mean “traveling far and wide” and they are applied to “a 
category of men of learning who go about the world for sake of knowledge.” For example, 
Hecataeus was credited with having perfected the map of the earth because of his experience as a 




prevalent at this point in history. In archaic times, a conception of wandering as the movement of 
the outcast prevailed.   
Wandering was inherently ambivalent, and possibly still is. A wanderer “could be praised 
for his superior knowledge or blamed for his idle taking” (Montiglio, 2005, p.3). Odysseus, the 
archaic wanderer, was both a liar and a godlike stranger. Dionysus, the wanderer god, roamed 
the world thus becoming “a stranger”. He could not be pinned down because he has not fixity, he 
could not be grasped because he is multiple. He is the god of liquid elements and he is like the 
sea: “wine colored” (p.75).  His strangeness “culminates in madness, the illness that makes its 
victims wander.” He lives in proximity to the human condition. 
The ambivalence of the condition of wandering consists in the perception that wandering 
is both a “mark of helplessness” and “yet of superior power” (p.91). To wander means “ to know 
everything and to know nothing” (p. 3).  Even though wandering acquired a more positive 
meaning throughout the centuries, “thanks to the glamorization by sages and men of learning 
who attached this condition to themselves” (p.4), it preserved its ambivalence.  The end of the 
chapter considers Seneca’s radical question about the value of travel for acquiring wisdom: is it a 
deviation from it or a means to it? The question inhabits the very experience of wandering. Now 
let us step back and consider the moment in which the connection between traveling or 
wandering and meaning is affirmed.  
Herodotus signals the shift in  perception and practices of wandering. In his work, 
wandering becomes the condition for knowing. He can write because he has traveled and seen. 
And, conversely, he has traveled not because of some divine punishment or madness, but in 
order to gain experience and information for his story writing. In The Histories he inserts his 




shift in the perception and evaluation of travel in comparison to the earlier centuries of Greek 
civilization.  Such a change is remarkable because it highlights a constitutive fluctuation of the 
idea.    
That traveling and wandering are means to acquire wisdom is made clear from the first 
paragraphs of book I. Here Herodotus   writes about Solon (whom Montiglio suggests to be 
Herodotus’ alter ego, p. 133) who had left Athens after reforming the city’s laws and had 
journeyed to Egypt before arriving to Lydia. Welcomed at the court of king Croesus in Sardis, 
Solon is addressed by the king Croesus who highlights the philosophical aspect of his journeys.  
“My guest [xenos] from Athens, we have heard much about you in Sardis for your 
learning and wisdom [sophia] and for your travels [plane]. We hear that as one who loves 
learning and wisdom [ hos philosopheon] you have journeyed the earth, for the sake of 
seeing it [ theoria]. So now I want to ask you who is the happiest man you have ever 
come across” (Herodotus, The Histories, I.30.2 my translation).  
The king’s welcome to Solon crucially depicts the relation between travel and sophia. Solon has 
traveled around in that he is “philosophizing” (the Greek uses a present participle, that I take to 
indicate the activity of loving or pursuing wisdom more than an identification with a role or 
figure, such as could be indicated by a different word choice like: “as a philosopher”) for the 
sake of seeing the world. Herodotus’ choice of the term theoria to describe the cause for which 
Solon travels is of particular interest. Montiglio  (2005, p. 131) explains that “theoria is the 
contemplation of a spectacle from a distance”, and the term  is eventually chosen by philosophers 
after the fifth century for the contemplative life. She suggests that theoria should be taken to 




contemplation”. This is supported by comparison with another term, theasthai, a verb that refers 
to the contemplation of spectacles in the way of watching.  
Croesus mistakes Solon’s love of seeing the world for mere, shallow watching it. He 
welcomes the guest and shows him his riches asking him to “watch” (theasthai, not theorein) the 
spectacle (Herodotus, I.30.2). He hopes to impress the guest and to obtain the sage’s designation 
as “ happiest man” in the known world. The gaze of Croesus is less intelligent and deep than the 
gaze of someone who sees the world because he is loving wisdom.  He is a tourist or a voyeur 
whereas Solon embodies the philosophical traveler. Still, even from his superficial stance, 
Croesus perceives that Solon’s undertaking is related to his love of wisdom and that it enables 
him to answer a question about human happiness. Friedman (2006) notes that “Solon, like 
Herodotus, or maybe, we should say, Herodotus, like Solon, is capable of a certain ability to see 
human affairs in the broadest of possible contexts. It is an ability that is linked, for both of them, 
with their experience of travel” (p.167). She continues “whatever type of theoretical knowledge 
both Solon and Herodotus might have, is inextricably linked with their own placelessness and 
engagement with theoria”.  
I want to consider the connection between the activity of philosophizing, that of 
traveling, and a view on human fulfillment and happiness. It is my intention to show that this 
connection shows itself in the act of teaching, as it will become clearer in the course of the 
chapter. In order to do this, I look at some lines in the opening part of The Histories. Herodotus 
writes: “I will cover minor and major human settlements equally, because most of those who 
were important in the past have diminished in significance by now, and those which were great 
in my own time were small in times past. I will mention both equally because I know that human 




context of a paragraph in which Herodotus introduces some considerations about his method for 
writing. He establishes himself as an inquirer-historian  by declaring his intention to probe every 
human settlement, on the ground of two considerations. The first one is factual and it implies an 
appreciation of the flowing of human history: some cities that are important now were less 
important in the past and vice versa. The second reason is presented in conjunction with the first. 
It expresses the conviction that the human condition and its perfection, happiness, are not fixed 
and stabilized because they never stay put. As a “student and observer of human happiness, he 
commits himself to following its migrant ways” (Friedman, p.166). 
Herodotus’ self-acknowledged method for his travels appears to allow for a potentially 
unlimited scope of movement. Montiglio comments that “the fifth century world travelers 
intentionally take multiple roads: their only destination is the world itself. They  may know (or 
think they  know) where they are  going each time, but they cannot predict (and do not want to 
predict) all the directions they will follow or even the end of the voyage” (p.128). The method 
for this open and centerless travel is justified on the ground of the human experience. Because 
human happiness is not fixed, is transient, mutable, capricious and unforeseeable in its 
manifestations, the individual who pursues an understanding of it commits herself to traveling. 
The realm being explored is then, importantly, the realm of the human in its manifold 
experiences. Within this realm, therefore, the traveler wanders with a movement that proceeds 
from the variability of the experience itself.  
The relation between theoria and placelessness  allows for an understanding of theoria as 
“productive and creative engagement with the foreign”(Friedman, p.166). Solon choses to leave 
his hometown, Athens, and by doing so he elects to be atopos or without a place. The dislocated 




Similarly we saw in the previous chapter that Marco Polo left Venezia, his hometown, 
thus taking on the condition of homelessness. We saw that this condition, while allowing for the 
development of a special gaze on the world, also nourishes the journey in that “home” is both the 
place left and yearned for. Displacement is the experience from which the traveler’s gaze is 
directed, perhaps confusingly, but also creatively, in every direction: forward, backward, and 
everywhere.   
With Herodotus we now see that the capacity of theoria is developed in displacement: 
leaving one’s home is condition for the encounter with the foreign. Being able to see it and to 
consider it in view of questions of human happiness arises from the practice of philosophizing 
(The Histories, I, 30,2). A moving image that captures the idea that theoria springs out of 
placelessness is offered by the story  of Arion the poet.  
The story of Arion appears in what is seemingly a digression from the main line of 
storytelling in book I of The Histories. It comes immediately before the introduction of the 
longer story of Croesus, in which Solon the sage appears. The proximity between the two 
figures, that of Solon the legislator and itinerant sage, and that of Arion the poet, singer and 
traveler seems to suggest a significant communality between the two. Arion “was the leading 
cithara-player of his day” and he was credited with the invention of dithyramb and the 
production of the first one in Corinth (The Histories, I, 24). He was based in Corinth at the court 
of Periander, even if he was originally from Methymna. Herodotus tells that Arion set out for a 
travel because he wanted to see Italy and Sicily. When he decided to fare back home in Corinth, 
he hired a crew of Corinthian sailors for the travel “since he trusted no one more than 
Corinthians”. An undeserved trust, as we are informed that the sailors plotted to throw him 




When Arion found out, he tried to convince them to spare his life. The sailors “were 
unmoved”. Herodotus continues: 
 In this desperate situation, since that was their decision, Arion asked their 
permission to stand on the thwarts in his full ceremonial costume and sing; when he had 
finished singing, he said, he would do away with himself. They liked the idea of having 
the opportunity to listen to the best singer in the world, so they pulled back from the stern 
in the middle of the ship. Arion put on his full ceremonial costume and took hold of his 
cithara. He stood on the thwarts and sang the high-pitched tune all the way through; at the 
end of the song he threw himself into the sea as he was, in his full ceremonial costume. 
(I.24) 
 
Arion is not simply a poet: Herodotus stresses that he is “the first” to invent a specific meter, and 
also the best performer. There is something exemplary in the way in which he practices his art. 
Though not explicitly claimed, Arion’s status as court poet is easily assumed by the reader, as 
well as his work-related travel as itinerant poet. At the beginning of the Arion digression, the 
narrator announces it as a “wonder”. There are indeed many wonders in the little story: Arion’s 
art; his betrayed trust in Corinthian sailors; his courageous choice about how to end his life. 
Truly, the image of the poet in his performance gear singing his last song standing on the ship in 
the middle of the sea stands as a striking case for the idea that human fortune never stays too 
long in the same place. It is a wonder to contemplate. Friedman (2006) comments that “it is a 
perfectly encapsulated image of the intersection of [Arion’s] techne and his itinerancy”(p.171). 
The poet performs his craft and with it he also enacts his agency in deciding how to exit life. The 
dramatic image of Arion expresses at the same time the vulnerability of the itinerant poet and the 
power of song for one’s life. The poet with his song exerts mastery upon his art and his life even 
in the life threatening situations due to his itinerancy. He has no place, but he stands on the 
moving ship in the moving sea. Wearing his ritual performance costume and holding on his 




consists in the fact that he survived. A dolphin- possibly sent by Poseidon- “ picked him up and 
carried him to Taenarum”(I, 24).  
Arion, the best poet of his time, saved by a dolphin, eternizes the figure of the itinerant 
bard with his  power and powerlessness. Herodotus insistently remarks both his exceptional 
talent and his professionalism (see the many references to his gear). Arion belonged to a varied 
professional category of itinerant practitioners: the demiourgoi. A demiourgos was a public 
worker or handicraftsman. With different professions falling under the definition in different 
times, in general it could be said that the term indicated a class of free professional, self 
employed and not tied to any particular community, who made a living by traveling from polis to 
polis offering their services. In Greece, the teacher-professor was considered a professional in 
the class of   demiourgoi. Teachers enjoyed a special status as itinerant professionals.  
 In Classical Athens the teacher enjoyed the same social status and remuneration as a 
physician. The Sophists are described as itinerant teachers who offered education for a fee  (see 
Plato, Protagoras 313d) at times with some admixture of charlatanism. Later in the Hellenistic 
period, when education was a public responsibility, the paidonomos and ephebes might engage 
skilled itinerant teachers for short periods. Research on teachers in the Hellenistic period portrays 
the wandering teacher as one of the professionals who lent their work from home to home 
(Nilsson, 1955; Cribiore 2001). They were called kathegetai: “itinerant teachers who moved 
from town to town offering their services and looking for better employment” (Cribiore, 2001, 
p.53). A kathegethes lent his services to male and female students who lived far from the large 
educational centers.  Teachers of secondary education who worked as private instructors were 




A testimony of the teachers’ itinerancy is found in a papyrus letter, written to Ptolemaios 
by his mother. She writes: “Do not hesitate to write to me about anything you might need. It 
grieved me to learn from the daughter of our kateghetes Diogenes that he sailed down, for I had 
no anxiety about him, knowing that he was going to take care of you to the best of his ability” (as 
quoted in Cribiore, 2001, p. 48).  The letter continues with the mother’s recommendation that the 
son follows his pedagogue’s advice in choosing a new suitable teacher. Teachers’ itinerancy 
depended on their precarious financial and social position (p. 54) though it also revealed their 
important role in the ancient educational scenario.  Contemporary Roman legislation guaranteed 
same privileges to physicians and teachers (Edict of Vespasian, referenced in I. Hadot, p. 223).   
If we move from historical considerations to an exploration of mythological 
representations, we find that tradition held the centaur Chiron as the educator of heroes and 
gods. The  “wise centaur” (Iliad, XI, 832) was the legendary teacher of many, like  Asclepius, 
Actateon, Jason and Achilles. Henri-Irénée Marrou (1956) explains that multiple sources depict 
Chiron teaching Achilles the arts of hunting, horsemanship, javelin-throwing, and  playing the 
lyre. He also taught the young semi-god the art of surgery and pharmacopeia (p.7). The very  
Asclepius, the God of medicine, learned the art of healing from Chiron (Iliad, IV, 218). Chiron 
derives his name from the word cheir: Chiron could be understood as “He of the Skillful Hands” 
(Robbins, 1975, p. 211). The many arts in Chiron’s curriculum express the ideal of the knightly 
hero in Greece’s archaic era.  
However, the figure of Chiron survives its Homeric ethos and comes to represent the 
ideal teacher. Numerous representations in the centuries contribute to the image of Chiron as a 
caring and skilled teacher who takes charge of teaching the art of living. Ovid (Fasti, V, 379-




Mount Pelion, where he was hospitably received by the centaur Chiron and his pupil, the young 
Achilles. While admiring Hercules' splendid weapons, Chiron accidentally dropped one poisoned 
arrow on his foot. The wound was incurable, and unbearably painful, leading Chiron to  
voluntarily renounce  his immortality and die7. Of interest for the purposes of my inquiry is that 
the teachings of Chiron seem related to the art of healing but also to the art of being master of 
one’s own life – to the point of eventually deciding to relinquish immortality if it means 
prolonging a life of suffering.  
Chiron is the centaur who surrenders his immortality, the itinerant practitioner always in 
movement thanks to his horse legs, the skilled healer who nevertheless could not heal his wound, 
a creature in between several worlds: the human, the animal, the divine.  Chiron is a teacher.  
In Ancient Greece, knowledge and wisdom are acquired and performed in movement. 
The “student of the world” embodied by Herodotus’ Solon explores the world in order to gain 
knowledge of human things and of human happiness. The “itinerant practitioner” as seen 
dramatically with Arion, and with less pathos in the brief exposition regarding the social status of 
demiourgos, roams the world in order to display and communicate his wisdom and knowledge. I 
want to point out that any neat distinction between the two types of wandering with respect to 
their goals is artificial, because “the teacher learns while he goes about to teach, and the student 
develops a reputation for wisdom while he goes about to learn” (Montiglio, 2005, p. 100).  
The  tradition about the “Seven Sages” recognizes that teaching and learning are 
interconnected. A Sage is usually credited with having traveled to research, and with dispensing 
his wisdom down the road. Solon is the philosophical wanderer who is also mentioned by 
Herodotus as a sophistes who came from Sardis to Greece as a teacher (The Histories, I, 29). In 




Plato’s Laws the Athenian Stranger has traveled to Crete as both someone who has things to 
teach and who wants to learn. It is truly difficult to separate teaching and learning in the travels 
of a wise individual, because they are co-implied into one another: one cannot teach unless he 
learns. The teacher/student moves along with a movement that does not resemble a straight 
journey, but rather can be described as “a curvilinear and centerless movement” that is 
“organically multidirectional”(Montiglio, 2005, p. 139) 
3. “What benefit has travel of itself ever been able to give anyone?”: a radical objection  
According to a contrasting perspective, the unpredictable movement of the curious 
traveler is not necessarily conducive  to thinking, and particularly to that thinking that searches 
wisdom: philosophical thinking.  Rather, because it  encourages dispersion  and fragmentation of 
the gaze, that movement can cause leakage and loss of focus instead of motivation to exploration 
and inquiry. The outward movement of the traveler can indeed hinder his inward attention. The 
multifold learning of many things (polimatheia) achieved by engaging in human contact through 
travel can take place in opposition to wisdom. Traveling shuns the sustained, focused application 
required for a course of inquiry towards wisdom.   
Recalling my guiding image of the teacher as traveler, the radical objection I am 
considering would translate in a different image: that of the static, resident teacher. Why scatter 
or dislocate when all a teacher needs is focus, mastery of her content knowledge, and control of 
the classroom? It could also translate into the idea of the specialist who never steps out of her 
“discipline”. Why explore different perspectives when they could threaten the integrity of 
scientific boundaries? Finally, it would translate into the thinker who follows a “straight path” 




frames of reference.  Preference for this way of thinking is informed by a radical criticism of the 
value of movement for the pursuit of knowledge and thinking.  
While I do not subscribe to this criticism, I find that a thorough examination of the 
philosophical argument underlying it will provide a decisive insight into the value of movement 
itself. The next chapters take on the challenge and find that the value of movement can be really 
maintained only if its relation to the idea of home is preserved. In the last section of this chapter, 
I decide to explore the referred standpoint in Seneca’s formulation. Seneca does not recommend 
travel to the aspiring wise man. 
Seneca  was born in the year 4 B.C. at Corduba (nowadays Spain) at the border of the 
Roman empire. He was “born in the province, educated at Rome, prominent at the bar, a 
distinguished exile, a trusted minister of the State, and a doomed victim of a capricious emperor” 
(Gummere, 1916, p. ix). He was a philosopher, a writer, a politician, and for some years the tutor 
of the young Nero. He committed suicide to avoid violent death at the hands of Nero’s 
emissaries in 65 A.D. The Epistulae morales ad Lucilium is  a collection of letters addressed to a 
younger friend, written with  the clear intention of educating Lucilius to a philosophical life.  In 
it, amongst themes like the relevance of philosophy for life ( Ep. XVI), on silence and study ( Ep. 
LVI), or on good company (Ep. LXII), Seneca addresses the theme of travel ( Ep.XXVIII, CIV). 
The emotional tone of the correspondence reveals that the themes discussed are germane and that 
they relate to the inquiry about how to live. At the opening of Epistle XXVII, for example, 
Seneca explains that he gives advice to Lucilius not as a shameless man who wants to “cure his 
fellows” when he is “ill himself” (XXVII,1. p. 193), but rather  he discusses with his friend  
“troubles that concern [them] both”. He illustrates their common condition with the telling 




co-shared philosophical inquiry and the awareness that such inquiry deals with matters of life 
and death.  
Epistle XXVIII begins with a question, replying to a letter from Lucilius in which he 
complained that a travel he had entertained had not helped him to feel less sad or less weighted 
down. Seneca asks: “are you surprised?” and he continues: “You need a change of soul rather 
than of climate” (XXVIIII, 1, p. 199). The human being cannot free himself from his own faults 
by simply moving his body. His faults will follow him wherever he travels (XXVIII, 2, p. 199). 
With a rhetorical device, the exact same argument is repeated after this formulation in the second 
person, this time reported as an utterance by Socrates: “why do you wonder that globe-trotting 
does not help you, seeing that you take always yourself with you? The reason which set you 
wandering is ever at your heels.” Showcasing the futility of such an attempt, Seneca continues by 
questioning the pleasure derived from “seeing new lands” and from “surveying cities and spots 
of interest.” He comments: “ all this bustle is useless (…) because you fell along with yourself.” 
Traveling to shake off life’s troubles and burden recalls the movement of a ship with a 
cargo:  “when stationary (it) makes no trouble, but when it shifts to this side or that, it causes the 
vessel to heel more quickly in the direction where it has settled” (XXVIIII, 3, p. 201). We are 
followed by our baggage if we let it be attached to us, and our movement is fettered by the 
weight of it. Setting oneself in motion while one is troubled is like “shaking up a sick 
man”(XXVIII, 3, p.201), in that the unrest causes even more pain.  
Indeed, the theme of travel as attempt at healing a sickness, probably existential, is 
retrieved  in another letter in which Seneca comments that “the remedies which are most helpful 
are those which are not interrupted. You should not allow your quiet, or the oblivion to which 




if one moves around. The Stoic preoccupation with self mastery implies a steady uninterrupted 
work on oneself, in condition of retirement and quiet. Movement, the kind of movement that 
consists in constant wavering, “means an unsteady spirit”(LXIX, 1). Seneca fears the 
fragmentation of the spirit when it outflows because of travel. Travel crystallizes the straying 
from the philosophical way.  
In the XXXVII letter, a clear case is made in favor or the straight line movement which 
describes the philosophical life. In order to free oneself, one has to exert power on his life, so as 
to overcome the necessities that cannot be escaped. “This way”, he continues, “will be afforded 
you by philosophy. Betake yourself therefore to philosophy if you wish to be free” (XXXVII, 3, 
p. 255). Seneca maintains the conviction that there is only one way to achieve freedom: “there is 
but one path leading thither, and it is a straight path; you will not go astray. Proceed with steady 
step.” [Una ad hanc fert via, et quidem recta; non aberrabis.Vade certo gradu] (XXXVII, 4, p. 
255). The straight path of philosophy is in facts the opposite of the disorderly movement, or 
better, in Seneca’s word choice, whirling [in medio turbine rerum] in the midst of which the 
individual is dazed and stupefied, asking: “how did I get here?”(XXXVII, 5, p.257).   
Here we are at the heart of the problem: spinning on himself, confused and lost, the astray 
traveler has lost his way to wisdom. The philosophical journey has a centripetal nature, which 
“demands a highly concentrated mental effort, a relentless vigilance (intentio). Traveling is a 
threat to intentio because it prevents the mind from taking hold of itself” ( Montiglio, 2006, p. 
563). Hadot (2002) writes: " Philosophy was a unique act which had to be practiced at each 
instant, with constantly renewed attention, which means constant tension and consciousness, as 
well as vigilance exercised at every moment"(p.138, quoted in Montiglio). The steady work of 




erratic movement. "But how," you ask, "does one attain that goal?  You do not need to cross the 
Pennine or Graian hills, or traverse the Candavian waste, or face the Syrtes, or Scylla, or 
Charybdis, although you have travelled through all these places for the bribe of a petty 
governorship; the journey for which nature has equipped you is safe and pleasant” (XXXI, 9, p. 
227). The secure and straight journey is again the philosophical one: iter tutum et iucundum. 
Attention to the pursuit of wisdom is endangered by distraction.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, Seneca rewrites the exemplarity of the Homeric hero 
Odysseus.  Recalling the episode in which Odysseus, sailing past the island of the Sirens, had 
himself tied to the mast so that he was able to listen to the Sirens’ song, without being seduced 
by it, Seneca indicates that the hero is not to be taken as a model. The crewmen instead, with 
their ears plugged by wax, are those who should inspire Lucilius. “In short, you will be a wise 
man, if you stop up your ears; nor is it enough to close them with wax; you need a denser stopple 
than that which they say Ulysses used for his comrades. The song which he feared was alluring, 
but came not from every side; the song, however, which you have to fear, echoes round you not 
from a single headland, but from every quarter of the world” (XXXI, 2, p. 223). The world’s 
seduction skirts Lucilius and everyone who is on the path to wisdom. A severe self inflicted 
deafness seems the best choice in view of the goal.  
Though impressed by the rhetorical effect of such a striking proposition, I will now 
attempt at balancing this view, always drawing upon Seneca’s letters. Even when expressing his 
vehement distrust, the philosopher seems to maintain an (unwilling) ambivalence towards the 
appraisal of travel in view of the philosophical life. Montiglio (2006) in her excellent study 




is concerned with how to maintain his health in old age, to honor his wife Paulina’s love for him. 
A good part of the letter is focused on the blaming and disapproving of travel. He writes,  
What benefit has travel of itself ever been able to give anyone?  No restraint upon 
pleasure, no bridling of desire, no checking of bad temper, no crushing of the wild 
assaults of passion, no opportunity to rid the soul of evil. Travelling cannot give us 
judgment, or shake off our errors; it merely holds our attention for a moment by a certain 
novelty, as children pause to wonder at something unfamiliar.  Besides, it irritates us, 
through the wavering of a mind which is suffering from an acute attack of sickness; the 
very motion makes it more fitful and nervous.  Hence the spots we had sought most 
eagerly we quit still more eagerly, like birds that flit and are off as soon as they have 
alighted. (CIV, 14) 
 
Attention in travel is superficially excited, it grasps an object of momentary seduction, and 
quickly leaves it, in result leaving the mind aggravated and nervous. Traveling wields a vexation 
on the integrity and endurance of one’s mind. The long list of things that traveling fails to 
achieve for human freedom comprises judgment, truthfulness, self mastery and morality. 
Straying from the straight course, an expression made popular by the later formulation of the 
Christian precepts, is an accurate description of what Seneca takes travel to cause to human 
existence. Remarkably, to such powerful restatement of his ascertained position on the theme, 
follows a beautifully convincing list of the discoveries allowed for by travel. He continues: 
What travel will give is familiarity with other nations: it will reveal to you mountains of 
strange shape, or unfamiliar tracts of plain, or valleys that are watered by everflowing 
springs, or the characteristics of some river that comes to our attention. We observe how 
the Nile rises and swells in summer, or how the Tigris disappears, runs underground 
through hidden spaces, and then appears with unabated sweep; or how the Maeander, that 
oft-rehearsed theme and plaything of the poets [exercitatio et ludus], turns in frequent 
bendings, and often in winding comes close to its own channel before resuming its 
course. But this sort of information will not make better or sounder men of us. (CIV, 15). 
 
The main element of interest in the lines I quoted lies in the emotional contrast between the 
concluding line, reaffirming the uselessness of travel, and the lengthy, poetic enumeration of the 




new shapes and qualities of a beautiful valley, and from the contemplation of the rising and 
flooding of the Nile, as well as of the puzzling course of the Tigris. More importantly, the 
Maeander, with its twisting and turning flow, is mentioned as the river that lends itself to the 
exercise and play of the poets. The Maeander’s serpentine shape is the exemplary challenge to 
the ideal of the straight unwavering route that one should follow in life. Seneca condemns this 
dynamic, yet the shift in his voice signals that he possibly harbors contradictory feelings about 
his position. Montiglio (2006) convincingly explains that “The Meander carries away the 
traveling Seneca along its sinuous banks and drives him farther away from his previous focus by 
conjuring up poetry as sheer entertainment, a playful diversion [ludus] that replicates the 
playfulness of the river itself, a meandering of the mind away from the straight path to wisdom.”  
It is an “enraptured detour” after which Seneca takes on once again the severe voice warning 
against the dangers of travel, “as if startled out of a reverie” (p.567).  
Another insight I want to borrow from Montiglio’s study regards the idea that in the 
quoted passage literary practice is represented as a form of travel. She notes that “traveling, 
reading and writing are indeed intertwined in Seneca’s prose”(p.567). Other lines in the same 
letter reveal this connection. After repeatedly having warned Lucilius, Seneca says:  
If you would enjoy your travels, make healthy the companion of your travels.  (…) The 
miser, the swindler, the bully, the cheat, who will do you much harm merely by being 
near you, are within you.  Change therefore to better associations: live with the Catos, 
with Laelius, with Tubero.  Or, if you enjoy living with Greeks also, spend your time 
with Socrates and with Zeno: the former will show you how to die if it be necessary; the 
latter how to die before it is necessary. (CIV, 22) 
 
In the movement natural to one’s life, it is important to associate with sage companions. 
Evidently, the ones mentioned can provide company in the conversation with their ideas and 




written or reporting sayings and stories. In fact, reading could be considered a form of travel. 
When discussing Lucilius’ reading habits, Seneca warns him against reading many books in a 
cursory way. He writes:  
Be careful, however, lest this reading of many authors and books of every sort may tend 
to make you discursive and unsteady.  You must linger among a limited number of 
master thinkers, and digest their works, if you would derive ideas which shall win firm 
hold in your mind.  Everywhere means nowhere.  When a person spends all his time in 
foreign travel, he ends by having many acquaintances, but no friends. (…)  There is 
nothing so efficacious that it can be helpful while it is being shifted about.  And in 
reading of many books is distraction. (II, 1) 
Unrest is dangerous for the mind. The traveler to many places is like the reader of many 
books: both lose focus and by hurrying here and there, do not let themselves become familiar 
with the ideas or places they are visiting. Their minds are not stable, and thus not at ease with 
themselves. Reading many books from different genres is like an  unstructured, dispersive travel. 
Shifting, dwindling, turning: for Seneca, these are unhealthy movements that ultimately 
undermine the struggle towards stability and self mastery.  
Seneca’s distrust of the potential in travel to foster a philosophical life becomes even 
more evident when contrasted to the advised counter-strategy. This lesson can be found again in 
the Epistle XXVIII with which I have begun this examination. Following the lines in which he 
chastises the futility of travel for dispelling one’s own state of illness caused by lack of wisdom, 
he writes: 
That trouble once removed, all change of scene will become pleasant; though you may be 
driven to the uttermost ends of the earth, in whatever corner of a savage land you may 
find yourself, that place, however forbidding, will be to you a hospitable abode.  The 
person you are matters more than the place to which you go; for that reason we should 
not make the mind a bondsman to any one place.  Live in this belief: "I am not born for 
any one corner of the universe; this whole world is my country”. (XXVIII, 4-5) 
 
The interpretative line that sees Seneca’s inward-looking conception of wisdom as undermining 




consideration of the above cited lines. Travel could conduct the person to wisdom as long as it is 
experienced alongside with a process of familiarization of the world. Seneca shares full-
heartedly the Stoic teaching on cosmopolitanism. He proposes here that the aspiring sage will be 
able to find herself at home in the world, if she will have made her way towards it through an 
intentional, focused enlargement of her circle of concern.  
The complex concept of oikeiosis  expresses the ethical movement of expansion of one’s 
own areas of concern. Oikeiosis is derived from oikos, that in Greek signifies “house”, 
“household”, or any dwelling place. Some thing is oikeion (in or of the house, family, kin) to the 
individual when it is the individual’s own. In Stoic philosophy, something is oikeion when it is 
endeared by nature8. One’sprimary concern will be around things that are oikeia to him, because 
they are his own. The impulse toward the preservation of oikeia things is oikeiosis (Brennan, 
2005, p.155-168). The individual’s task is to love and take care of that which is his own, which is 
primarily his reason, and to progressively enlarge this care for things that become oikeia to the 
individual. Hierocles’ model of the individual at the center of expanding concentric circles 
functions upon the process of oikeiosis. Brennan (2005) explains that an oikeion is an object of 
concern, and oikeiosis the process through which, thinking of something as oikeion, one takes the 
oikeion’s welfare as a reason to act. Through this process, others are perceived as one’s own. The 
individual who is on the safe way to wisdom in the Stoic tradition, knows how to progressively 
expand the circle of the familiar. The cosmopolitan ideal informs the sense that it is possible to 
find home everywhere. 
The whole world is “a hospitable abode”(XXVIII, 4) to the individual who works on his 
oikeiosis and gradually expands his circles of concern. However, precisely when such an 




awareness is reached, the vainness of actual exploration and travel becomes evident, or so 
Seneca contends. The epistle continues by restating the conclusion that the sage individual does 
not, really, need to travel but is content with what is close by and familiar. 
If you saw this fact clearly, you would not be surprised at getting no benefit from 
the fresh scenes to which you roam each time through weariness of the old scenes.  For 
the first would have pleased you in each case, had you believed it wholly yours. As it is, 
however, you are not journeying; you are drifting and being driven, only exchanging one 
place for another, although that which you seek, - to live well, - is found everywhere. 
(XXVIII, 4) 
 
Journeying in the world is not a journey to wisdom. Seneca' s stoic ideal of domestica felicitas is 
linked with his intuition that the soul needs to be contained, not exposed to voices and 
landscapes. One should be able to "stay at home" and pursue a philosophical journey dominated 
by vigilance and a mental effort of intentio. Lavery (1980) comments that "If all of life is a 
journey, the Stoic is always on the road; but, at the same time, he is at home everywhere. The 
Stoic is a resident pilgrim" (p.154). The image of the resident pilgrim well embodies both the 
ambivalence of the idea of life’s journey and its inevitableness.  It is undeniable that Seneca felt 
a fascination with travel and with the metaphors of journeying, and his warning that traveling 
may prevent the mind from the disposition of self mastery- taking hold of itself- cannot be taken 
as simply a recommendation for the philosopher to "stay home". It represents instead a radical 
challenge to the established idea that movement conduces to learning and wisdom. Seneca 
individuates and exposes the possibility that movement and exploration of the world could be 








From the discussion of Seneca's ambivalent assessment of the value of travel for the 
philosophical life I have gathered elements for understanding what travel brings to philosophical 
thinking. Not any kind of movement is conducive to better thinking. Not every journey is 
educational. Not every traveler thinks well nor does  every thinker travel well. A study about 
what it is to "travel well" will allow me  to see what it is to " think well" and how to educate for 
this. The primary connection between travel and thinking, posited at the beginning of the 
chapter, is  layered with relations to teaching, education, and philosophical thinking.  
My next chapter works on the hypothesis  that the philosophical educational value of 
traveling resides in the possibility to problematize, disassemble, and reimagine  the relation 
between home (the known, familiar, loved proper and immediate environment to one's life), and 
frontier (the unknown, yet to be explored, unsettling and fascinating land of one's journeying). A 
closer look at that moment in history in which the conception of "home" and "frontier" ruptured 
will shed light on  what it is to travel well.  I suggest  that the traveler has to maintain a sense of " 
journeying residency" that is nourished by the exercise of imagination. This  kind of geographic 
imagination redefines the interplay between known and unknown in terms of curiosity, wonder, 
and capacity to find direction where a map is still not given. This hints at the presence of a 
poetics of thinking which is built around practice, rhetoric and reasonableness more than on 
theory, logic, and rationality  (on this see Toulmin, 2001).  
It is necessary to raise again the question I started this chapter with: How are  thinking 
and traveling  connected? In the next chapter I propose that they are  inherently related due to the 
dynamic quality of thinking itself. This relation becomes clearer when we consider philosophical 




attachment and detachment, belonging and alienation, ultimately challenging a simplistic or 
touristic understanding of traveling.   
In some sense, being a philosopher requires the capacity to leave one's home, to explore 
and follow one's inquiry threads, to get lost and to adopt a viewpoint "from without" one's 
familiar and cherished ways, ideas, and judgments. Socrates serves as a demonstration of the 
problematic relationship between the philosopher and the home: not fully integrated in the polis, 
that punished his biting philosophical thinking, yet Socrates is the citizen who elects to spend his 
life in the agora and who dies as a result. If philosophical thinking is the thinking of the one who 
comes to the inside from outside, who belongs and does not belong, it could be that the capacity 
to "travel well" is a condition for the individual to develop such philosophical disposition.  
The territory I am going to explore next, the work of Michel de Montaigne, is lit by a 
similar concern with the philosophical life viewed in terms of movement. Montaigne, who lives 
and writes at the beginning of the modern age in which conceptions of the world and of travel 
transform, will have much to offer to my inquiry. Through his work, I will connect the theme of 
travel with that of home, which are not even thinkable apart from one another. Home is the 
reference point out of which (and toward which) travel takes place. Understanding this relation 
will allow for a better description of how to travel in order to philosophically think, that is, it will 









How does one become educated?  Does one need to experience the world outside of her 
home in order to learn? Or is the exploration of the outside only a distraction from what really 
matters, namely knowledge of oneself? This chapter looks for a way to reconcile the opposition 
between these two descriptions of one individual’s growth.  I propose that she who travels, who 
leaves home and then comes back, enacts the movement of thinking which makes education 
possible. This becomes clear when traveling implies a confrontation not only with difference, but 
with a radical alterity. Such an encounter is typified, from a European point of view, in the 
discovery of the Americas which marks the beginning of the Modern Age.  
Early Modernity sees an opening of the geographic boundaries that alters the conception 
of travel and of what is gained through travel. This, together with the new cosmology, a different 
conception of science and of method, and the new emphasis posed on the individual 
interpretation of the Scriptures by the Reformation, marks the start of the new era. An 
examination of the multiple factors leading to Modernity lies beyond the boundaries of this 
inquiry; I chose to look at how practices of travel and movement are interconnected with 
conceptions of thinking and learning at the beginning of Modernity in the hope that this will 
offer a plausible response to the Stoic objection, presented in the previous chapter,  that 
experience of the world is not necessary for attaining wisdom.  
In the course of the chapter, I initially consider the new disposition stemming out of the 
Renaissance about the role of experience for the attainment of knowledge. Relying on research in 




that truth be attained only through inquiry based on experience. New objects find wide diffusion 
at this time: the press books. A look at some of their frontispieces helps illustrate the shift of 
Modernity.   Then, I turn to Montaigne as a thinker who lives in between the two conceptions, 
and by considering his travelogue and  selected essays, I sketch a humanistic conception of  
traveling as a path to self discovery. In the next chapter I propose that such a conception be 
reflected in the image  of those who teach as travelers. This image addresses the divide between 
res et verba, or broadly theory and practice, book and road, by offering a way to overcome this 
opposition.   
 
2. A framework 
My intention in the opening section is to introduce some considerations about  the Early 
Modern new understanding of the role of direct experience of the world in the attainment of true 
knowledge. Timothy Grafton’s New Worlds, Ancient Texts. The Power of Tradition and the 
Shock of Discovery (1992) opens with the description of a pivotal scene: the Jesuit Jose’ de 
Acosta was passing to the Indies and was expecting to find a torrid climate zone, according to the 
Aristotelian natural philosophy. Instead, he writes, he and his companions found a temperate 
climate: they were cold. He notes: “What could I do but laugh at Aristotle’s meteorology and his 
philosophy?” (quoted in Grafton, p. 1) Grafton reads the learned traveler’s laughter at his ancient 
books’ teaching  as a sign of the irreversible change in the understanding of the seat of truths, 
and consequently of the relation between the thinker and his books. He writes: “By the early 
seventeenth century knowledge had burst the bounds of the library” (p. 3). Empirical studies in 
astronomy and anatomy had revealed mistakes and inconsistencies in the traditional physical 




biblical accounts on the origins of humanity and on classical cosmographies. Living in a universe 
whose boundaries kept expanding, philosophers and scholars knew that ancient books were not 
central to the intellectual life, or better they were such only in so far as a new awareness of the 
meaning of Antiquity for the current times was made possible.  
Francis Bacon’s idea that the ancient time was the childhood of humanity- Antiquitas 
saeculi juventus mundi (De augmentis scientiarum, Bk I, aph 84) points at the perception that in 
some ways the wisdom of the past was not a perfect sum of knowledge but simply the beginning 
of humanity’s way of progress. The Renaissance use of the term “antiquity” to signify an 
attribute of the modern times tells of the newly found awareness of being “older” than the 
ancients and thus able to express authority. An examination of this paradoxical use of the 
concept of antiquity in the Renaissance (Von Leyden, 1958) correlates it to a new sense of 
history developed through an analogy between historical perspective and that of the visual arts. 
In Von Leyden’s study, an exemplification of this mode of relation to antiquity is provided by a 
lengthy quote by Sir William Temple that I find   worth reporting in its entirety: 
I suppose Authority may be reasonably allowed to the Opinion of Ancient Men in the 
present Age; but I know not why it should be so to those of Men in general that lived in 
ages long since past; nor  why one Age of the World should be wiser than another; or if it 
be, why it should not be rather the latter than the former; as having the  same Advantage 
of the general Experience of the World, that an old  man has of the more particular 
Experiments of Life.  
(An Essay upon the Original and Nature of Government [Works (London, 1720), 
I, 101], as quoted in Von Leyden, 1958, p.485) 
 
Antiquity, taken to be the basis of authority, that is of the legitimation of knowledge,  is 
predicated of those who have “more particular experiments of life”: truths found in the books of 
the Greeks and of the Romans were being challenged by what was learned from direct 




 The origin of this shift can be sought in travel, and, specifically, in transatlantic 
explorations. Tzvetan Todorov’s beautiful study, The  Conquest of America. The Question of the 
Other (1986), endorses this idea. In it, he posits that “it is in fact the conquest of America that 
heralds and establishes our present identity” (p.5). It is so because of the paradigmatic value of 
the encounter with the other, an encounter that gave place to “the greatest genocide in human 
history” against the native American peoples. Since Columbus’ discovery, Todorov writes,  “the 
world has shrunk (even if the universe had become infinite), the world is small as Columbus 
himself will peremptorily declare (Lettera Rarissima, 7/7/1503); men have discovered the totality 
of which they are part, whereas hitherto they formed a part without a whole” (p. 5). A description 
of Cristoforo Colombus’ motives for the explorations as new Crusades includes medieval beliefs 
and values, such as the description of America as the new Jerusalem and of his travels as a new 
crusade.  However, Todorov suggests, Columbus had some traits that show a mentality closer to 
the modern one. He seemed to enjoy discovery as an activity whose rewards are inherent in the 
activity itself. This, what Todorov takes to be a sign of a “modern mentality”, is shown in the 
grammatical use of the verb “to discover”. For Columbus, that is an intransitive action. He 
writes, “I wish to see and discover” (October 19th 1492, cited in Todorov, p 13). Discovery is not 
a means to an end, but, rather, an end in itself.  
Todorov does not discount Columbus’ many references to gold and riches as a motivation 
to further the explorations, but he reads those as functional to secure support to the expedition 
from the Spanish monarchs and to motivate Columbus’ sailors and travel companions. In the 
man Columbus evidently the motives of greed and conquest coexist with missionary aspirations 
and with a novel, modern curiosity towards the experience of the world. It is important to note 




periodization and to the inadequacy of labels such as “modern” or “medieval”; the 
acknowledgment of intricate overlapping of motives, ideas, and sensibility is most likely to 
foster some understanding of who we are now at the other end of modernity.  
The discovery of the past as a time distinct and separated, though related, to the modern 
time preceded the discovery of the New World and was immensely relevant to the transformation 
of the cultural world. The humanists, those devoted to studia humanitatis, had been challenging 
the scholastic system of the universities and their canon for at least a century. They criticized 
both the focus on formal argumentation, and the conviction that all philosophy worth knowing 
resided in commentaries of the Aristotelian corpus. Grammar, rhetoric and philosophy were now 
taught outside of the official academic institutions in schools aiming at an education suitable for 
new intellectual classes engaged in civic life. 
 The new philosophy of man championed by the early humanists was centered on the 
renewal of ancient ideals. “For these individuals the only way out of centuries of darkness, 
decadence and corruption was by returning to the ancient sapientia and recovering its exemplary 
ways of living and thinking as well as the language which was its vehicle” (Vasoli, C., 1988, 
p.60). Attention to the past was heralded through a new philological criticism: the discovery and 
editing of unknown Greek and Latin texts helped separate antiquity from myth and fable. The 
development of historical consciousness made possible an evaluation of the testimony of the 
past. Early modernity, growing out of humanism, builds upon such historical awareness. It thinks 
of itself as a new era distinctively aware of the rupture with what came before it9.  
Bacon’s title page of Instauratio Magna (London 1620, see figure 1 in the appendix) tells 
the whole story: it shows a ship sailing past the Hercules Pillars that are represented as classical 
                                                
9 More on this in  The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, Schmitt, C.B., Skinner,Q., Kessler E., Kraye 




columns. On the background of a serene sky, a caravel has just surpassed the last known part of 
the world. It is now adventuring in the ocean. Two sea monsters seem to observe its sides. The so 
called “Hercules pillars” are represented as actual doric pillars. The limits of ancient knowledge 
– and navigation- are to be surpassed thanks to a new model of inquiry. At the horizon, a ship 
that has already ventured far can be observed. Discovery is not a solitary enterprise; rather, it is 
only thanks to combined efforts of many that the boundaries of the known world have been 
forced through. There is a line on the bottom of the page that reads: Multi pertransitabunt et 
augebitur scientia [Many will pass through here and knowledge will increase].  Bacon’s great 
launching of a new way of knowing celebrates and foregrounds the modern success of sciences 
and technologies, advocating for the only book a true philosopher should trust: the book of 
nature. Grafton (p.198) comments that this marks the end of a time in which reading was the 
main way of attaining important knowledge, and the beginning of a time in which discovery is 
the central mode of learning.  
The frontispiece of Moeurs des savages amériquains compare au moeurs des premiers 
temps ( Joseph F. Lafitau, Paris, 1724, figure 2 in the appendix) displays a full blown illustration 
of the shift of modernity: here the student is seated at a desk and represented in the act of writing 
with a pen. Three winged figures, an older man and two children, encourage the student to pay 
attention not only to the text on his desk, but also to consider the natural sciences, medicine, and 
all that the frontispiece has in its close up: a globe, an idol, medallions, sculptures of eastern 
look, a measuring instrument. All these objects are amassed without an apparent order, and they 
recall the new Wunderkammer, or cabinets of curiosities, that were becoming the environment of 
the scholar’s study.  The display of objects arrayed as natural facts to offer to the student’s gaze 




lies.   By the 1600 it had become accepted that nothing written in a book could ever supplant the 
experience of the world.  
 
3. Montaigne on the road 
I turn to Montaigne whose essays are wired with the novel Renaissance sensibility 
deriving from the awareness of being on the cusp of something completely new. Montaigne 
maintains a posture of dangerous balance, continuously lost and found again, between the culture 
of the book and the culture of discovery. He travels to discover, and discovers to think; but what 
he finds in his explorations is, foremost, himself.  
Montaigne is the thinker for whom travel is an exercise of self-discovery in the 
exploration of the world; and at the same time, conversely, it is an exercise of exploration of the 
world in the examination of the self.  He is a traveler in manifold ways: he travels for work, he 
travels for leisure, he travels the historical distance between himself and his beloved authors, he 
paces endlessly in his library. He travels in that he thinks and writes. Travelling, thinking, 
teaching and writing are connected:  “Who does not see that I have taken a road along which I 
shall go, without stopping and without effort, as long as there is ink and paper in the world?” 
(III:9, p.945).  
The world is indeed the way to gain knowledge of the self. Geralde Nakam (2001) 
proposes to read Montaigne’s gaze through the engraving “Congnois toy toy-mesme” by Jean II 
de Gourmont (1562, figure 3).  She interprets the engraving and Les Essais as developing the 
same idea and advice in that for both the Socratic precept “know yourself” shall be practiced in 
the conjunction of world and self (p.15).  Nakam maintains that the engraver had no knowledge of 




Montaigne of the engraving; but both the engraver and the essayist, were responding to the same 
world. The date of the engraving, 1562, sees the beginning of civil wars in France. The incredible 
character illustrating the precept: Congnois toy toy-mesme wears an armor. He is possibly a knight 
and he inhabits a world at war. The armor defends him and defines him at the same time. This 
knight is represented partly as a fool with a helmet having two points at whose ends we can see 
two bells. He is holding a scepter, on which we find the only present representation of the human 
face: what seems to be a grinning older man conjoining the stick of the scepter to the sphere on its 
top. The words: Vanite des vanites tout est vanite appear around the sphere.  How should the 
warrior fool be interpreted?  This could signify the folly of the civil war, which seems to envelope 
any viable reflection on humanity in that historical occurrence. The precept “know thyself” cannot 
do away with the given fact that humanity is at war with itself, so that an armor seems the only 
sensible attire for embarking on such a task of self-knowledge. But the warrior-fool may as well 
find a place in the reflection of humanity on itself: inspired by the Ecclesiastes (Nakam, p.16) 
both the engraver and the writer meditate on the vanity of most human aspirations, and find value 
in confronting one’s own limits. 
 One of the ways in which to receive the socratic precept is then the way that leads to 
knowledge of the folly of the world and to the exercise of reflection bringing to a sharp and fair 
judgment of it. The fool warrior wears a medallion chain, on which the words are engraved: O 
combien est vain le sousi des hommes et toutes chose/l’homme fol est la vanite universelle./tout 
desir est plaisir a qui plaict./et l’honoeur du signeur nest point laict. The embroidery on his 
costume reads: nul eureux quapres la mort [ no one is happy until after he has died].  The fool 




not recognize them as such. It is not an accident that the fool is also the last character in 
Montaigne’s “On Vanity”:  
It was a paradoxical command that was given to us by that god at Delphi: “Look into 
yourself, know yourself, keep to yourself; bring back your mind and your will, which are 
spending themselves elsewhere, into themselves; you are running out, you are scattering 
yourself; concentrate yourself, resist yourself: you are being betrayed, dispersed, and 
stolen away from yourself. Do you not see that this world keeps its sight all concentrated 
inward and its eyes open to contemplate itself? It is always vanity for you, within and 
without; but it is less vanity it is less extensive. Except for you, O man”, said that god, 
“each thing studies itself first, and, according to its needs, has limits to its labors and 
desires. There is not a single thing as empty and needy as you, who embrace the universe: 
you are the investigator without knowledge, the magistrate without jurisdiction, and all in 
all, the fool of the farce. (Essays, III: 9, p 766). 
 
Humanity’s folly seems to reside in the fact that humanity does not look at itself, nor does it 
know itself. Knowledge of the universe is unsubstantial unless it is rooted in knowledge of 
oneself: the man who does not look into himself is scattered, dispersed and ultimately alienated 
from himself. The grimace of the fool is a mask being waved as a reminder of the fruitless 
attempts at knowing the world without knowing oneself.  
This reminder is issued as a “paradoxical command”. This is made evident by the flow of 
the argument for a prioritization of the “know yourself”. The god, in Montaigne’s account, 
continues the plea by recommending “do you not see that this world keeps its sight all 
concentrated inward and its eyes open to contemplate itself ?” We are supposed to acknowledge 
the importance of looking into ourselves by looking at the world and recognizing that the world 
keeps its eyes open to contemplate itself. How can the world- and indeed, anything- keep its eyes 
open onto itself? It can only be through a reflective movement, and through something in which 
the gaze can reflect itself. Bringing forth the Delphic command, man is told to learn from the 




What does the warrior fool, this champion of humanity, see when he obeys this command 
and  looks into himself? What do I see when I look at him, and open the helmet to see whose 
face is represented? Instead of a human face, what I find is a map of the known world. The 
discovery of the American continent had altered the traditional perception of the world and had 
changed the work of cosmographers. Major advances in cartography took place thanks to both 
the new explorations and the printing techniques. The first whole –world maps began to appear 
in that time ( cfr. Woodward, 2007).  The new world was a place of conquest and exploitation, of 
new trades and incredible monetary riches; but it was also a chance for the modern European 
gaze to consider its own difference and originality. The fool-warrior illustrating the precept 
“know yourself” reveals a view of the world underneath his armour, there where one would 
expect to find  his face. Looking at himself in the mirror, that is: through reflection, our character 
can see the map of the world. Maintaining this same reflecting process, looking in the world he 
can see reflected his own face.  
A double mirroring movement seems then to sustain and enact the gaze of the individual 
in search of self knowledge. A play of reversals seems to take place when things are looked at 
through that gaze: Europeans and natives, self and world, moderns and ancients lose their 
opposition and find new ways of relation. Our fool-warrior can find knowledge of himself in the 
exercise of this reflective view on the world: like the naïve observer that Montaigne claims to 
trust so much at the beginning of the essay “On the Cannibals”, the fool recognizes the truth of 
what he sees. The “savages” are an image of the other which may function as a confirmation of 
the modern superiority only to a foolish observer: and perhaps our observer, though naïve is not 




Marc Fumaroli (1992) describes this dynamic by proposing to see the “savages” as a 
mirror in which the modern fool can ironically recognize his own decaying face (p.26).  Facing 
“another world” is interesting primarily because the removal from the ordinary life renders some 
of our delusions all the more evident. The discoveries were taken as a sign of the clear superiority 
of modernity over the past, and the newly discovered peoples with their exotic customs were 
simply confirming the feeling of progress and of superiority of the Europeans over the natives. 
Such conceptions were of capital importance to the way early modern Europe was starting to form 
an understanding of itself. Early modern Europe understood itself as a civilization of progress and 
rationality by contrasting itself from what it was not: not the ancients, not the natives.  The 
warrior in the engraving by Jean II de Gourmont can express the foolishness of assuming 
uncritically such conceptions; the fool can make fun of the self-importance wiring these ideas and 
with a somersault he points out that we can very much mirror ourselves in those whom we deem 
so different.  
Montaigne’s appeal to the figure of the fool functions as a strategy of Socratic irony, to 
dismantle shallow conceptions and start the search for real knowledge of the self. The 
philosophical figure of the fool seems then to cover the very function of prying the world open by 
lifting the mask of accepted hypocrisy. The fool serves as to overthrow established and bound 
visions of the world in favor of a more free exploration of its novelty. Timothy McDonough 
(2001) has an article, “The Fools’ Pedagogy: Jesting for Liminal Learning” in which he considers 
the figure of the fool in the Renaissance as enacting the pedagogical intention to “encourage a 
positioning of the subject in such a way that he or she could manage the shift in world conception 




laughing at the absurdity of his statements, but at our recognition that within his discourse he is 
doing something we thought undoable, questioning something unquestionable”(p.115).   
 The fool looks at the world in Montaigne’s philosophical way. The special way of 
looking of Michel de Montaigne is at work in the double mirroring of self and world: it takes a 
proper position that is not firmly in-between the two. Nakam calls Montaigne a “génie du 
regard”(p.17). I find this expression challenging to render in the English language. Montaigne is 
the most expert gazer, he is an artist of sight, he has a unique gift for looking at things. His gaze is 
always placed in a state in-between, but this being placed is not fixed. It is a constant re-
positioning of itself exercised through a continuous movement within the intermediate space 
(Nakam, p. 17). In the double mirroring of the reflective movement, there is a variable that is 
always moving, deeply individual and constantly in the exercise of judgment: that is the gaze of 
the philosopher Michel de Montaigne. 
 That is the gaze of a man who made of learning through his life his main purpose. The 
perpetual change in the position of the observer allows for multiplicity of perspectives in the 
examination of life and ideas. Montaigne expresses his views through a “vision bouleversée”, an 
overthrown vision that he achieves through a permanent discipline of his self. This discipline 
consists in a constant rejection of established views in favor of a new vision that is more precise 
and also more fit to the world. Life itself, as the next section will show, is characterized by 
constant dynamism and by an irreducible diversity.  Being able to see this is what makes of 
Montaigne a genius of the gaze. I will suggest later that his work constitutes an ideal mirror in 






3.1. Montaigne on the dynamism of thinking 
This section deals with the ever present recognition in Montaigne’s work of the 
dynamism of living and conversely of thinking. In “Of Three kinds of associations” he writes:  
"Life is uneven, irregular, and multiform movement” (III: 3, p.621). Dynamism: the constant fact 
of movement, not a constant regular movement, but an irregular and unequal one, is a quality of 
biological life. Life has an erratic movement; it proceeds through leaps and dashes, it bounces 
back and forth with times of unpredictable rest. Montaigne notes this in the context of an 
examination of how to educate his self. The acknowledgement of the continuous movement of 
life enables him to recognize the dynamism of thinking. It is indeed because he cannot “nail 
himself” down to his own humors, that he has to admit that living consists in allowing oneself to 
break free from the “necessity of a single course” (ibidem). To live for a human means to think, 
and to live is to be moving. Montaigne thinks thinking to be made possible by movement.  He 
notes that thinking is always characterized by an inherent dynamism: "At the first thoughts that 
come to (the mind), it stirs about and it shows signs of vigor in all directions, practices its touch 
now for power, now for order and grace, it arranges, moderates, and fortifies itself"(p. 621). 
Thinking is described as a stretching by which the mind exercises its power and handles a 
subject (whatever subject) forcibly or gracefully. Any subject can be made object of such 
treatment: anything can be made “large and stretched to the point where the mind must work on 
it with all its strength (p 621)”. Here Montaigne might be pointing to the fact that his essays deal 
with the most disparate variety of topics, and his mind has applied itself with vigor to all that has 
awakened its interest. He confesses that a state of idleness is not healthy to him, as in that state 
his mind stay agitated and under a constant strain. When the mind is idle, ironically it is also 




same context Montaigne seems to also offer a justification for his peculiar way of writing: here 
more insight about the dynamism of thinking can be found.  
  “Of Idleness” (I: 8) similarly presents considerations about the movement of thinking 
while trying to justify and describe the author’s purpose in writing the Essays.  Idleness, 
Montaigne contends, can be dangerous. The ground on which it can be dangerous and is indeed 
experienced as such by the writer is nevertheless different than what common sense would 
expect. One would think that idleness, as a state of calm and absence of work, could sustain 
boredom and indolence.  The danger in idleness seems to be that of an excessive familiarity: 
when one does not engage in any activity, one is motionless and reaches a state in which nothing 
surprises him nor interests him. Life becomes boring. This outcome is not what Montaigne sees 
in idleness, though. With a movement quite much like a fool’s somersault, Montaigne reverses 
the meanings commonly associated with the word and rather considers idleness as a state of 
agitation. It is the state in which thinking can begin. Its danger lies in the facility with which the 
idle mind experiences hard to master movement, as the mind is set in motion with an unsettling 
and unforeseeable trajectory.  
For the author, this state is akin to that of an unsowed land which grows a multiplicity of 
wild weeds, or to that of a woman that needs a seed of a different kind than herself to be made 
fertile. It is noticeable that both comparisons deploy images dear to the imagery of pedagogy: 
education as cultivation; or, Socratically, education as begetting. Like soil that must be made 
fertile, so it is with minds. At a closer look, however, neither the land nor the woman are sterile: 
on the contrary, the issue seems to be that they are over-producing in a disorderly way. He 
continues: “Unless you keep them busy with some definite subject that will bridle and control 




p.21).  Idleness is the natural state of the mind, a state in which the mind dangerously runs 
unchecked and produces shapeless, excessive offspring of imagination. Subjects keep the mind 
busy by “bridling” and thus controlling it.  
A connection between the metaphor of the bridle and the idea of the home has been 
suggested (Van den Abbeele, 1992, pp.12-19). The bridle tames and domesticates the mind: in 
doing so, it channels the movement of the mind towards centers of interest, and it also keeps the 
mind within the walls of its proper home.  The problem of idleness, it is proposed, becomes the 
problem of property or better of the proper habitat: a mind in a constant state of agitation does 
not recognize its own bearings and cannot establish its home, the place in which, to recover the 
previously used metaphor, gardens can be cultivated and children grow. The following  citation 
of Martial: Quisquis ubique habitat, Maxime, nusquam habitat [he who lives everywhere lives 
nowhere] reinforces the correlation between  the requirement of  bridles to the mind and the 
preservation of a place where to live.  
It is not surprising that in the immediately following lines Montaigne calls upon the idea 
of home to explain what he was trying to achieve by his early retirement. He confesses to have 
retired to his home in the determination to keep away from bothersome concerns so as to “let 
(his) mind entertain itself in full idleness and stay and settle in itself” (I:8, p 21). He seeks repose 
in idleness: but he does not find it. What he finds, instead, is the state of purposeless unbridled 
movement of the mind. The mind cannot settle in itself and make itself at home: Montaigne 
wants to stay “chez soi” but his mind is relentless and runs everywhere. Here a defining 
metaphor is offered: 
On the contrary like a runaway horse, it gives itself a hundred times more trouble than it 
took for others, and gives birth to so many chimeras and fantastic monsters, one after the 




strangeness at my pleasure, I have begun to put them in writing, hoping in the time to 
make my mind ashamed of itself. (I:8, 21)  
 
A line from Lucan: variam semper dant otia mentem [idle times always make the mind 
distracted] introduces this capital metaphor of the horse. The “varied” mind is a runaway horse. 
When Montaigne removes himself from the world in search for a space of self reflection and 
repose, he finds his mind escaping his desire of control and quiet and instead sprinting in all 
directions. It is the move towards self reflectivity that indeed spurs and unbridles the horse. In its 
run, the horse (the mind) gives birth to fantastic monsters. A few lines previously he had 
described the dangers of a mind running disorderly  “hither and yon in the vague field of 
imagination.” At that point, it seemed that the only possible outcomes of such disorderly 
movement be wild weeds or shapeless lumps. Now, instead, it appears that more appealing 
creatures originate from such movement: fantastic monsters that Montaigne wants to 
contemplate at his pleasure. The monsters have two qualities: they are strange and useless 
[l’étrangeté et l’ineptie]. Their master (who is Montaigne in this proliferation of metaphors? Is 
he the owner of the horse? Is he the stable out of which the horse runs away?) wants to 
contemplate them at his pleasure, for this reason, he says, he starts putting them in writing [de les 
mettre en rôle]. The horse is perhaps bridled by this intention, unless of course the author 
chooses to let it run as he takes in and studies the chimeras and monsters born out of this lack of 
order and discipline.  
Montaigne seems to say that recording the strangeness and ineptitude of the chimeras, 
making a scroll of them, is the main motivation for his work: the essays as we know them. The 
offspring of his mind are retraced in writing, recorded and somewhat mapped. It could be that the 




chose before starting to write his essays. This prepositional clause, chez moi, expresses a location 
by using a preposition introducing a personal pronoun. It is a very interesting way of indicating a 
spatial qualification through a personal reference. It has been noted that it “designates an 
interiority as vast as the entire surrounding region of Gascony or  as restricted as the innermost 
core of Montaigne’s private being”(Van den Abbeele, 1992, p.18). When Montaigne decides to 
retire chez soi, he hints at a whole territory worth exploring, in which he can unbridle his mind, 
let it run free and then contemplate its wonders. This territory may well be the territory 
comprised in the space between moi and chez moi, between the self as unquestioned given (moi) 
and self as that to which one returns and finds a place (chez moi). Under this light, the line in “Of 
Glory” casts well the territory of Montaigne: “As for me, I hold that I exist only in myself (II:16, 
p.474)”. [moi, je tiens que je ne suis que chez moi]. Interiority, the space between “I, myself” 
and “at my place, at home” is explored and mapped through a reflective consideration of the free 
movements of the mind in it.  
Freedom of movement is surely the condition for knowledge of the self and consequently 
for fashioning of the self.  Montaigne writes: “If it were up to me to train myself in my own 
fashion, there is no way so good that should want to be fixed in it and unable to break loose” 
(III:3, p 621). The movement he wants to preserve by making sure he can break loose out of 
fixed fashions, for how good they may be, is the movement of the unbridled mind. The very 
conditions of life as constant unequal movement (III:3, p. 621) demand that  room for the 
movement of the mind be safeguarded. Dynamism of the mind responds to dynamism of life. 
Any intention towards the fashioning of the self must consider the constitutive, vital need for 




Conversely, also the movement of the body becomes required to the activity of thinking. 
One of the dangers of spending much time on books is maintaining the body inactive while the 
mind is exercised in books (III: 3, p.630). A similar logic is at work in both Montaigne’s study 
and work: it is the logic of movement. The space in which most of study and work take place, his 
library, respects such logic and also enables it. Montaigne offers a long description of his library 
at the end of the essay “Of three kinds of associations” (III:3) in which he examines his 
relationship with friends, with women, and with books. Books, he writes, bring assistance to his 
life and are “the best provision” he has “found for this human journey” (III:3, p. 628). He then 
says that when he is chez soi he turns more often to his library from which he can see his whole 
household. It can be suggested that the expression chez moi is pregnant as it once again signifies 
both the physical space of the property, and the psychological space of interiority, as I discussed 
above. So, he turns aside to his library, from where he gains a view of his ménage. The position 
of the library room lets him obtain a viewpoint from which he can overlook his property: once 
again spatially reenacting the movement of metacognitive observation (to step out of oneself in 
order to look onto oneself) implied in reflection.  
While in the library, the place where soi becomes chez soi, the thinker describes his 
activity: “There I leaf through now one book, now another, without order and without plan, by 
disconnected fragments. One moment I muse, another moment I set down or dictate, walking 
back and forth, these fancies of mine that you see here” (III:3, p.629). The activity in the library 
is unplanned and disorderly, characterized by musings and incessant walking, and creative: very 
much like the unbridled horse of the mind as described in “On Idleness.”  Movement is the 
condition for the life of the mind. He continues: “My thoughts fall asleep if I make them sit 




 A mobile mind may be able to seize and judge the polymorphic experience of life in its 
ever changing conditions. For Montaigne, a mobile mind is exercised when the whole person is 
set in motion, and she starts journeying through life. In the next section, I consider Montaigne’s 
view and narrative on travels. 
 
3.2. Montaigne ‘s philosophy of travel 
The essay “On Vanity” (III: 9) is written completely after Montaigne’s travel to Italy.  
This essay offers extended observations on the function and need for travel in the author’s life. In 
the chronology of Montaigne’s life and work, the travel to Italy takes place between the 
publication of the first and second volume of the essays in 1580 (normally referred to as the a 
stratum) and the final publication of 1588 including revisions of the first two volumes and a third 
volume (b and c strata). While I cannot enter the discussion between scholars about the supposed 
discontinuity and difference between the early essays and the late ones10, I find useful to consider 
in his writing the continuity of problems, themes, and questions that are developed in constant 
correlation to his life experience. It is suggested that “what Montaigne brings back from his 
travels may be what led him away in the first place” (Van den Abbeele, p 5) and I cannot but 
agree with this idea that both his voyaging and writing be sustained and inspired by similar cares. 
In this spirit, I will not consider the question of the difference between the volumes and will 
operate under the assumption that the travel to Italy is a central event in the author’s life not 
because it sections it into two part; but because it serves as the core at the heart of the author’s 
deepest concerns.  
                                                
10 On this see for example, Frame’s Montaigne’s Discovery of Man (1955). This work espouses an evolutionary 
approach to the Essays, for which the essays grow from an earlier or impersonal quality demonstrated in the first 
two volumes to a more personal and humanistic attitude in the later one. The travel to Italy would mark the passage 




In my previous section I have suggested that the home, what Montaigne indicates as chez 
moi, demarcates a space of interiority to be explored by the reflective movement of the mind. 
Unsurprisingly, Montaigne prefaces his considerations about traveling with a long reflection on 
his household, and the governing of it. Travel as the movement of leaving home, obviously 
presupposes one, and it implies that there, home, is where return will be made. He confesses that 
the desire to travel is elicited in him by two factors: the “greedy appetite for new and unknown 
things” (III:9, p.723), and the joy in “turning aside from governing [his] house”( III:9, p.723).  
The two factors are correlated, as the desire for newness is nourished also by the author’s 
inability to be pleased with his own (a pleasure he considers “monotonous and languid”, ibidem). 
He takes it to be a quality humans share, to “be better pleased with other people’s things than 
with our own, and to love movement and change.” He adds, “I have my share of that.” He 
recognizes that many do not find pleasure in novelty and indeed cherish what they already have. 
They “take delight in themselves” and they are “in truth happier” than him, even if they are not 
wiser. Wisdom resides in recognizing with Horace that “each hour proceeds on a fresh horse”: 
apprehension of life’s flux seems to sustain both wisdom and the desire to travel. It is tempting 
here to connect the fast horses on which hours ride [quod permutatis hora recurrit equis], in the 
quote from Horace, to Montaigne’s image of the mind as an unbridled horse. In fact, it is the 
movement of the mind attuned to the flowing of things that nourishes curiosity and desire for the 
unknown.   
If wisdom consists in the movement of the mind in accordance with the continuous flow 
of everything else, and if the philosopher’s inclination is to listen to the “greedy appetite for new 
and unknown things that help to foster the desire to travel”, then, it is possible to inscribe the 




becomes clear in the way Montaigne approaches the theme of travel in “Of Vanity” is namely 
that such a cultivation of the philosophical life takes place in relation to that of home. It could 
indeed be that the pursuit of wisdom appeals for both positions, home and leaving home, to be 
taken care of. I hope this to become clear in the following parts of the chapter.  
Turning aside from governing his house contributes to Montaigne’s desire to travel (III:9, 
p.723). He acknowledges the pleasure deriving from “being in command, were it only of a barn”, 
and in “ being obeyed”; yet, this pleasure, he writes, is “too monotonous and languid”, and 
“mingled with bothersome thoughts”. A description of the kind of worries that are implied in the 
managing of the household follows: tenants, neighbors, weather, crops, and marriage. He 
continues by telling that he undertook the management of the household late in life, after having 
developed a different disposition towards his life. He does not aim at acquiring riches; he does 
not want to acquire anything it seems, rather, he declares to aspire only at “acquiring the 
reputation of having acquired nothing”, just as he has “squandered nothing” (III:9, p.723). And if 
this aspiration seems to contradict the thinker’s constant appreciation for change and instability, 
instead it can perhaps add something to that appreciation. In a world that is constantly moving 
and changing, one needs to hold on to and maintain something as immutable. What one aims at 
conserving is what one has inherited: the household, the family wealth, the family name. Those 
count as “home” for Montaigne. Home is at the same time a source of boredom and of petty 
concerns, and what he measures his life upon. In this sense, he does not want to add, neither to 
detract to what he has received. He seems to recognize a duty in continuing his father’s legacy: 
“My father loved to build up Montaigne, where he was born; and in all this administration of 
domestic affairs, I love to follow his example and rules, and shall bind my successors to them as 




Home is the measure of life in two ways. Firstly, it seems to show the extent to which one 
should manage his gains and losses. Montaigne has a meter on which to evaluate possessions and 
also to survey his desires. Such a meter is provided by his father’s inheritance. Then, home also 
functions as to provide a weight to his own existence. His desires, he declared, push him away 
from home (the “greedy appetite for new and unknown things that help to foster the desire to 
travel”). Yet home is what his father loved to build up and by doing so he set an example not 
only in regard to the administration of domestic affairs, but moreover so in regard to a general 
approach to life. He writes: “I wish that (…) my father had handed down to me that passionate 
love that he had in his old age for his household.  He was very happy in being able to keep his 
desires down to his means, and to be pleased with what he had” (III:9, p.727).  A measured life 
in which desires are tamed in a pleasurable way is what Montaigne wishes to be able to realize.  
He is unable to achieve it the same way his father did, though. He wishes he had inherited 
that love, so that to be able to be fully committed to what he sees as a way to “restore” a 
“semblance of life” to “so good a father”; but he has not. None of the pleasures of housekeeping 
“can amuse (him) very much”(III:9, p.726).  
Why is it? It is not because “his heart is set on some higher knowledge”. He rejects such 
a charge vehemently. He writes: “ I would rather be a good horseman than a good logician” and 
supports this claim with a quotation from Vergil about the utility of something that “meets a 
need”. Of course here it should be asked what are Montaigne’s needs. It appears that being a 
good horseman better responds to what he is short of. It would seem as if Montaigne’s life 
needed horsemanship more than logic. In the following line he writes:  “We entangle our 




very well without us, and we leave behind our own affairs and Michel, who concerns us even 
more closely than man in general” (III:9, p.726). 
These lines are framed between the beginning of the next paragraph in which he declares 
“Now I do indeed stay home most of the time” and the preceding claim that he  “would rather be 
a good horseman than a logician”. This may cease to be a puzzling statement if, once more, the 
momentous metaphor of the mind as a horse is retrieved. Montaigne the thinker prefers to be 
able to keep his mind on a tight rein, or eventually to chose to set it free and unbridled. The 
capacity to master his mind and to follow its movement is vital to him to a greater extent than 
any formal reasoning skill. Echoing Seneca, he seems here not to see the necessity to master the 
general laws of the universe, when the universe conducts itself well without our help. There are 
more pressing matters at hand.   When thinking about the home, what is at stake is not a 
generality, but Montaigne himself.  
Michel11 stands or falls with his horsemanship: hence it is as such, on the back of his 
horse, that my work will follow him in order to understand what traveling in relation to leaving 




3.3. The Journal de Voyage 
The Journal de voyage de Michel de Montaigne en Italie par la Suisse et l'Allemagne en 
1580 et 1581 is a unique text. Unintended for publication, it was retrieved in the 1700s and 
                                                
11 I am not aware of many other instances in the Essays in which the author refers to himself only by his given name. 




attributed with certainty to Montaigne.12 It records Montaigne’s travel in France, Germany, 
Austria, Switzerland, and Italy, partly in search of a cure for his kidney stone disease. He travels 
from June 22nd 1580 to November 30th 1581.The travel itinerary is all but linear: unlike the 
typical Grand Tour, undertaken as an educative rite of passage characterized by an exposure to 
classical antiquities and Renaissance art in set stages, Montaigne’s travel follows a complex, 
indirect route with frequent detours.13 Montaigne travels with a party composed of his younger 
brother, a secretary (by whom the first part of the journal is written) and other companions. They 
travel by horseback, taking their time with numerous stops. The purposes of this travel are many 
and interlayered, ranging from a response to a sense of curiosity to the relief for leaving “home” 
behind with all that it entails, to the hope to heal or to alleviate his kidney stone disease with 
visits to mineral water spring localities.  
The composition of the journal reveals it as something more interesting than a mere 
chronicle of the journey. The text is built through a meshing of voices, languages and styles. The 
fabric of the narration is lacerated in many parts. The first pages of the journal are missing, likely 
due to the circumstances of the manuscript preservation and retrieval. The writing of the journal 
does not begin with the beginning of the journey; therefore, the narration does not have a proper 
beginning. The journal starts when the journey has already been undertaken, en route, so to say: 
at Beaumont-Sur-Oise and not at Montaigne, where the travel had began.14 The accidental 
mutilation of the manuscript points inevitably to the consideration that the telling of a travel does 
have a belated quality. The narrative can only begin in medias res, after the journey, or the 
movement leading to it, has begun. And in doing so, it causes interruption and it announces that 
                                                
12 On this, see Garavini (1983) pp 101-118 and Frame (1983) pp xiv-xxxiii.	  
13 Schneikert (2006) provides a chronologie of the travel and a map on pp. 61-63 from which the non linear quality 
of the route emerges. Bideaux (1988) qualifies it as a “zigzag itinerary”(p.456).	  




the telling of the experience does not cover all of the experience itself. The hiatus between the 
thing experienced and the words to tell it is never fully composed, as can be seen by the constant 
moving of the point of view of the observer and by the experimenting with the languages.   
The text of the journal is initially written by an anonymous scribe, who refers to 
Montaigne as his master and in the third person. This first section takes the form of a 
biographical sketch. The telling here is a retelling of an experience whose primary subject is not 
the author of the text (yet he is the master for whom the story is written). The hand that is writing 
this section oscillates between dependence from the master and attempts at autonomy. An 
example shall be found in the part of the journal describing the Roman Carnival. Here, the scribe 
observes and describes the details of the celebrations that were held supposedly with the Pope’s 
permission, “more licentious” than the past years. He notes: “we found, however, that it was not 
much of a thing” (p.82). Here the subject, nous, suggests that this opinion is shared by the writer 
and his company, most likely the Monsieur de Montaigne. A few lines later, the journal offers 
some comments on the beauty of Roman women: the idea that they are commonly more 
attractive than the French ones, even though there is no more “perfect and rare beauty” in Italy 
than in France is an opinion that the scribe firmly attributes to Montaigne. The remark: “he said” 
[disait-il] serves this purpose and it highlights the coexistence in the travel account of the two 
perspectives: nous and il, portrait and self-portrait labor side by side to coexist in this part of the 
text.  
A second breakage (after the initial loss) in the text occurs when the secrétaire is let go 
and Montaigne takes on the journaling by himself. This happens during Montaigne’s first stay in 
Rome in February 1581, and no explanations are offered for it. Montaigne seems to ascribe this 




the one of my men who was doing this fine job, and seeing it so far advanced, whatever trouble it 
may be to me, I must continue it  myself” (p.83) [il faut que je la continue moi-meme]. What is 
this duty of writing? I wonder if perhaps Montaigne is disliking the fact of being the subject of a 
book whose author is someone else. Perhaps the split instituted between the protagonist of the 
journal and its author needs to be bypassed. Perhaps this too- the distance between living one’s 
life and telling one’s life- is a wound that could be healed by traveling, similarly to the intention 
of healing the kidney disease by drinking the many thermal waters of Switzerland and Italy. 
Nonetheless, this question shall be answered only by way of conjecturing, and what is left, the 
“given” is a text whose authorship passes from hand to hand in the course of the narration. This 
fact opens a place of reflectivity: in the distance and the proximity between “il” (Montaigne, 
character in the third person as narrated by the scribe) and “je” (Montaigne, author and character 
in the first person as narrated by himself) there is room for the continuous movement of the mind 
with itself.  
A third rupture takes place when Montaigne, now firmly in command of the journeying 
and of the journaling, decides to leave the French language and starts writing in Italian. The 
second rupture described above could be understood in terms of mastery: of wanting to re-
appropriate authorship over one’s own biography, over the writing of one’s life. This one, 
instead, seems to make sense under the sign of a loss of mastery. Montaigne leaves a language he 
masters perfectly to venture in the writing in a language that is not his. He wants to write in the 
same language spoken in the area he is touring and in order to do so he gives up his native 
tongue. Such a loss for such a precise writer!  
Yet that this is a decisive step toward a diminished authorship should be problematized. It 




trying to use a foreign language Montaigne wants to “master” his situation as an outsider and a 
traveler. He wants to be more attuned to what is around him. Traveling for him runs parallel to 
writing. He comments in the Essais that he will go along the road he has chosen “as long as there 
is ink and paper in the world”(III:9, p.945). As a result of this, it is reasonable that he prefers to 
use a language in which he is less proficient but that can tell his experience in a better way.  
Schneikert (2006) notes that leaving French for Italian allows Montaigne to “be an other” 
because taking on the language of the hosting country reveals an opening to what is foreign and 
other (p.205).  
Secondly, it has been argued that Montaigne’s written Italian is very well mastered. 
Garavini(1983) shows that his Italian is modeled on the language of Boccaccio and Petrarca and 
she dismisses the critics claiming it to be  poor (pp. 119-131). Montaigne’s Italian mixes the 
humanist literary speech with the terms from the local dialects, learned through exchanges with 
men of the working class. It embodies thus his peculiar eclecticism that, once more, lets him 
overcome set boundaries to receive organically, by traveling, the whole experience (in this case, 
the experience of a whole culture and not only parts of it).  
The discussion of the hypothesis that Montaigne performs choices leading to a loss or a gain 
of mastery reveals that it is difficult to read this as a linear trajectory. Mastery or ownership over 
one’s life and over the story of one’s life is not achieved through a cumulative process. It is not 
saved, grown, or piled up and then steadily possessed. Rather, it is experienced in the keeping up 
and attunement of the individual to the ever-shifting conditions of life, of which travel exposes 
the irreducible traits. Then, the choices of Montaigne the traveler should be understood as 
responses to the dynamic conditions of his life. Shifting the locus of control does not entail a loss 




in touch with the experience of life because life itself is always moving. The promise in all this 
for the teacher lies in the recognition of life’s constant dynamism, to which she can respond by 
keeping to switch her position. 
By changing language Montaigne shows that he learns by traveling. He learns that in order to 
grasp one’s experience and to tell it, a constant movement is necessary: and this movement is 
experienced radically in the abandonment of the mother tongue as well as of home. He writes: 
“Let us try to speak this other language a little, especially since I am in this region where I seem 
to hear the most perfect Tuscan speech…” (p.126) [Essayons de parler un peu cette autre langue, 
me trouvant sur-tout dans cette contrée où il me paroît qu’on parle le language le plus pur de la 
Toscane] (emphasis added). 15  The term “essayer” refers here not only to the attempt at speaking 
another language. It also and chiefly points at the fact that this choice, the choice of writing in 
another language, is to be understood as a practice of the essaying itself- of Montaigne’s way of 
relating to his own existence and to the world. 
It is by leaving home, and by experiencing the challenges and alienation of a different 
language, together with the joys of discovery and communication, that Montaigne feels at his 
proper place. When he travels, he is “chez soi”. For instance, during his second stay at La Villa 
(August 14-september 12 1581) he writes: “I received a warm welcome and greetings from all 
those people. In truth it seemed I had come back to my own home” (p.152) [da vero si pareva 
ch’io fussi ritornato in casa mia].  
                                                
15 This is the French translation by Meusnier de Querlon dating from the first publication of the Journal de Voyage 
in 1774.  The Italian says: “Assaggiamo di parlare un poco questa altra lingua massime essendo in queste contrade 
dove mi pare sentire il piu’ perfetto favellare della Toscana particolarmente tra li paesani che non l’hanno mescolato 
e alterato con li vicini.” ( p.419, Journal de Voyage. Nouvelle Edition avec des notes par le professeur  Alessandro 




 This note in the first person, written in Italian, is confirmed by a very similar remark 
offered in the second part of the journal written in French by Montaigne. He is describing Rome, 
the city where he has taken up the task of writing the journal by himself. He writes that there 
everyone is at home (p.97). This feeling at home is not only Montaigne’s: everyone, he writes, 
can feel at home there. “I used to say about the advantages of Rome, among other things, that it 
is the most universal city in the world, a place where strangeness and difference of nationality 
are considered least; for by its nature it is a city pieced together out of foreigners; everyone is as 
if at home” (p.97).  
It is possible that he feels “chez soi” because he sees that everyone [chacun] there feels 
“chez soi”. He compares Rome to Venice, a city as well filled with foreigners. The comparison 
serves to reinforce the proposition that Roma is a “most universal city”. In Venice, foreigners  do 
not feel at home. There, they are “nevertheless as if at someone else’s house” [comme chez 
autrui](p.98).  
A compelling case shall be made at this point for the correspondence between what I 
have counted as ruptures in the text and the mentions of “being at home”.  The first mention 
(p.97) takes place in the same section dedicated to the sojourn in Rome, at whose beginning it is 
made known that the unnamed scribe had been dismissed and Montaigne was taking on the task 
of writing the journal. This event was discussed above in the sense of a choice revealing a 
shifting of the locus of control in the narrative. The second mention of “feeling at home” comes 
about during Montaigne’s second stay at La Villa (p.152). It was upon his first arrival at La Villa 
(p.126) that Montaigne decided to “essay” turning to the Italian language. La Villa, that place 
that sees him lose his most familiar way of expression, what I had read above as the radical 




between homes intensifies and reveals the frame of Montaigne’s life: that very essaying that 
compounds for him thinking, writing, and living. 
 
4. Travel as education and education as travel 
The writing of the travel journal exposes Montaigne’s varying positions as author, 
subject, master, and as a growing individual. It reflects  namely the dynamic  reflective 
movement of his gaze. In it, biography and autobiography, ils and je, nous and il, native tongue 
and learned language all concur to outline the problematic, reflective nature of Montaigne’s 
response to the invitation “know yourself”. “On Vanity”, the chapter in which Montaigne’s 
reflection on his travels are predominant, ends with a renewed proposition of the Delphic 
command.  Montaigne travels and writes about traveling as an enactment of his search for 
knowledge: knowledge of the world and of his self.  
The reasons for which Montaigne and his party ventured through Switzerland, Germany 
and Italy are many, as I have touched on above. Yet they all seem to somehow culminate in the 
sojourn in Roma. Despite the declared intention not to visit any place twice during his travel 
(Journal, p.51), Montaigne visits Rome three times: for five months from November 1580 to 
April 1581, then again in the month of September 1581 and lastly for two more weeks in October 
1581 winding up his affairs before returning home to Montaigne. But then, indeed, Rome is 
home to Montaigne in a truer sense then his hometown.  
He writes: “The care of the dead is recommended to us. Now, I have been brought up 
since childhood [j’ai ete nourri des mon enfance avec ceux-ci] with these dead. I was familiar 
with the affairs of Rome long before I was with those of my own house. I knew the Capitol and 




nourished himself with the dead of Rome. Caring for them is recommended as it would be caring 
for oneself, because  through upbringing, that is through education, they have become part of 
Michel de Montaigne. In the following lines, the mention of his father emphasizes and confirms 
that Rome stands for Montaigne’s home in a direct way. He continues, after naming Lucullus, 
Metellus and Scipio: “They are dead. So indeed is my father, as completely as they; and he has 
moved as far from me and from my life in eighteen years as they have in sixteen hundred”(III:9, 
p.762). While associating his father to those remarkable Roman figures works as to strengthen 
and highlight the connection Montaigne feels with them, the claim that they are all removed from 
him by the same temporal distance  remains indeed bewildering. 
The past is far and irreparably disjointed from us. Once they leave the community of 
living beings, those who are not anymore with us are lost and this is an irretrievable loss. They 
melt into a past that does not touch us, in that we-the-living are only in the present. Montaigne 
wrote elsewhere: “When I dance, I dance; when I sleep, I sleep” (III: 13). He is a man of the 
present, with an acute awareness of it and of its occurrence.  
However, his take on the present is reinforced by his relation to the past. He continues: 
“Nevertheless I do not cease to embrace and cherish his memory, his friendship, and his society, 
in a union that is perfect and very much alive”(III:9, p.762). Acknowledgement of the distance 
does not inhibit the maintenance of a vital relation. It is really because the distance has been 
recognized that a relation of life is made possible. If that is the case, then Montaigne is well 
attuned with his times. 
 As we saw in the introductory section of the chapter, the development of historical 
consciousness, due to the studies of the Humanists, allowed for Early Modernity’ understanding 




past, as a time gone, different and separated from them, individuals were able to think that their 
present was theirs and stood in their hands, rich of possibilities and ripe with new knowledge. 
This perspective on the past reinvigorated the love for it and its teachings. Only because the 
difference from it and the rupture with it were accepted, it was possible for people of the present 
to look back and love what was past. 
 In the distance, relating to what is part of oneself but is lost becomes a matter of vital 
importance. Education of oneself then must embrace the “memory, friendship and society” with 
what is gone because that is what makes present possible. The present, Montaigne’s present as he 
approaches Rome in his travel, is motivated and ultimately also made possible by what has 
passed and is part of his inheritance: his father, his cultural tradition, his home. Traveling is 
made possible by home, and one shall learn in travel if home is embraced and its memory, 
friendship and society are cultivated.   
Moving closer to Rome signifies for Montaigne arriving home. Recognizing Rome as his 
hometown and being recognized as a citizen makes of him a cosmopolites: he is a citizen of the 
universal city, thus, he is a citizen of the world. I report again his words here: “I used to say 
about the advantages of Rome, among other things, that it is the most universal city in the world, 
a place where strangeness and difference of nationality are considered least; for by its nature it is 
a city pieced together out of foreigners; everyone is as if at home” (p.97).  
The universality of Rome does not depend on its uniformity. Rome is a city where 
difference and strangeness find place. Foreigners are domiciled there and Rome elects its Pope 
regardless of his origin (possibly here Montaigne describes an ideal more than the actual reality 
of the Papal court in the Renaissance). Rome is a patchwork, a quilt of foreigners. Such is 




so shapeless and diverse in composition that each bit, every moment, plays its own game” (“On 
the Inconsistency of Our Actions, II:1, p. 244). Montaigne “therefore” searches to “obtain the 
title of Roman citizen” (Journal, p.98). He elects citizenship in the city that resembles him and 
his nature the most. He obtains it after overcoming some difficulties. He receives the letter-patent 
on the 5th of April 1581, and the fact gives him “much pleasure”.  
The same feeling of pleasure is confessed at the end of “On Vanity”. Here he reports that 
the “authentic bull of Roman citizenship,” “pompous in seals in gilt letters,” feeds his “ silly 
humor.” He transcribes it in due form, justifying the transcription with his intention to satisfy the 
curiosity of “some person”. The whole bull is copied in the original Latin with what is perhaps 
the longest quotation in the essays. A notable fact is that Michel de Montaigne in the bull is 
mentioned without his family name, Eyquem. Michel abandons his father’s name to bear the 
name of his land. This fact could be seen as a denial of the father’s paternity “to set himself up as 
self-engendered” (Van Den Abbeele, p. 35). Or, I suggest it could be understood as a way for 
Montaigne to come to terms with his inheritance. More than giving it up by denying his 
patronymic, Montaigne seems to intend to widen it by taking on a more comprehensive name. 
He also may be imagined to say “this is where I am from and this is what constitutes me”: again, 
the home being pressingly there whenever questions of “identity” are posed for Montaigne.  
After the citation of the whole document, Montaigne comments that “being a citizen of 
no city” he is “very pleased to be one of the noblest city that ever was or ever will be”(III:9, 
p.766).  Certainly this one can be added to the number of disconcerting claims with which 
Montaigne punctuates his writing. How can the diplomat, soldier, mayor of Bordeaux, close 
adviser to the king Henry of Navarre and peace negotiator, the knight Michel de Montaigne, 




as a strong gesture of self identification as a philosopher and a teacher, if we consider that the 
“citizen of no city” echoes the figure of Socrates. In  “The education of children” Montaigne 
writes: “Socrates was asked where he was from. He replied not “ Athens”, but “the world.” He, 
whose imagination was fuller and more extensive, embraced the universe as his city, and 
distributed his knowledge, his company, and his affection to all mankind unlike us who look at 
what is underfoot”(I, 26, p. 116).   
Montaigne, very much like Socrates, finds it useful to deny his citizenship in order to 
claim a wider and fuller one. Similarly to the movement by which he dropped his family’s name 
to adopt his land’s one, now Montaigne lets go of his citizenship to adopt a new one. Likewise, 
also in this occurrence the movement is towards a more embracing outlook. Socrates, very much 
like Montaigne, knew to embrace “the whole world as his city”. They both can do this because 
they are philosophers and teachers. They have learned to “look” further than their own feet. 
Truly, it is appropriate to the purpose of my inquiry to emphasize that  the capacity to look stays 
at the core of Socrates and Montaigne’s world-citizenship. The passage continues with this 
consideration: “If others examined themselves attentively, as I do, they would find themselves, 
as I do, full of inanity and nonsense” [Si les autres se regardaient attentivement, comme je fais, 
ils se trouveraient, comme je fais, pleins d’inanité et de fadaise]. (III:9, p.766 emphasis added). 
The verb used, regarder, translated by Frame as “to examine”, means more specifically to look 
at, to watch. The verb recurs in the passage many more times: “This common attitude and habit 
of looking [regarder ailleurs] elsewhere than at ourselves has been very useful for our business.” 
The reason for this, he writes, is that we are a miserable object to our gaze, hence “nature has 
very appropriately thrown the action of our vision outward”. It is painful and discomforting to 




look at the public, (…); in short, always look [regardez] high or low, or to one side or in front, or 
behind you”. 
These lines follow the Roman citizenship Bull and  signal a hasty shift in the emotional 
tone of the closing part of the chapter “On Vanity”. The connection to Socrates, that I proposed 
helps explain Montaigne’s declaration of not having a citizenship, is at work in the passage from 
the Roman Citizenship bull to this anxious and passionate appeal for a discipline of the gaze. 
This brings to the last paragraph in which a dramatic paraphrase of the Delphic precept “know 
thyself” is presented.  
This invitation is, as Montaigne declaims, paradoxical. The beautiful image of the sea 
that “grows troubled and turbulent when it is tossed back on itself” well unearths the pathos with 
which Montaigne realizes that the imperative of Socratic knowledge is extremely hard to fulfill. 
Here, moreover, an articulation of what the recommended regarder looks like can be found.  
He writes: “Look into yourself, know yourself, keep to yourself; bring back your mind 
and your will, which are spending themselves elsewhere, into themselves; you are running out, 
you are scattering yourself; concentrate yourself, resist yourself: you are being betrayed, 
dispersed, and stolen away from yourself.” The mind moves, and in order to watch itself, its 
movement needs to be seconded. Freedom of movement shall be preserved: in this education 
consists.  Penalty for not preserving such freedom would be the death coming from the rigidity 
of stillness. We run out, we concentrate ourselves; we are dispersed, we gather ourselves; we are 
stolen away from ourselves, we keep to ourselves. And so on. Stillness is not achieved nor 





Chapter 5 Thinking Travel and Education with Montaigne 
 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter consists in providing a working argument about the teacher as 
traveler through an examination of the philosophical experience of teaching and traveling. I take 
as a point of departure Montaigne’s lines: “If it were up to me to train myself in my own fashion, 
there is no way so good that should want to be fixed in it and unable to break loose” (III: 3, p. 
621).  I propose to read these lines in relation with the inherently dynamic quality of the mind 
and of life. The dynamism of the mind is nourished by  the play of a reflective gaze roaming 
between the different positions of the subject. Such dynamism shall be respected and maintained 
as it allows the space for   fashioning of the self. This dynamism implies a paradoxical, and also 
dramatic in its challenges, knowledge of the self. In the previous chapter, freedom of movement 
was recognized as the condition for knowledge of the self and consequently for shaping and 
forming  of one’s self, that is of education.  
A project of education of the self must preserve the person’s freedom of movement within it 
and also away from it. She who wants to educate herself will not desire to be fixed in any one 
idea, no matter how perfect the idea is. Freedom of movement of the mind is condition for 
knowledge of the self and at the same time it is a condition for the fashioning of the self, that is 
the project of education.  
In my previous chapter, I have ascribed the practice of traveling to the modes in which the 
philosophical life is cultivated, on the basis of the acknowledgment that travel encodes the 
movement of the mind in accordance with the continuous flow of everything else. Travel has 




found upon return: what has been named the home. “Home” indicates the weight or measure of 
one’s life in terms of what has been passed over and received: family, residency, possessions, 
and especially language. The pursuit of wisdom, that is the philosophical life, appeals for both 
positions, home and leaving home, to be taken care of.  
This connection is shown with clarity in Montaigne’s relation with the city of Rome and with 
his idea that Roman citizenship be, indeed, a global citizenship. Rome is and is not the place 
where he belongs. Originally, by birth, he is not Roman. But he feels at home there, for two 
reasons: in force of the relation he developed with the Latin language and culture; and because 
he has traveled to reach it. His way to Rome has called for several ruptures and experiences of 
decenterment. It entailed that it- the “way” and the experience of it- be written. The travelogue 
shows that Montaigne  learns by traveling.  
He learns that in order to grasp one’s experience and to tell it, a constant movement is 
necessary.  This movement is experienced radically through travel.  He writes: “Let us try to 
speak this other language a little, especially since I am in this region where I seem to hear the 
most perfect Tuscan speech…” (Travel Journal, p.126). He uses the term essayer (“let us try”) 
and in doing so he does not only mean the attempt at speaking another language. It suggests that 
the whole matter, the travel and its journaling, shall be considered as a practice of the essaying: 
that is of Montaigne’s way of making sense of his own existence through the roads of the world.  
Once in Rome, Montaigne denies his citizenship and takes on a new one, more embracing 
and somehow universal. We learn in “On the Education of Children” that Socrates, just like 
Montaigne, knew to embrace “the whole world as his city”. They both can do this because they 
are philosophers and teachers. They have learned to “look” further than their own feet. Travel 




Montaigne recommends as an educational principle- that the student be let roam free and rub 
against “other peoples’ brains” (I: 26, p.112) is what Montaigne first handedly feels and thinks 
through his travels.  
This  chapter looks into the ways for which travel can be seen as responding to a 
Montaignean sketch of education. The teacher as a Socratic figure is reflected in the living 
metaphor of the traveler. Travel fosters a way of thinking that is so inherently  educational as to 
allow for teachers to be imagined as travelers. In order to see this, I consider specifically the kind 
of thinking that is enabled in traveling. I reflect on Montaigne’s thinking  on the discovery of the 
New World. The radical novelty of the experience of the New World  lets a central dimension of 
travel emerge: travel builds the space of movement for thinking of what is other. Once this 
relation is made clear, I move to explore the educational views expressed in selected essays. 
Finally, I return to the opposition I ascribed to the beginning of Modernity: that between book 
and road, or theory and experience, tradition and experimentation, to suggest that, with 
Montaigne, a new figure of the teacher shall be imagined. Emerging from this inquiry, one finds 
the teacher as a Socratic figure of philosopher and traveler, and with it a productive way of 
considering the opposition aforementioned: book and road shall be composed in the practice of 
philosophical education.  
 
 
2. Thinking travel 
This section considers what kind of thinking is enabled in traveling. I propose that, in 




logic in Montaigne’s reflections on the newly discovered continents of the Americas16.  For the 
European consciousness, the dawning of Modernity sees a pivotal encounter with alterity when 
the Americas are discovered. The Americas, and the American natives, represent a challenge, an 
opportunity and a problem from the perspective of the old European representation of the world. 
The new world is the “other” and it is encountered as such. With “alterity” I mean the quality of 
being “other”, as a defining trait recognized in the experience of that which is different than “I.” 
The surprising experience of the New World allows for an essential  dimension of travel 
to appear. In travel, one finds a possibility of movement that opens the ground for thinking of 
what is other. When they caught  sight of the new land, with its bewildering vegetation, unknown 
fruits and beautiful peoples, the European explorers were presented with the prime instance of 
difference. What they saw was so utterly foreign to make them doubt it could even fall within the 
realm of human things. How Europe dealt with the newness of the discovered lands is telling: 
what, in the  words by Todorov (1982), was “the most astonishing encounter of our history”, an 
encounter that “ will never again achieve such an intensity”,  produced “the greatest genocide in 
human history” (pp. 5-6).  We look back in horror to the conquest, exploitation and destruction 
of a continent. Horror contains a sense of disconcert as well: by what reasons was such a disaster 
rendered possible?  
The question is not only, and perhaps not primarily of interest to the historian; it is a 
question for everyone concerned with the results of the full-blown encounter with alterity. For 
we can accept that what happened then shows as magnified what is at stake with every such 
encounter. There exists, in any instance of contact with the other, a chance that it turns into a 
clash. Such encounters take place, so to say, on a rim standing between two abysses: that of the 
                                                
16 Abecassis (1992) writes that “no phenomenon can equal in the XVI century that radical figure of 




annihilation of the other; or that of indifference or assimilation. The traveler stands on a fine 
edge and needs to keep finding a balance. A double movement is present and it is hard to resist 
its contrasting thrusts. Todorov notes that “the postulate of difference is a difficult one. (…) [it] 
readily involves the feeling of superiority”(p. 63). Between postulating difference and 
postulating equality, the traveler finds again and again the challenge of recognizing the other as 
different and the same. The challenge was not met by the conquistadores, and the conquest of 
America remains “marked by ambiguity: human alterity is at once revealed and subjected” 
(p.50).  
Montaigne reacts with the same horror and dismay to the annihilation of the New World. 
“Of Coaches” reflects these very feelings. Written eight years later than “On Cannibals”, this 
essay provides an account of Montaigne’s response to the destruction of the new lands. “Of 
Coaches” is seminal in that it presents the unavoidable connection between thinking and 
travelling: both human activities put the subject in relation with what is other; and by instituting 
a relation to it, they present the danger of its annihilation (the other is eaten up via destruction 
and assimilation) or of the annihilation of the relation (the other is not considered via 
indifference). In other words, the traveller is constantly on the border between the two dangers. 
She walks on the line between being a conqueror and being a tourist. If she is able to think in 
accordance with life’s dynamism, if she is not knocked of balance by the ever changing presence 
of alterity, and can relate to it, then like a tightrope walker she has found her ways to travel.  “Of 
coaches” prepares this set of considerations and in doing so it also suggests, although in an 
indirect way, not only that the good traveler is a philosopher, but also how a traveller shall 




Montaigne opens his essay noting that “It is very easy to demonstrate that great authors, 
when they write about causes, adduce not only those they think are true but also those they do 
not believe in, provided they have some originality and beauty. They speak truly and usefully 
enough if they speak ingeniously ”(III:6, p.685). Evidently, he wants to frame his essay within a 
longstanding conversation about the question of how to “write about causes”, hereby operating 
upon a straight reference to the Aristotelian understanding of philosophia as the science of 
causes. Causal investigation is one of the ways in which philosophy engages with the world.  
Philosophy asks the question “ why?” and searches for reasons to explain the natural world or 
human action (see Aristotle, Physics II 3 and Metaphysics V 5). Moreover, in the same line 
Montaigne tells that, for him, the activity of causal investigations cannot be disjointed from the 
telling of the investigation. He puts forth that when authors write about causes, they follow not 
only criteria of truthfulness, but also criteria of originality and beauty. It can be easily objected 
that it is not easy to see how the two sets of criteria can coexist: one either searches for the “ 
true” cause of something; or he accepts the ones that are finely said because they are original and 
beautiful. Probably the reader at this point has in mind the great alternative staged in some of 
Plato’s dialogues between Socrates: the philosopher teacher who searched the essence of things, 
and a Sophist (be he Protagoras, or Gorgias): the teacher of rhetoric who was interested in 
presenting a convincing speech rather than a truthful one.  
Montaigne seems to believe that the opposition between truthfulness and usefulness, 
figuratively between Plato’s Socrates and Plato’s sophists, is a false one and is overcome in the 
practice of those who write beautifully about causes. The evidence to support his claim is found 
in the following example about the reason why we bless those who sneeze. He continues: “We 




mouth carries some reproach of gluttony; the third is sneezing. And because it comes from the 
head and is blameless, we give it this civil reception”(III:6, p. 685). How are we supposed to take 
this evidence? What is this example supporting? The argument is not particularly elegant, nor the 
language to express it. It does not seem to be proving that one can write beautifully about causes. 
Should we then take it to prove that reasoning about causes- the Aristotelian understanding of 
what is philosophy- should not be beautiful? 
 Perhaps instead, we are supposed to receive it as a judgment about the very same idea 
that writing about causes be the utmost way of philosophers to talk truthfully. A few lines above, 
Montaigne had noted that great authors “speak truly and usefully enough if they speak 
ingeniously”, seemingly implying that a beautiful speech would, by itself, also gather enough of 
those qualities of truthfulness and usefulness (that are not opposed but can be had together). It 
could be that the example about sneezing serves the purpose to mock the idea it seems to 
support. Montaigne continues: “Do not laugh at this piece of subtlety; it is, they say, from 
Aristotle”. A scathing line expresses at the same time the awareness that the example is 
laughable, the ironic command to avoid laughter, and the real target of the introduction to “Of 
Coaches”. This being not Aristotle himself, but the traditional ipse dixit and the scholasticized 
gravity of a certain way of intending philosophy. The ironic command: “do not laugh! It is 
Aristotle’s, they say” may be uttered by a Montaigne in  a teacher’s position.  
In the utterance of the warning: “Do not laugh!” Montaigne wears  the fool mask. “On 
Vanity” has already shown that the fool has a serious message to communicate by exerting his 
philosophical irony. Montaigne wears the fool mask to invite us to see that the matter: how we 
think and talk about reasons, is indeed very serious. How we orient our thought to inquiring 




causes have a direct impact on us not through argument, but through “necessary experience” 
[moi sais bien que cette cause ne me touche pas, et le sais non par argument, mais par 
nécessaire expérience] (p.363). The weight put on the experience shows the importance of the 
introduction to “Of Coaches”: Montaigne frames his essay on the New World with a necessary 
consideration about the kind of thinking that can be used to understand our experience. It is a 
way of reasoning that does not do without experience, but that passes through it.  
This way shall be explored quite appropriately then, in a piece of writing that moves from 
considerations about ways of understanding the causes to considerations about ways of moving- 
and to finally unfold the author’s deepest concern about the destruction of the New World. The 
line of reasoning in the essay could be traced as moving from thoughts about ways of thinking 
(in which an abstract, logician’s way is opposed to an experiential, traveler’s way) to a display of 
what is at stake when the experience in not fully thought of: the dangers of denial and also 
annihilation of it. The horrified report of the blind destruction reserved to the population of the 
newly discovered continent is a full manifestation of the failure of experience when it is 
unthought of (perhaps the “unexamined life”). The dimension of travel exposes the radical 
presence of alterity and of novelty. A challenge is posed to thought: the challenge of thinking 
through the experience of alterity and newness without negating it.  
The announcement of the discovery of the new world is preceded by an astounding 
declaration of the deep inadequacy of our ways of knowing in comparison with the richness and 
vastness of the world. The world- life, indeed- is infinitely creative and ultimately unknowable in 
its entirety. Our conception can cover life only partially in both space and time. Montaigne 
borrows and adapts a comment by Cicero:  “If we could view that expanse of countries and ages 




wide that it can find no limit where it can stop there would appear in that immensity an infinite 
capacity to produce innumerable forms.” ( Cicero, De natura deorum, I, 20, in Latin in the 
original text, III:6, p. 692).  
 The boundless magnitude expands itself in regard to space (“countries”) and time 
(“ages”). Even if it were possible for us to position ourselves as to view the boundless expanse, 
we would simply realize that it gives birth to innumerable forms. This kind of fertility, 
Montaigne explains, characterizes nature. It marks also our ways of knowing and thinking: “We 
do not go in a straight line; we rather ramble, and turn this way and that. We retrace our steps”. 
Our knowing of the world with difficulty matches the infinite creative and moving forms of the 
world. Our knowledge is “a miserable foundation for our rules” and it is “apt to represent to us a 
very false picture of things” (p.693).  
 Montaigne is concerned primarily with the challenges encountered  and not satisfied by 
our thinking in the face of alterity and newness, that is, really, of the world of life. To a world 
that “ glides along while we live on it” (p.692) we respond with ridiculously inadequate notions 
of historical progress, or, likewise, of decline. Two quotes by Lucretius are used to show both the 
conviction of the world’s decay and ruin, and of the world’s youth and novelty. Such inferences 
are vain, Montaigne says, and the poet operated them in relation to the weakness or liveliness of 
the minds of his time.  The idea that the age of the world is to be inferred by comparison to the 
health and livelihood of the minds of the time does not stand the test of reality. Opposing 
conclusions can be drawn about the same time: like those of the world’s progress and of the 
world’s decay, when thought of by a knowledge that is shortsighted and weak. Our knowledge is 
inadequate because it “embraces little and has a short life both in extent of time and of 




The weakness of our knowledge poses problems not only because we have 
representations of the world untrue and misleading, but moreover so because on such 
representations (such as that of historical progress) we found the rules and norms of our 
behavior. The issue at stake here is chiefly epistemological, but from it an ethical issue is 
streaming immediately. In the essay’s crescendo, the considerations on the falsity of ideas of 
progress culminate in the image of the king, Montezuma, pulled to the ground from his chair of 
gold amidst the corpses of his army (p.699). The heroic figure of the defeated king stands high in 
comparison to the felony of the greedy and cruel Spaniards. Montezuma joins the  rank of great 
souls like that of Socrates, who, after the rout of his army, being on foot, walked resolutely and 
unafraid out of the battle field ( p.686). Of course, while Socrates’ courage impressed his 
enemies in that occasion and they let him make his escape, a very different end is met by 
Montezuma, whose enemies are not able to recognize and honor his courage.  The moderns, who 
feel indeed at the highest point of civilization and look back at the ancients as backwards, clearly 
lose in the comparison of the war ethics and of the treatment reserved to the defeated. Similarly, 
in “On the Cannibals”(I: 31), the reader was brought to question who was indeed practicing 
cannibalism, if the Brazilian people or the French ones.  
The comparisons instituted or suggested give place to sets of ironic reversals: the 
civilized are not such; the savages are not such; our heroes, like the conqueror of Peru, Marquis 
Francisco Pizarro, are not such. There is certainly irony in the gaze Montaigne poses on the 
conquerors, and in general on the Europeans with their presumption of superiority. Yet, the 
dominant emotional tone of the last part of the essay is sadness at the loss and destruction of the 




He writes: “Our world has just discovered another world (and who will guarantee us that 
it is the last of its brothers, since the daemons, the Sibyls, and we ourselves have up to now been 
ignorant of this one?) no less great, full, and well limbed than itself” (p.693). The first mention 
of the discovery of the new world comes well into the essay, in the last third of it. The other 
world is nothing less than the one we know: a brother of ours, and perhaps not the only other 
existing world either. “We”: the contemporaneous Europeans, were ignorant of this one, as were, 
in Montaigne’s puzzling list, the daemons and the Sibyls. What kind of knowledge, perhaps a 
divinatory one, would have let us be aware of the existence of the new world? Or perhaps, a 
more interesting question to ask would be: how long can we maintain our ignorance that makes 
us monstrous?  
The problem is, in fact, that “we” are still ignorant of the new world even though we have 
discovered it. Our guilty, self-righteous ignorance makes us monsters; and it makes the cosmos, 
figuratively, an in-between creature: half human, half inhuman, as the demons mentioned above. 
The pride taken by the moderns in the discovery of the new world is badly placed. Montaigne 
observes that, if “we” think of ourselves and of the new era, modernity, as a winning giant, the 
truth is that the giant is dying. The giant is indeed a monstrous hemiplegic one. For one half- the 
European one- is paralyzed; while the other part is in full vigor (p.693).  The vital half of the 
cosmos is the new world, and it is  described as a newborn.  
He continues: “not fifty years ago it knew no letters, no weights and measures, nor 
clothes, nor wheat, nor vines. It was still naked at the breast, and lived only on what its nursing 
mother provided” (p.693). The new world is tender, hopeful, and strong. It is harmoniously 
constituted, it is free and intelligent, radical and natural. Its encounter with the conquerors is 




world, naked, disarmed, is visited by an unknown monster, mounted on an apocalypse beast, 
bearded, armored in shiny metal, with a dreadful roar. The Conquest is a tragic epopee” (p. 348, 
my translation).  
Retombons à nos coches: let us fall back to our coaches. This is the opening of the last 
paragraph of Montaigne’s chapter. Let us go back to our seats and from there let us view the last 
sequence of the history of the tragic encounter. What has been noted to recall an ante litteram 
cinematographic experience (G. Nakam, 2001, p.349) frames the scene of the fall of the last king 
of the Inca. Atahualpa, captured and pulled to the ground from his chair of gold by a horseman, 
remains triumphant even when defeated. Montaigne exhorts us, who read his work, to follow 
him in the concluding movement of his essay: a double movement composed of  distancing- 
falling back to our seats; and of taking cognizance of a reversal- the triumphant defeated king.  
Such movement characterizes the gaze of she who, in travel, learned the ways of looking 
and thinking of what is “other”. I have described  it earlier (chapter 4) as a reflective movement 
that sustains a double mirroring of self and world. The traveler’s gaze is projected onto the world 
of her experience in a constant re-positioning of itself. The change in the stance from which to 
observe is constant, because it is roused by the games of reversals offered in the double 
mirroring. Continuous change allows for a multiplicity of perspectives that shall be considered in 
their whole and not as mutually excluding one another. The traveler knows that there is only one 
right way of receiving the experience of the world without negating it. This way consists in 
responding dynamically to the quality of dynamism proper of both world and the traveler.  
The European colonizer is thus the opposite of a traveler. He is unable to respond to the 
vitality and novelty of what he sees. He deploys stale categories that justify his greed and will to 




without killing it, both in thought and in practice. He thinks, so to say, in an armored way: a hard 
metal defends his mind, making him perhaps invulnerable. But it also imprisons him and does 
not let him breathe. Nothing of the new world can touch him, as his armor effectively protects 
him. A mind shielded from the traits of vitality proper of the experience of the world can only 
enact a mechanical, rigid movement that does not attune itself to the movement of life.  Such an 
encumbered movement! Such a lack of grace and of naturalness. Cruelty comes from the denial 
of life brought about by the armored way of thinking. Rejection of the other, due to incapability 
to even perceive otherness in its presence, is indeed lethal. The weakness of human knowledge, 
the inadequacy of our ways of knowing in comparison to the richness of the world of experience 
(III:6, p. 692) shall not be amended by shielding it with the cold and lifeless armor of a scholastic 
warrior. What happened with the discovery of the new world confirms that such a remedy is 
useless and deadly.  
The way to a more embracing way of looking and knowing shall be prepared and fostered 
through one’s life: such is the task of education. My next section considers the respects in which 
education responds to its task in relation to the traveler’s gaze.  
 
3. Thinking education 
Traveling responds to the ideal proposed in the two chapters written explicitly on the 
subject of education: “Of Pedantry” (I: 25) and “Of the Education of Children” (I:26). The 
correspondence is multiverse. Initially, and more obviously, there is a literal interpretation for 
which actual, physical travel is considered part of a good education. Then, there is a sense that 
the movement of travel concurs to the movement and to the refinement of one’s thinking. 




to educate and to be educated cannot prescind from the exercise of dynamic thinking signified by 
traveling.  
The main argument presented to sustain such correspondence rests on the consideration 
that learning requires apprenticeship. Montaigne mentions two famous Milanese dancing 
masters, who cannot teach to dance by simply showing the steps to their students. In the same 
way, one cannot be taught to handle anything without practicing it, because it is impossible to 
“train our understanding without setting it in motion” (I: 26, p. 112). The practice, it is 
suggested, consists in taking “everything that comes to our eyes” as “book enough”: facts and 
events or experiences of daily life “are so many new materials”. Human understanding is put to 
work and set in motion in the exercise of reading the given of human experience: everything that 
is offered to the subject is “book enough”. The contrary of bookish education is an education to 
recognize that experiences may serve as books. Everything can supply “new material” to human 
understanding. “For this reason,” Montaigne continues, 
mixing with men is wonderfully useful, and visiting foreign countries, not merely to 
bring back, in the manner of our French noblemen, knowledge of the measurements of 
the Santa Rotonda, or of the richness of Signora Livia’s drawers, or, like some others, 
how much longer or wider Nero’s face is in some old ruin there than on some similar 
medallion; but to bring back knowledge of the characters and ways of those nations, and 
to rub and polish our brains by contact with those of others (I:26, p. 112). 
 
Human understanding is activated by putting oneself in relation to others. Traveling abroad can 
set conditions for this to happen in so far as it is experienced with a right disposition. The 
disposition is inspired by a desire to “ bring back knowledge” of one kind. Not every traveling is 
by itself educational, as many, “in the manner of our French gentlemen”, carry back knowledge 
that is irrelevant. Examples of such knowledge include measurement, length and width, and the 




be gained from “mixing with men” regards “characters and ways” of the nation visited: les 
humeurs et leur façons. It is indeed the knowledge of qualities that the traveler is after. Qualities, 
instead of measurable quantities: this is what is worth “bringing back” or better, “relating” (the 
original text uses the verb rapporter) to ourselves.  Certainly, qualities are also that which is 
more difficult to gain knowledge, and a relatable knowledge, of. Yet measuring one’s mind with 
this task is namely what makes the mind exercised, flexible, smooth and ultimately able to judge 
experience.  
Hence, travel is needed to “rub and polish our brains by contact with those of others.” 
This image tells at the same time of the idea we can work on our minds and improve them, and 
of the awareness that such improvement can only take place by contact, that may imply friction, 
with the minds of others. The work on one’s mind has two main traits. It is artistic: the 
“polishing” [limer] recalls Horace’s well known expression labor limae et mora (Ars Poetica, ll 
290), the labor and delay of the file, indicating the slow and meticulous refinement needed for a 
work of art. The work on one’s mind assumes qualities of the work of an artist on her way of 
knowing. It is a reflective work, because it is exercised by the subject on herself and specifically 
on her way of thinking and knowing. But Montaigne interestingly binds the trait of reflectivity in 
a new way. It may be asked, what is the tool for this filing to take place? Where is the file in this 
metaphor? There seems to be no ‘external’ tool. The polishing takes place by contact with the 
minds of others. It is by connecting the labor limae to  the presence of others, with whom to 
enter in contact, that the experience of difference is allowed and reworked, so as to make the 





Travel is the name for the experience that makes room for such a work on one’s mind to 
happen. A mind that is polished – that is, intentionally made into a work of art through 
intercourse with others- can “bring back” knowledge of characters and ways. A last note is to be 
made about the idea of “bringing back” knowledge. If on one hand it may seem to hint that 
knowledge is a good that can be transported, thus brought back, on the other hand it may suggest 
that knowledge is primarily searched for in relation to home.  The knowledge searched for, and 
attained, is that which one “brings back”: the movement of discovery implies a correspondent 
movement of gathering or collecting. I have argued above that the double movement constitutes 
travel properly. I have recognized Montaigne as depicting travel as a movement which takes 
place in relation to what is left behind and at times found upon return: what has been named the 
home. I have proposed that the idea of home encompasses the core of one’s life: family, 
residency, possessions, and more so language. The passage I am analyzing now spotlights that an 
educated mind knows what to “bring back home” from her experience of difference. That travel 
is a mode of movement, and thus responding to the inherent dynamism of both life and mind, is 
confirmed by the following remark in which Montaigne continues: “I should like the tutor to take 
him abroad at a tender age”.  The original text says [Je voudrais qu’on commençat  à les 
promener] where the verb promener  indicates both to take out someone and also, in the 
reflexive form, to take a walk or stroll. To be taken out entails to walk, to move, and this is 
advised from a very early age, as it attunes and exercises the child’s mind to experiencing 
difference and to knowing its ways and humors in making the way home. 
 I insist that Montaigne’s emphasis on travel as part of education is based on the idea that 
the movement constituting travel assists the movement of one’s thinking  and consequently the 




thought can be traced clearly in those passages of the essay in which Montaigne puts forth a 
parallelism between traveling and reading. Such correspondence is shown in that part of the 
essay in which Montaigne proposes that the formation of judgment is indeed what education 
aims at. After quoting Dante on the value of doubting, it is suggested that the pupil needs to be 
exposed to a variety of ideas, even if she is not able to chose which one to adopt. Montaigne 
defends the opportunity of hesitating in front of an array of choices instead than uncritically 
picking one. Embracing another person’s opinion shall happen only by the pupil’s own 
reasoning: otherwise, it equals to slavery ( I:26, p.111).  
Truly, for Montaigne, the exercise of judgment is a matter of freedom: giving it up means 
conversely giving up that freedom and enslaving oneself to the authority of the author read. The 
relation between freedom of thinking and movement  had been just reinstated few lines 
previously. When one does not judge critically of what she reads, her “mind moves only on faith, 
being bound and constrained to the whim of others’ fancies, a slave and a captive under the 
authority of their teaching”(p.111). Montaigne explains  that “our vigor and liberty are extinct” 
because of the fact that we have grown used to “leading strings”: being under the control of 
another enslaves us and weakens us. It is necessary that freedom be safeguarded and the student 
let know that she shall “choose, if she can”, whose ideas to make her own. Montaigne writes: “he 
must imbibe their ways of thinking, not learn their precepts” (p.111). [il faut qu’il emboive leurs 
humeurs, non qu’il apprenne leurs precepts].  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the parallel between traveling and reading is reinforced by this 
last note. What the pupil searches for in books is the same she searches for in travel.  While 
reading, she must “imbibe their ways of thinking”(p.111). While traveling, she must “bring back 




unambiguously such a correspondence. In both mentioned instances, the word Montaigne choses 
is leurs humeurs. Reader, traveler; student, teacher: what they are after, is experience and 
relatable knowledge of the world’s ways of thinking, of valuing, of living. In sum, “education, 
work, and study aim only at forming this”(p.111).  
 In the formation of judgment as faculty, human understanding flourishes and thrives 
there where human experience is lived through and read through. When human understanding is 
set in motion, it finds that everything in its life shall be read and judged, in so far as it recognizes 
that experiences come and present traits of difference and novelty. Human understanding is put 
to work and set in motion in the exercise of reading the given of human experience: everything 
will suffice as new material for it.   What I had named earlier in the previous chapter as “the 
opposition between book and road” proves, in Montaigne’s thought, to be a polarity rather than a 
mutually exclusive relation. He writes: “I don’t travel without books. (…) It is the best provision 
I have found for this human journey (...)” (III: 3, p .628). The human understanding does not 
need to choose between the book and road, because they are in fact held together in the exercise 
of judgment. Such is, as I already suggested, a primary concern of education. Marc Foglia (2011) 
explains that “education is made through the reciprocal mediation of experience and of 
philosophy, mediation whose author is personal judgment” (p.94, my translation).  Education of 
judgment takes place in the give-and-take of one’s own experience and the philosophical 
thinking about the experience itself.  
“Of practice” (II:6) sets convincingly the connection between education of oneself and 
experience. Practice forms the self because through experience judgment is exercised, and 
prepared for life’s tasks. It is important to take notice of the fact that, Montaigne notes, not every 




thus be experienced and practiced. It is pointedly about such tasks anyway, that the value of 
practice as preparation becomes evident. In relation to such events one learns that formation of 
the self implies preparation and exercise through “education, work and study” (I: 26, p.111).  
The essay starts: “Reasoning and education, though we are willing to put our trust in them, can 
hardly be powerful enough to lead us to action, unless besides we exercise and form our soul by 
experience to the way we want it to go; otherwise, when it comes to the time for action, it will 
undoubtedly find itself at loss” (II:6, p. 267). 
With this reflection Montaigne opens his chapter, in which he unfolds the value of 
experience in consideration of the direction given to one’s life. He takes on the analysis of the 
experience that marks human life: its end. He provides accounts of how human beings 
familiarize themselves with death and “ try it out to a certain extent” (p.268). Life is at stake: to 
learn to die is to philosophize (I: 20), and likewise, philosophizing is what teaches us to live (I: 
26, p.120). Meditation on death is one of the philosophical exercises17. Montaigne thinks of 
practice by offering a prolonged meditation on death: thus making it clear that the “practice” 
[exercitation] being talked of, is the practice of living. It is, it can be suggested, the practice 
which “walks man to action” [pour nous acheminer jusques a l’action] by forming the 
individual’s judgment.  
Teachers should work with students, aiming at exercising and forming judgment. This 
process  cannot happen through role modeling, as Montaigne does not trust the imitative nature 
of learning through exemplarity (see Hansen, p.149). Emphasis on education’s finality to form 
judgment requires that the subject’s relation to exemplary models be complicated. Montaigne 
explains that his very advice shall be examined and not uncritically accepted by the tutor. 
                                                
17 Pierre Hadot unfolds at length the philosophical practices aiming at kindling a transformation in the 




Introducing his considerations about the education of children, he writes: “and in this matter on 
which I venture to give him (i.e. the tutor) advice, he will take it only as far as it seems good to 
him” (I:26, p. 110). This consideration, albeit seemingly incidental, encapsulates the 
Montaignean view that the ultimate measure for action resides in the individual’s free and 
unfettered judgment. Parenthetically, such a line succeeds in communicating to the reader- and 
perhaps the reader is a teacher searching for advice- the importance of her individual 
understanding in receiving and seizing any educational advice. Which seems vital, for often the 
literature addressed to teachers does not live up to the educational principles it preaches: it is 
prescriptive, condescending, infantilizing. Montaigne is very far away from such a mode of 
addressing the tutor. He knows that no tutor can educate her student to exercise judgment unless 
her own freedom is preserved and valued. 
 The tutor, he continues, will be a person chosen for her “character and understanding” 
more than for her “learning”, since she will have to “go about [her] job in a novel way” (p.110).  
The novelty implied in any educational undertaking requires some qualities in the teacher: that 
she be “formed” and free. “Of Pedantry” (I:25), the essay preceding “Of the education of 
children”, sketches by contrast the figure of the teacher. By depicting pedantry as that useless 
disposition to accumulate the knowledge of others without every owning it, with what is defined 
as a “dependent and mendicant ability” (I:25, p. 101), Montaigne tells us that the teacher shall be 
its opposite: independent, and self sufficient. Such are possibly the personal qualities, it could be 
suggested, that enable the tutor to “go about her job in a novel way”.  If the image of the traveler 
then can be maintained, the tutor, like a traveler, is independent and “owns” enough to sustain 
herself in her undertaking. She has enough of a solid ground to be able to lean forward and 




the traveler’s resources, or else of the teacher’s possession, it seems that insisting on a well 
formed rather than a well filled mind for the tutor does not entail a void mind either. Montaigne 
comments: “as plants are stifled with too much moisture, and lamps with too much oil, so too 
much study stifles the action of the mind, which, being caught and entangled in a great variety of 
things, may lose the ability to break loose, and be kept bent and huddled by its burden” (I:25, p. 
98).  
The danger of a “too filled” mind consists the possibility that it is suffocated by the 
quantity of things: that mind is kept prisoner, bent and immobilized. The overfilled mind is 
frozen and unable to free itself, very much analogously to the mind of the armored warrior in the 
cruel conquest of the new world18. Too much study, erudition, too many unexamined opinions do 
not leave room for the mind to move. A mind that does not move is a dead mind, that cannot 
possibly be put in charge of educating others.  
However, an empty mind is not recommendable either. The teacher shall have owned 
enough knowledge and be enough learned to afford her that self reliance I was discussing earlier 
on. Right after the lines I just quoted, Montaigne modulates his idea: “But it works the other 
way, for the more our soul is filled, the larger it becomes” (I: 25, p.98). Pedantry is not really 
about the quantity of things hoarded in one’s mind: it is instead about the way in which such 
things are made own and disposed in the space of one’s mind. Minds can be made larger instead 
than more filled. Minds, I would insist, are made larger if they experience the kind of free 
roaming movement we have qualified as “travel”. The example Montaigne provides goes as 
follows. He presents the case of the ancient philosopher Archimedes, who put his knowledge to 
his city’s use by building defense machines. He notes, talking about ancient philosophers in 
                                                




general, that “they, if at any time they were put to the test of action, were seen to soar on such a 
lofty wing that it clearly appeared that their heart and soul had been marvelously enlarged and 
enriched by the understanding of things” (I:25, p.99). Montaigne proposes that, because of the 
work of formation of the mind and soul, they (mind and soul) are made figuratively able to fly. 
They are made larger and richer, without being made heavier, since they have been exercised not 
by accumulating things, but rather, by understanding them. It thus seems as though things, 
understood, are what shall inhabit the tutor’s mind. Some paragraphs later, he comments: “we 
labor only to fill our memory, and leave the understanding and the conscience empty” (p.100). 
Amassing and collecting things and words unexamined do not make the mind able to pass the 
“test of action”. With lucidity Montaigne suggests that such a mind- a storage mind, if it were, 
needs not even to actually “contain things”. Adducing the example of  that rich Roman who  
surrounded himself with men learned in everything, and used to call on them whenever he 
needed a sentence, or an argument (p.100-101), Montaigne  hints that the same way applies to 
those “whose ability dwells in their sumptuous libraries”(p.101). It may be superfluous to notice 
that the problem resides not in the sumptuous library, but in letting one’s ability lie there, instead 
than in one’s mind.  
The teacher’s mind may be “burdened”, “stifled”, “entangled” (p.98),  “inflated” and 
“swollen”(p.101). Or else, it may be  “large” (p.98), “enriched  and lofty” (p.99), and “full” 
(p.101).  It may be “more learned”, or else, it may be  “ better learned” (p. 100). Commerce of 
one’s understanding with “things” is what makes the difference. The teacher who is not a 
pedantic caricature shall “attend to things.” The student whom such teacher teaches shall, in turn, 




The fact, the experience, that learning requires an understood exchange with the world, is 
that which, appreciated, enables the person to form her own judgment. The idea that education is 
foremost about “things” is supported on this ground. When describing how shall a tutor with a “ 
well-formed head” teach the child, Montaigne perorates: “right from the start, according to the 
capacity of the mind he has in hand, (to) begin putting it through its paces, making it taste things, 
choose them, and discern them by itself” (I: 26, p. 110). The teacher will put her student’s mind 
in motion by “making it taste things.”  “Taste” here may be taken to indicate both the sensorial 
experience and also the element of appreciation of it. The aesthetic side of the experience is 
being pointed at through this expression. Choice and discernment of things, the next steps of the 
student’s mind set in motion with the teacher, indicate elements of the exercise of judgment 
implied in the learning experience. 
 “Words”- traditionally opposed to “things” in discourses of logic and of language- will 
be present as well, but only when exchanged in dialogue concerning the things experienced. “I 
do not want him to think and talk alone, I want him to listen to his pupil speaking in his turn” 
(p.110). Hansen (2002) notes that engaging the child with things “tenaciously and playfully 
complements the task of learning how to speak of the world in a moral spirit. (…) For 
Montaigne, indefatigable seeker of the honest word, right speaking respects the aleatory world 
humans inhabit” (p.149). An education comprises attending to things in relation to paying 
attention to the words that respect such things. “Things” [choses, res] indicate matter, content, 
what we are talking about. “Things” clarifies Hansen, “is a metaphorical term that stands for 
concrete experience of what the world brings into a person’s life, as well as what it offers if the 
person responds with an open mind and open senses”(p.149). An education to things is not an 




sense, words- the “right words”- follow the experience of the world as it is lived through with 
openness and respect.  
Montaigne relies on the understanding of the relation between “things” and “words” 
proposed by the classical rhetorical tradition. “Things” or res indicate the content, which is the 
subject matter of the orator’s speech; while “words” or verba indicate its style, that is the verbal 
form it receives.  By endorsing the primacy of “things” over words, Montaigne aligns himself 
with Horace, Cicero and Seneca the elder (I: 26), as seen with the successive quotation of lines 
from these three authors underscoring the injunction to “hold the thing”-live it, grab it, get it, so 
that the words will follow by themselves.  The priority of res has a vital relevance because it 
stems from the realization that nothing can substitute the person’s engagement with experience. 
Vickers (in Kessler, Maclean, eds, 2002) explains that the belief that the thing said could be 
distinguished from the style or form was often expressed through the metaphor of clothing 
(p.288). Style is the “verbal dress of thought”. Words are the verbal dress of things. Montaigne’s 
preference for a natural, effortless style reveals a position that is not only and not primarily 
concerned with matters of rhetoric: what is at stake is one’s stance in the world and what would 
be called, in a different context, one’s social and narrative identity.  
           Under this light, the address “To the Reader” bears the mark of a statement regarding 
Montaigne’s project of essaying his self, as it can be confirmed by the occurrence of the same 
metaphor of clothing. He writes,  
If I had written to seek the world’s favor, I should have bedecked myself better and 
should present myself in a studied posture. I want to be seen here in my simple, natural, 
ordinary fashion, without straining or artifice, for it is myself that I portray. (…) Had I 
been placed among those nations which are said to live still in the sweet freedom of 
nature’s first laws, I assure you I should very gladly have portrayed myself here entire 





He portrays himself- with both a descriptive and a prescriptive movement- “to the life”[au vif] 
and in his “natural form” [forme naïve]. Simple unstudied form is what suits his intent and his 
purpose, the project of his self being surely matter of his book, but moreover so of his existence. 
The words chosen to say his life, Montaigne’s words to say Montaigne’s life, will be alive, 
natural, unstudied, and effortlessly suited to it with no artifice. Honesty and responsibility 
towards his experience are moral, rather than rhetorical, qualities. Such is Montaigne’s 
pronunciation at the opening of the Essays.  
That same intent shall be at work in the teacher’s education of the student. Making sure 
the student attends at things translates into a disposition of attentiveness for the world of 
experience, and for the words chosen to say the experienced relationship. The freedom of 
movement of the student’s mind needs to be safeguarded so that “things” find room in it. Words 
unrelated to things risk overstuffing the mind. The teacher knows or learns the ways of 
movement, the favored patterns or lack of such, the velocity, the rest stops, the rhythm of her 
student’s mind. She knows because she has studied him, by long observation and association. 
Montaigne writes:  
It is good that he should have his pupil trot before him, to judge the child’s pace 
and how much he must stoop to match his strength. For lack of this proportion we spoil 
everything; and to be able to hit it right and to go along in it evenly is one of the hardest 
tasks that I know; it is the achievement of a lofty and very strong soul to know how to 
come down to a childish gait and guide it. I walk more firmly and surely uphill than 
downhill. (I: 26, p.110) 
 
The teacher should observe and study the pace, the steps and velocity with which the student 
moves. “Trot” refers to the physical movement and to the mind’s one. It is very difficult to pay 
attention to another person’s rhythm of thought. It takes a “lofty and strong soul” to achieve that 




teacher in “Of Pedantry” (I: 25, p.99) depict here the attentive teacher who can judge the right 
proportion in the student’s manner and speed. Which teacher can do this? She whose mind is 
made lofty, full, and better learned (pp.99-100) in the way I described earlier on19 has the 
capacity “to come down to a childish gait and guide it”. The capacity to “go downhill” with 
balance, strength and judgment is recalled centuries later by P. Jackson (1986). He writes: “I 
noticed that when nursery school teachers spoke to individual children or listened to what they 
had to say they first descended to the child’s height by bending at the knees until their faces were 
at on a level with the child’s own” (p. 76). Capacity to adopt this posture, he explains, depends 
on the teacher’s way of seeing: a teacher sees things differently20. This way of seeing, I have 
proposed, consists in being attuned to the ever shifting dynamism of the experience and of 
thought- so that, in order for teaching and learning to take really place, it is requested that the 
teacher has practiced travel: the encounter and discovery of alterity and newness experienced 
and found meaningful in view of self knowledge.  
A teacher who has formed and educated herself in this fashion shall encourage learning in 
her student. What has been explored as a dichotomy between “book and road” proves valid only 
for the sake of better understanding a shift of emphasis at the start of Modernity towards a more 
relevant role of direct experience of the world. The teacher’s quest for a different way of seeing 
composes the dichotomy by thriving in the points of contact between the two supposed 
alternatives. Such different way of seeing, I have proposed, can be found in the parallelism put 
forth by Montaigne between traveling and reading. There is where reflexivity takes a relational 
bend and becomes more accurately, the capacity to judge. Our teacher, with a well formed mind, 
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is then able to reach the child’s height and to seize the child’s steps with balance and attention. 
Where do they go once they have found each other?  
 
4. Conclusion 
Education is an exercise in freedom. Montaigne writes: “for all this education I do not 
want the boy to be made prisoner” (I: 26, p.121). It is mainly a philosophical education, and a 
conjoined enterprise by the student and the teacher. They will explore together everything.  Their 
classroom, and their textbook, is the world.  
This great world, which some multiply further as being only a species under one genus, is 
the mirror in which we must look at ourselves to recognize ourselves from the proper 
angle. In short, I want it to be the book of my student. So many humors, sects, judgments, 
opinions, laws, and customs teach us to judge sanely of our own, and teach our judgment 
to recognize its own imperfection and natural weakness, which is no small lesson. (I: 26, 
p.116) 
 
The two metaphors used to qualify the world are evidently related to one another and to the 
humanistic consideration of the relation between cosmos and individual: the world is a mirror 
and the world is a book. As I put forth earlier on, the two –world as way to self knowledge and 
world as text to be mapped and interpreted- find an agreement in Montaigne’s thinking. Self 
discovery and exploration of the world are co-implied in what I described as a relational 
understanding of the reflexivity of judgment. This is the heart of any educational intention, be it 
education of one’s self or of another. Through a philosophical education, reflection provides the 
angle from which to view oneself, the world and others. The philosophical experience of 
traveling assumes meaning in view of home: thus the relatable knowledge is found, reported to 
one’s own sense, and then, again, moved away. Traveling as a mode of learning comes back 




where it moves because it has practiced the encounter with the world’s alterity and novelty and 
has learned to mirror itself in them and to read them finding meaning. Education makes one “at 
home everywhere” because it is the experience through which one learns to leave and to come 
back in a steady, swinging movement.  He writes: “For our boy, a closet, a garden, the table and 
the bed, solitude, company, morning and evening, all hours will be the same, all places will be 
his study; for philosophy, which, as the molder of judgment and conduct, will be his principal 
lesson, has the privilege of being everywhere at home” (I:26, p. 122). 
Together, teacher and student experience the world in its astounding variability and 
philosophize about their experience, in that every part, moment, spark of human life serves as 
“book enough” to those whose gaze is being exercised. Because they engage in forming their 
ways of life and judgment, they are philosophers. Because they do so in courageous, open 
exchange with the world in its familiar and unfamiliar parts, they are travelers. Because they aim 
at forming that “wonderful brilliance  (that) may be gained for human judgment by getting to 
know men”(p.116), they are educating themselves. Traveler, philosopher, teacher, student are 
but “words” that cloth and reveal, in the most natural way possible, the living “thing” which is 







Chapter 6. Conclusion: the Teacher as Traveler 
 
1.Introduction 
In my concluding considerations, I want to relate the sense of my inquiry to the 
existential situation of being a teacher in the classroom today.  
 Many times, we teachers feel stuck. The students come, grow, and leave, cohort after 
cohort. We stay the same. They move, they develop, they grow. We cannot see our own growth 
with the same clarity. We are motionless, caught in the repetition of the institutional routines. 
The administration imposes its iron grip on us. We are expected to give up our judgment and 
agency. We sit there and feel the blow.  
William Johnson, a teacher at a public high school in Brooklyn, wrote on the New York 
Times in March 2012:  
Worst of all, the more intense the pressure gets, the worse we teach. When I had 
administrators breathing down my neck, the students became a secondary concern. I 
simply did whatever my assistant principal asked me to do, even when I thought his ideas 
were crazy. In all honesty, my teaching probably became close to incoherent. One week, 
my assistant principal wanted me to focus on arranging the students’ desks to fit with 
class activities, so I moved the desks around every day, just to show that I was a good 
soldier. I was scared of losing my job, and my students suffered for it. (Confessions of a 
‘Bad’ Teacher, The New York Times, Sunday Reviews, 3.5.2012). 
 
Mr. Johnson was given instructions to follow with no questions. He was made slave by a 
principal who did not respect and preserve the teacher’s freedom of movement. His words are 
particularly important not only for what they describe, but also because they appeared on the 
most diffused newspaper in the context of a public discussion about the appalling decision made 
by the New York City Department of Education to release its numerical ratings about the 




In an elementary school in Philadelphia, the third grade students and their teacher, Jaime, 
found their reading corner removed after a Holiday weekend. The week before, a District 
walkthrough team had visited the classroom and described the reading corner as “clutter” asking 
the teacher to remove it from the classroom. Jamie reports that the students loved that corner, 
with beanbag armchairs, ottomans, cushions and stuffed animals surrounding a large, low table 
with baskets of books arranged by topic, and used it regularly developing interest and passion for 
reading.  The reading corner had been donated by members of the local community. After it was 
taken away, a donor brought the case to the SRC (School Reform Commission) meeting at the 
beginning of January.  I report an excerpt of what he read:  
Now, these 8- and 9-year-olds do not understand why their special spot is gone 
and why they have to read at their desks. They think they are being punished, and 
they have no idea why. Moreover, relationships among the staff at [the school] 
have been seriously damaged. Of course, since [the school] is an Empowerment 
School, skilled teachers (…) are effectively handcuffed to the scripted curriculum. 
They are not free to use their knowledge and expertise, because the District says 
that it is better for them to act like automatons and follow the script. The 
walkthrough process only adds insult to injury. Besides denying them the freedom 
to apply their teaching skills, they are also taking away teachers' classroom 
resources. (Andrew Ganim, Walkthrough team deems reading area 'clutter,' 




Local papers developed an interest in the story and interviewed Jaime. An article in the 
most read blog about Philadelphia public schooling received an impressive number of comments 
and reactions from the readers. After attention was raised about the facts, the district’s Chief 
Academic Officer  personally went to the school, dragging in the principal and the regional 
superintendent, who had  caused the whole problem about the reading center.  They made sure 




missing, so the principal bought a new one: it's apparently in her car”(from a private 
correspondence between me and the teacher). 
We teachers have many reasons to feel trapped, immovable, somewhat frozen in our 
work. If we cultivate a way of thinking that instead keeps our dignity and liberty present, we are 
able to carve places of freedom in the constricting circumstances and break free.  Jaime, the third 
grade teacher, was able to think even within the boundaries posed by the absurd violations she 
was exposed to. She started to bring her case to the attention of her community.  Her kids also 
spontaneously wrote a letter to the principal in which they asked her: “we are told we should not 
bully other kids, why did you bully our teacher?”  
The story ends well, but it also tells of the constant threats coming to teachers’ autonomy 
by the mere fact of working in an institution. In some ways like Arion, the poet described by 
Herodotus that I mentioned in chapter 3, Jaime is at the same time powerless and powerful. She 
is powerless, due to the abuses she and her students underwent, but she also has much power that 
comes from having cultivated her life and her students.  Like Arion on the prow of the ship, 
singing his beautiful song, Jaime raised her intelligent voice, was listened to by her community, 
and found ways to resist the shameful insult.  
In the course of my study, I have described a traveler teacher philosopher who “move[s] 
within the space for good teaching" (Santoro, p.332). It is this image that I want to offer to us 
real, embodied teachers. If a widely accepted description places teachers “in the trenches”, I 
hope with my work to have shown that it is indeed possible to turn the trenches from lines of 
conflict into terrains of hopeful  exploration.  The next section looks at the sense of offering a 





2.Why offer a sketch?  
David Hansen (2011), towards the end of his book The Teacher and the World proposes 
to imagine some exercises for the teacher. The exercises have the aim of sustaining the person in 
the cultivation of her self as a “response to pressure, teachers can ready themselves through a 
variety of exercises for the challenges, difficulties and possibilities of education in a globalizing 
environment” (p. 33). One of these exercises consists in the formation of a personal canon made 
of meaningful works that can help every teacher think through her own individual experience. 
Hansen insists that a personal canon has no pretense of offering specific instructions about 
techniques or strategies. Rather, it offers “the voice of wisdom, courage and imagination” 
(p.108). Writing about the works composing this canon, he continues:  
In effect they say to the teacher: “Are you actually surprised that educating 
is difficult, and yet also wondrous? Are you really shocked that your school is 
rent by competing agendas and yet also positions you to mature? Are you really 
stunned to be witness of both the good and the bad in human nature? You, 
teacher, dwell at crossroads of people, places, institutions, and more. There are no 
preset boundaries there that rule out the manifold expressions of human nature- 
remembering to, that that very nature is ever-changing in ways nobody can mark 
or calculate, since we are all too close to see it. You will encounter every day, 
every hour, and perhaps every minute the problematic and the promising, the 
frustrating and the liberating, the depressing and the delightful” (p.108).  
 
A strong reminder of the complex beauty of education shall be heard, even amidst trying 
and arduous conditions, in the conversation between works of thought and the actual living 
thinking that teachers practice while they teach. Listening and responding to this reminder can 
“deepen one’s care for the world itself” (p. 109).  The conversation I have developed in the 
course of the dissertation embraces many voices, that could be seen as forming some personal 
manual or canon in the way described by Hansen.  My guiding image has been refracted in 




dissertation, we have encountered many of those figures: from Marco Polo, to the teachers in the 
Kindergarten observed by Phil Jackson, to Solon the sage, Diogenes the kateghetes, Chiron, 
Seneca, Montaigne’s Latin tutor, the Milanese dance teachers Pavel and Pompeo, pedantic 
teachers, the teacher with a well formed mind, Mr. Johnson, and  my friend Jaime.  
By responding to the many figures and voices who partook in the conversation, I attend 
to the reminder issued by them of the complex beauty of our shared enterprise, education, and I 
develop my response intentionally as an exercise of care.  With my last strokes I wish to sketch 
the figure of the teacher as traveler as it emerged from the inquiry of the dissertation. By doing 
this, I enact a kind of essaying: I attempt at making sense of the world from the particular angle 
of my existence. A sketch is a reflective outlining of the figure of an experience, a draft always 
susceptible of new redrafting. Still, in its temporariness, a sketch offers one meaningful retelling 
of the experience, of which it captures, even for a glimpse, some deep and secret traits.   
What I am about to offer, at the end of my study, is then not a summary, but an attempt at 
perceiving the study in its lines and features.  By doing this, I aim at doing two things. First, I 
want to practice a mode of essaying, which nourishes my own teaching.  Essaying is made 
possible by a mode of looking and thinking that every teacher practices. Stephanie Burdick 
Shepherd (2012) talks insightfully of teachers as sketch artists. She writes: “Teaching is 
something like this. At times it can be a messy and chaotic activity. And yet, if we do not admit 
that it is the constant sketching, the redrawing of what it means to educate and to be educated, 
asking ourselves what we should notice and pay attention to we may very miss what it is to teach 
at all”.  
Second, by sketching the figure of teacher as traveler, I want to expose a meaning for this 




desire.  The Italian philosopher Adriana Cavarero (2000) in her book Relating Narratives: 
Storytelling and Selfhood tells a story that was recounted to Karen Blixen when she was a child: 
A man who lived by the pond was awakened one night by a great noise. He went out into 
the night and headed for the pond, but in the darkness, running up and down, back and 
forth, guided only by the noise, he stumbled and fell repeatedly. At last, he found a leak 
in the dike, from which the water and fish were escaping. He set to work plugging the 
leak and only when he had finished went back to bed. The next morning, looking out of 
the window, he saw with surprise that his footprints had traced the figure of a stork on the 
ground. (p.1) 
 
Cavarero asks the question with Blixen: “When the design of my life is complete, will I see, or 
others see, a stork? Does the course of every life allow itself to be looked upon in the end like a 
design that has a meaning?” (p.1). 
She comments that the design could not be anticipated because it is not “projected or 
controlled”. On the contrary, it stems from the man’s response to an emergency: the leaking dike 
that he repairs in the darkness of the night. “His journey mixes intention with accident”: his steps 
leave behind a figure that results from them without following a plan. The unpredictable unity of 
the stork is seen only when the experience that traced it is concluded. For the man of the story, 
the unforeseeable meaning of his night is outlined in the figure composed by his steps. Cavarero 
concludes by repeating Blixen’s question: “When the design of my life is complete, will I see, or 
others see, a stork?”, to which she responds: “The figural unity of design, the unifying meaning 
of the story, can only be posed, by the one who lives it, in the form of a question. Or perhaps, in 
the form of a desire” (p.2). 
It is then in the interrogative mode of a wish, that I now offer this description.  
 
3. The teacher as traveler 




She has a new way of seeing: she looks with attention and considers the educational 
elements in her classroom. She looks closely and perceives telling details, she then steps back 
and lifts her gaze to far away things and ideas. She focuses back her gaze on what is she is 
tending to, and so forth in a swinging of close by and far away that substantiates thinking. If she 
lets her attention be excited by something and she quickly leaves it after having grasped it, she 
does not let this vex her mind, because she has maintained her mind’s integrity and endurance 
with practice and exercise of instability.  
She recognizes uncertainness  and dynamism as qualities of the educational experience 
and knows how to sail across them. Her capacity to do this descends from the fact that she is 
acquainted to a sense of displacement: of having left home and of not having a predetermined 
“proper place” in the classroom. Her way of looking allows her to maintain the educational 
terrain as partially known. Because she is aware that there is always so much more to be 
discovered, while being a teacher she is always also a student of the world. She knows that 
surprises keep arising and she is open and flexible. She has a regular routine in teaching that she 
holds on to, knowing that at every moment her habits can be altered of suspended if the situation 
requires it.  
She has a way of thinking that stems from her reflective gaze. Her thinking encompasses 
knowledge of the world and of her self, while in each realm (world and self) she moves and 
transforms the familiar in unfamiliar and the unfamiliar in familiar. She thinks in relation to 
finding meaning in her experience: a meaning that needs to be relatable and that assumes 
relevance in view of the point of departure of the exploration. Alterity, difference and newness 
are met in the exploration and are recognized. Her way of thinking keeps the situation open to 




She views time as a dimension of her essaying- attempting at reading life and at forming 
it. By viewing the present as not concluded, she acknowledges it as living, open ended, and 
promising. She carves out in the given situation the room for her agency and through her 
thinking she opens it up to new growth. Because her freedom depends on her capacity to see the 
given as open, and to generate new ways from it, she has a serious playfulness. Serious, because 
much is at stake in her work: matters of life and death. Playful, because the importance of her 
task is respected only when she finds conditions of freedom, by opening room for movement and 
action and finding how to play, reversing points of view through irony and creativity. She is 
seriously playful because, by viewing the present time as ripe with far reaching meanings, non 
concluded, and still open, she accepts responsibility for it. Assumption of responsibility is for the 
teacher an exercise in freedom.  
She is free and is not enslaved, not even under probing conditions.  Her freedom derives 
from the fact that she can make a place for possibility within the educational space. Her way of 
thinking translates into unfettered and unbound judgment. She has formed her judgment by 
polishing her mind, that is by artistically shaping it,  through contact with the minds of others: 
contact that takes place in conversation, in exploration and interpretation.  
Our teacher can read: to her everything is “book enough” as in everything she will trace 
the signs of the human strive towards meaning. She reads with her students and engages in tasks 
of translation and familiarization, followed by problematizing and questioning.  She can read but 
is not bookish, as she knows to preserve her mind’s freedom in the presence of the written 
word’s authority. She thinks that nothing written in a book can supplant the experience of the 




the same way, she understands books and traditions through her experience of the world, 
enacting the double vision championed by Montaigne.  
Our teacher travels light. She has enough provisions to sustain her in her movement, but 
not too many that would encumber her. She has a solid ground that allows her to lean forward 
and leap into the exploration of new things. She has many ideas but does not cram her mind with 
unexamined opinions or weighty displays of erudition. She is not pedantic, instead she has a 
larger mind shaped and furnished in the free roaming movement I name “travel”. 
 In her travels, she knows no straight line, nor safe itinerary, but she allows herself 
unconstrained wandering; for she knows that her destination will come towards her as she keeps 
exploring for things to take home. In the enactment of travel, she is not a tourist, nor is she a 
colonizer. Uncaught between the supposed alternative between indifference and appropriation, 
she jumps out of it and instead aspires at maintaining the grace of a newcomer. She is, and stays, 
a beginner because the more she acquaints herself to her land, the more she finds how much 
more there is to get to know and experience. She is and stays an amateur (Masschelein, 2011, 
p.534) as the further she adventures, the more there is for her to discover with a loving gaze. 
In her travel, she is not armored, because she prefers to get in touch with the experience, 
unshielded and sensitive. She is no scholastic warrior, rather she lives unmasked and truthful to 
the human endeavor. With her dynamic search, she challenges the ideal of a straight, unwavering 
route. She disassembles the relation between the home and the abroad, and reimagines it in many 
new ways.  Our teacher is at home in the habit of paying attention: she discovers novelty in the 
well known and familiarity in the new and foreign.  
She is a philosopher if we accept that traveling is a mode of philosophizing: she 




risk losing her cherished ways, ideas, and judgment. A good traveler calls into question her 
currently accepted views and has an eye for the splendor of unexpected finds. As a traveling 
philosopher, our teacher is also always in touch with the home she left behind, meaning that she 
keeps in mind the place she is from, her tradition, ancestors, language, and discipline. She knows 
that she belongs and does not belong there, because our teacher has decided to leave it and to 
keep finding home in the world.  
 
4. Questions to explore 
The work has explored the dimensions of teachers’ thinking in the classroom as 
philosophical thinking through the figure of the traveler. Intentionally, the study was demarked 
in relation to themes and questions of thinking. References to traits of the experience of life as 
dynamic could not be avoided, nor could an assumption (that was also a joyous appreciation) 
about the constitutive and irreducible diversity in the human experience of the world. Due to this 
initial delimitation, a whole world of other dimensions of teaching were left unexplored, even if 
occasionally touched upon: the social, political, and emotional sides of teaching. While I think it 
was a legitimate decision for the sake of my inquiry, I find that a deeper consideration of some 
elements will contribute to a better use of my guiding metaphor.  
My first focus of perplexity regards the consideration that the teacher, moving in that 
oscillating space of difference we name classroom, has an embodied presence. How do facts of 
corporeality, sensation, emotion, work with the mainly perceptive and epistemological 
description of teachers’ thinking that I have proposed? The image of the traveler letting herself 
exposed to the experience of otherness and newness without armor suggests that these facts 




with the other, which I have somewhat advocated, also calls into play considerations about self 
boundaries, self preservation, courage, and vulnerability. Teaching is such a difficult endeavor 
also because it calls into question the teacher’s whole existence, that is an embodied existence. 
The wear and tear of teaching signals that it is an all embracing, all consuming task. It also 
signals that teaching is in the hands of the other. Teaching is a relational experience. Teaching is 
unpredictable also because it necessarily involves more than one person. This brings me to the 
second theme in need of further research.  
When I concluded the first chapter, I posed a real question I have: in the boat of the child 
solo sailor who circumnavigated the globe, is there a place for a teacher? Why cannot I accept 
that Laura Dekker taught herself quite much during her two-year experience? I started by 
assuming that teachers are irreplaceable and by asking why. During the inquiry, some elements 
have convinced me that teachers are such in that they can inhabit the condition of learners- of 
students, beginners, explorers. If so, then, I find a big problem in understanding when the teacher 
is needed and when, instead, one can be a teacher to herself. I have a doubt, and a hope, that the 
way of thinking I have been describing could well be ascribed to a good student as well. It could 
be that this mode of thinking only comes to be, or takes place, in the interaction teacher/student, 
without being special property of any one. This hypothesis would require a whole new 
imaginative effort, in which I would need to figure some multi-center-ever-dynamic-shifting-
focus-inter-subjective-cross-temporal thinking and learning. I lack a guiding metaphor for this, 
and it promises to be a whole new territory to explore.  
Finally, I can see that my work requests that I articulate and theorize the tacit idea of 
philosophy that has informed the inquiry. I have been guided by an understanding of philosophy 




problematization and clarification in a dialogue with others and with texts from the philosophical 
tradition. This understanding, that I have implicitly adopted in years of study of the discipline 
and of teaching, found its explicit formulation for me in the context of a intense and beautiful 
dialogue with other teachers of philosophy quite recently. I look forward to more philosophizing, 
with the sense that a deeper exploration of “what is philosophy” will make available a more 
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